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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is about influence which is defined as the ability to move ideas 
forward within, and in some cases across, organizations. More specifically it is about an 
extraordinary organization called the Club of Rome (COR), who became advocates of the 
idea of greater use of systems analysis in the development of policy. The systems 
approach to policy required rational, holistic and long-range thinking. It was an approach 
that attracted the attention of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Commonality of 
interests and concerns united the disparate members of the COR and allowed that 
organization to develop an influential presence within Canada during Trudeau’s time in 
office from 1968 to 1984.  
 The story of the COR in Canada is extended beyond the end of the Trudeau era to 
explain how the key elements that had allowed the organization and its Canadian 
Association (CACOR) to develop an influential presence quickly dissipated in the post-
1984 era. The key reasons for decline were time and circumstance as the COR/CACOR 
membership aged, contacts were lost, and there was a political paradigm shift that was 
antithetical to COR/CACOR ideas. The broader circumstances that led to the rise and fall 
of the COR/CACOR’s influential presence in Canada from 1968 to circa 1988 also 
provides a fascinating opportunity to assess political and intellectual tumult and change. 
 Specific organizations where the COR/CACOR’s influential presence was felt 
included: the Ministry of State for Science and Technology, the International 
Development Research Centre, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the 
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The Limits to Influence: Overview and Context 
This dissertation is about an idea called systems analysis that blended with an 
extraordinary organization called the Club of Rome (COR), and the circumstances that 
allowed the organization advocating the idea to have an influential presence in Canada 
during the Prime Ministerial reign of Pierre Elliott Trudeau from 1968 to 1984.  This 
dissertation also concerns intellectual precursors to policy development advocated during 
Trudeau’s time in office. It is about the thinking behind how policy problems ought to 
have been approached from a particular theoretical viewpoint. It is not about the creation 
and implementation of specific policy initiatives during the Trudeau era. 
The rise and decline of the COR and its Canadian Association, (CACOR)’s 
influence occurred during Trudeau’s time in power. This was no coincidence. A 
synergistic relationship was created as the systems approach to policy development 
advocated by the COR/CACOR dovetailed with the Trudeau-era approach to and 
philosophy regarding public policy development. This dissertation, then, is a work of 
intellectual political history that examines how an idea becomes adopted by groups, 
spread via common connections, and adapted to suit differing circumstances.  
Historians are inherently storytellers. But they are bounded by the discipline’s 
requirements to prove a hypothesis based on careful observation of collected factual 
evidence. To draw an outline of events, or to limit an exploration of a topic to parameters 
established by limited models is not sufficient. Political science theories and policy 
analysis methodologies provide important insights and are inherently valuable. Academic 
fields such as political science provide an important lens for historians to view and 
understand the events in their narratives. However, the role of the historian is to identify 
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key actors, to outline key ideas, motivations, and events, and to present the different parts 
of the story within the context of the contemporary times of the events discussed. 
Inherent in historical methodology is a dependence upon the works of others. This 
dissertation is particularly indebted to works from a variety of fields including: history, 
political science, journalism, philosophy, ecology, information technology, engineering 
and popular culture.  As this study is Canadian-based, the secondary literature is 
predominantly Canadian. 
Academics such as John Hodgetts, Donald Savoie, Nicole Morgan, and Jack 
Granatstein helped to explain the development of the public policy process. Hodgetts’ 
exhaustive work on the history of the Canadian civil service from its beginnings to the 
post World War II era told the story of an institution struggling to find and maintain a 
consistent vision and role for itself in the midst of uncertainty, tumult, and expansion of 
governmental activity, especially in, during, and after the Second World War.1  The 
expansion of the federal bureaucracy and its services created numerous administrative 
problems described in the works of Donald Savoie, Nicole Morgan, Bruce Doern, Jack 
Granatstein and others. Problems of increasing numbers of bureaucrats with increasing 
workloads, often with a lack of political direction, led to the perception that by the end of 
the 1960s Canada’s bureaucracy was not working as efficiently as it ought to have been.2   
                                                 
1 J. E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker and V. Seymour Wilson, The Biography of an 
Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada 1908-1967, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1972), pp.16-19, pp.40-41, pp.56-60, pp.82-83, p.115 and pp.137-142. 
J. E. Hodgetts, “Public Power and Ivory Power,” in Trevor Lloyd and Jack McLeod, (editors), Agenda 
1970: Proposals for a Creative Politics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968) pp.256-280. 
J. E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government 1867-1970, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp.22-25. 
2 Nicole Morgan, Implosion: An Analysis of the Growth of the Federal Public Service in Canada (1945- 
1985), (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986). 
Donald J. Savoie, Governing From the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Pres, 1999), p.198. 
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During the 1960s there was general agreement among political actors, pundits and 
possibly the general public, that politics and the policy making process was in need of 
reform. 3  In 1960 the pressure to act on perceived problems led to the creation of 
arguably, one of the most influential Royal Commissions in Canada’s history, the John 
Grant Glassco Commission.  The commission’s findings undermined the old system and 
have influenced how bureaucrats operate ever since. Glassco provided the mantra of “let 
the managers manage” that proved to be the dominant slogan of civil service reform since 
the report’s publication in the early 1960s.4 While bureaucratic reform was important 
among the chattering classes, there also appeared to have remained a longing for a new 
kind of politics to emerge to replace the stodgy style of politics evident in the 1960s with 
rather staid political leaders. 
It was a sense of change that Trudeau was able to excite in people that led to the 
emergence in 1968 of Trudeaumania that swept him and the Liberals to power. However, 
Trudeau was not a political opportunist, nor, especially in his first term to 1972, was he a 
pragmatist who governed by playing close attention to public opinion. A similar sense of 
attracting public opinion, but not being governed by popular opinion also applied to the 
Club of Rome (COR), especially in their early years from 1968 to 1974. There has not 
been as much secondary research on the origins, and early activities of the COR as there 
                                                 
3 Writer Christina McCall-Newman similarly argued that during the Pearson era, a consensus emerged that 
the established bureaucracy had to be placed under tighter political control, become more accountable, 
efficient and was in need of new personnel in order to infuse the civil service with new intellectual ideas. 
Marc Lalonde, “The Changing Role of the Prime Minister’s Office,” Canadian Public Administration, 
(Volume 14 No. 4, Winter 1971), p.511.  
Christina McCall-Newman, “Michael Pitfield and the Politics of Mismanagement,” Saturday Night, 
(October, 1982), p.32. 
4 John G. Glassco, (Chairman), Royal Commission on Government Organization, First Report on Progress, 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1961). 
Allen Thomas Lambert, H. Marcel Caron, John Edwin Hodgetts, and Olive Gerald Stoner, Royal 
Commission on Financial Management and Accountability: Progress Report, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply 
and Services Canada, 1977), p.3. 
Morgan, Implosion,pp.52-55. 
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has been of Trudeau. However, works by Peter Moll and S.W. Verstegen and a biography 
of Aurelio Peccei by Gunthier Pauli provide important contextual information about COR 
its origins and public reactions to the group and the reports it sponsored.5  
It was a unique set of circumstances in the late 1960s that led to the emergence of 
a collective of renowned individuals, known as the Club of Rome, who shared a common 
concern about the future of industrial civilization. The first two chapters provide the 
requisite overview of the events and movements internationally and domestically that led 
to the emergence of the Club of Rome in 1968, the same year Pierre Trudeau was elected 
Prime Minister.  The 1960s was a decade of frustration with the past, and the then 
present. It was also a time in which there was great optimism in the generation’s ability to 
do things differently and to create a better future. That context is necessary in order to 
appreciate how an organization such as the Club of Rome and an intellectual like Pierre 
Trudeau were able to capture, for a time, the public imagination.  
Both ecological and history of science writers present the argument that it was in 
the United States that the modern ecology movement emerged. Authors Barry 
Commoner, Barabra Ward, and Alvin Toffler built upon the populist groundwork laid by 
Harrison Brown and Rachel Carson in moving forward a movement that was deeply 
concerned about humanity’s reciprocal relationship to its environment and about the 
future of life on Spaceship Earth. 6 The broader environmental and ecological concerns 
were given apparently computer-based scientific validity in the first COR-sponsored 
                                                 
5 Peter Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability: Futures Studies and the Environment: the Role of the Club of 
Rome, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1991). 
Gunter A. Pauli, Crusader for the Future: A Portrait of Aurelio Peccei Founder of the Club of Rome, 
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987). 
S.W. Verstegen, “Environmental Consciousness in the Netherlands and the First Report to the Club of 
Rome (1971-1983),” (Unpublished Paper presented at: European Society for Environmental History 
conference, Prague, 2-8 September 2003), p.2. 
6 Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p.146. 
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publication, The Limits to Growth in 1972 out of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. International events the next year created an energy crisis that sent 
shockwaves through the industrialised world. That crisis was a proof of concept for the 
MIT report in terms of the interrelated nature of geo-politics, economics and the 
contingent nature of prosperity for industrialized nations. Chapters three and seven 
explore how The Limits to Growth attracted a great deal of notoriety and public exposure, 
for good and ill, for the report’s sponsor, The Club of Rome (COR). As will be discussed, 
for the COR, Limits proved to be a doubled edged sword. 
In the years before 1972 the COR may not have been on the minds of many 
Canadians, but the group had already succeeded in attracting the attention of Prime 
Minister Trudeau. COR co-founder Alexander King commented that soon after its 
establishment in 1968 Trudeau “stimulated our thinking on the Club’s philosophy and 
methods.” Trudeau’s interest led to the Canadian government sponsoring a COR meeting 
at Montebello in 1971.7 As discussed in chapter three, it was the critical meeting that led 
to The Limits to Growth report becoming a reality.  
As will be discussed further in chapter four, with Trudeau’s backing, in 1974 
Canadians Rennie J. Whitehead, Senator Maurice Lamontagne, Ronald Ritichie, William 
Stadeleman and Robert Fowler, among others, decide to establish a Canadian Association 
for the Club of Rome (CACOR).8 It was the formalization of an organization that had 
been in unofficial operation since the COR itself was founded in 1968. Having the Prime 
Minister’s attention, and that of key cabinet ministers and civil servants such as Alastair 
                                                 
7 Alexander King, “ In a Well-disposed Country,” in Roseann Runte, (editor), The Foundation for 
International Training: Twenty-Five Years Dedicated to International Development, (New York: Legas, 
2001), p.15. 
8 R. H. Clayton, “The Birth of the Association,” CACOR Newsletter, (11 September 1974), pp.1-6. 
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Gillespie, Michael Pitfield, Ivan Head, C. R. Nixon and others played a critical role in 
COR’s and CACOR’s successes discussed in this dissertation. 
 
The Trudeau Era – The Historiographical Absence of Systems Analysis 
However, at the most fundamental level, Trudeau was the critical hinge upon 
which both the COR and CACOR’s fortunes in Canada swung. Consequently it was 
necessary to delve into the vast literature on Trudeau’s time in power. Of greatest 
contextual assistance were the works of Christina McCall (McCall-Newman), Stephen 
Clarkson, Donald Savoie, Joseph Wearing, Bruce Doern, Robert Bothwell, Ian 
Drummond, John English, and Robert Campbell. Their writings are most relevant to a 
study of systems analysis in Canada as the authors provided a rich tapestry of stories, 
opinions, and explanations from which to draw. Works such as Trudeau and Our Times, 
Grits, Governing From the Centre, The L-Shaped Party, Canada Since 1945 and Grand 
Illusions provided invaluable glimpses into the personalities and events that shaped the 
events, opinions and characters in this study. 
Within that secondary literature there is only passing, if any, reference to the Club 
of Rome and systems analysis in Canada during the Trudeau era. In both Grits and 
Trudeau and Our Times explicit and implicit mention is made of Trudeau’s and his aide 
Michael Pitfield’s, interest in systems analysis and how they sought to implement 
systems ideas as a part of the functioning bureaucratic system.9  Christina McCall, in 
Grits, does not delve into her argument that an abiding interest in “cybernetics and other 
                                                 
9 Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall, Trudeau and Our Times Volume I: The Magnificent Obsession, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), pp.116-117, p.136. (Hereafter Clarkson and McCall, Volume 1). 
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technocratic ideas” by Pitfield “fitted in well with Trudeau’s views on ‘functionalism.’”10 
She later commented that cybernetics – the science of communications and control in 
machines, living organisms and societies - connected to effective planning was “an idea 
that was in intellectual vogue in the 1960s.”11  
Similarly in their discussion of the origins of the Department of the Environment 
(DOE) academics Bruce Doern and Thomas Conway make passing reference to 
Trudeau’s three meetings with the COR before the DOE was established. Doern and 
Conway noted that Trudeau’s “environmental instincts” were sharpened through such 
meetings, but they do not go into an in-depth explanation of how or why the COR 
influenced Trudeau’s thinking.12 The how and the why of the transference and morphing 
of ideas to suit differing political purposes are two key questions that are addressed in 
this work. 
Systems analysis and underlying approaches to policy development were not 
central foci for Christina McCall, Stephen Clarkson, Bruce Doern or other writers on 
Trudeau’s time in power.  Consequently issues related to the sources of systems ideas, the 
development and nuances of systems thinking, and the links to external organizations 
also interested in systems analysis were not explored. This dissertation provides a deeper 
explanation of how systems ideas came to be in vogue. It also explains why Trudeau and 
others were drawn to systems analysis, and it examines why bureaucratic support for the 
use of systems analysis as policy tools dissipated by the late 1980s. 
                                                 
10 Christina McCall-Newman, Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party, (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1982), pp.104-105. 
11 McCall-Newman, Grits, p.212. 
-- “Cybernetics,” in Frank Abate (General Project Editor), Reader’s Digest Oxford Complete Word Finder, 
(Pleasantville: The Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., 1996), p.348. 
12 G. Bruce Doern, and Thomas Conway, The Greening of Canada: Federal Institutions  
and Decisions, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp.19-20. 
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This study takes the contextual information provided in the general secondary 
literature mentioned above and detailed in the bibliography as a starting point. From there 
it delves into the critical aspect that differentiated the Trudeau government from both his 
predecessors and successors – the implementation of systems-analysis-based holistic 
long-range thinking as the underlying approach to public policy development. Trudeau’s 
reforms to the cabinet system illustrated this new fundamental approach. His insistence 
that Cabinet ministers develop multiple options to all policy issues, and that each cabinet 
minister be full informed about and involved in the development of all government policy 
reflected a concern that the people who ran the country develop a holistic approach to 
policy development.  
Trudeau believed that the new approach would help to end the older ad hoc 
approach to policy development that he perceived as being the mode of operation in the 
Lester B. Pearson cabinet. He also hoped it would lead to intellectual cross-fertilization 
and policy creativity.  In terms of creativity, Trudeau likely shared a common opinion of 
bureaucratic meetings with COR co-founder Alexander King. As Science Director for the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and as an individual 
who had numerous outside interests, King served on multiple boards and committees. He 
said that too often within bureaucracies there was insufficient attention and time allotted 
at meetings “for the generation of ideas.”13  
Trudeau’s new approach was meant to foster collegiality, to encourage collective 
responsibility, and to encourage creativity.14 Moreover, the Prime Minister sought to 
                                                 
13 King, “ In a Well-disposed Country,” p.17. 
14 Herb Gray, Conversation with Graduate Students Centre for International Governance Innovation, 
January 2005. (Hereafter Gray Interview). 
Allan MacEachen, Conversation with Author, September 2003. (Hereafter MacEachen Interview). 
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ensure that ideas were generated and vetted by his cabinet in a holistic manner with an 
appreciation for the interrelationship of policies and future consequences of policy 
decisions. Chapter three explains how Trudeau’s holistic policy approach melded with 
the emergent field of systems analysis. The chapter also explains the appeal of systems 
analysis to the Club of Rome. Given that Trudeau and the Club of Rome and its Canadian 
Association were drawn to systems analysis, it is not surprising that synergies emerged 
between the COR/CACOR and the government led by Trudeau. The impacts and 
consequences of that relationship are detailed in chapters four and five. 
 
Ivory Tower and Electoral Power 
Trudeau was also imbued with intellectually charged, but largely politically 
impractical, ideas such as the Just Society and participatory democracy that formed part 
of a larger abstract but unified vision. Trudeau and other like-minded individuals 
believed that society could be governed based upon rational consideration of long-term 
interests and the collective good. Problems for thinkers such as Trudeau, Peccei and 
others, emerged when the world of rational political theory clashed with pragmatic 
political reality. The book Canada Since 1945 commented “The Just Society was perhaps 
a dream that could not be fulfilled; the vexations and vanities of man would forever 
prevent fulfilment.(sic)”15  
While the idea of Canada as a Just Society may have never matured beyond 
infancy, Trudeau’s idea of participatory democracy proved to be a stillbirth. Announced 
with great fanfare in 1969 at Harrison Hot Springs in British Columbia, participatory 
                                                                                                                                                 
Allistair Gillespie, Conversation with Author, June 2004. 
15 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power Politics, and 
Provincialism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p.369. 
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democracy was to have been a new grass-roots approach to public policy development. 
Rank and file Liberals were to propose, debate and recommend policy that subsequently 
was to become part of the governing party’s platform.16  As time passed in Trudeau’s first 
mandate, the idealism of greater participatory democracy promised at Harrison fell into 
abeyance as the economic and governance realities of Canadian politics took hold. As 
Trudeau advisor Jim Coutts said: “Though Trudeau talked about “participatory 
democracy,” he had little idea how it would work.” 17 
Liberal insider Joseph Wearing explained the inherent difficulties of the 
participatory model evident at the 1970 convention where nearly 400 resolutions (some 
combinations of which were contradictory) were voted upon. The end result was the 
writing of the “Liberal Charter for the Seventies.” Wearning lamented however, “It had 
all led to nothing. Neither Trudeau, nor any other of the proponents of participation were 
prepared to fight for it.”18 Journalist Christina McCall-Newman said of Trudeau’s 
participatory democracy theory, “Rationally it all made sense. It was a model plan for a 
model party in some idealized democracy…. The trouble was it didn’t work.”19 
The clash of theory and reality is a theme that was evident throughout Trudeau’s 
time in office and it permeates this work as well. Chapters six and seven explore the 
                                                 
16 McCall-Newman, Grits, p.122. 
Pierre, E.  Trudeau, “Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister at the Harrison Liberal Conference 
Harrison Hot Springs, Britsh Columbia, November 21, 1969,” (NAC: MG28 Volume 1165 File “Harrison 
Liberal Conference,”) pp.1-2, p.10. 
Lorna Marsden, “The Party and Parliament: Participatory Democracy in the Trudeau Years,” in Thomas 
S. Axworthy, and Pierre Elliott Trudeau  (editors), Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years,  (Toronto: 
Penguin Books, 1992), p.316. 
Joseph Wearing, The L Shaped Party: The Liberal Party of Canada 1958 –1980, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson Limited, 1981), p.162. 
17 Jim Coutts, “Trudeau in Power: A View from Inside the Prime Minister’s Office,” in Andrew Cohen, and  
J. L. Granatstein (editors),  Trudeau’s Shadow: The Life and Legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, (Toronto: 
Random House of Canada, 1998), p.146. 
18 Wearing, The L-Shaped Party, pp.166-171. 
19 McCall –Newman, Grits, pp.122-123. 
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ramifications of worlds colliding as the rationalist world of ideas was dragged to the 
ground by the empiricist-laden world of electoral politics. Trudeau faced stiff resistance 
to his new policy approaches from within his own cabinet. Experienced cabinet ministers 
from the Lester B. Pearson era, such as Alan MacEachen, Don Jamieson, Mitchel Sharp, 
Eugene Whelan, and Eric Kierans were especially pointed in their criticisms.  For Aurelio 
Peccei, Alexander King, Rennie Whitehead and other COR and CACOR members, the 
seemingly perpetual problems of political leadership became an intractable problem. To 
strive towards a state of equilibrium and to control growth would have required measures 
that would have inflicted short and medium-term difficulties and been politically 
unpopular. Pragmatic political expediency was a Gordian Knot that bound any possible 
solutions to the global problems discussed below and was referred to by the COR as the 
Problematique. That realization on the part of COR members had a profound impact and 
is explored in chapter seven. 
 
Aurelio Peccei and Pierre Trudeau: Kindred Thinkers 
It was the use of various primary source materials that created the novel aspects of 
this narrative.  A close study of archival sources, published political memoirs, 
contemporary media coverage, Hansards and other primary sources helped to present an 
overview of the key personalities involved in, and their perspectives on, policy 
development, systems analysis and the Club of Rome in Canada when the events were 
unfolding. The intellectual minutiae of Canadian public policy during the Trudeau era 
were subsequently provided through interviews with individuals such as Allan 
MacEachen, Rennie Whitehead, and Allistair Gillespie. Those insights were 
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supplemented by conversations held with key players who, unfortunately, are no longer 
with us, Ivan Head and Mitchell Sharp.  
The Club of Rome (COR) side of the story was provided through archival work at 
the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (CACOR) Archives in Guelph and media 
studies. Further details and insights were attained and interviews with key individual 
COR and/or CACOR members. Included in that list are: Rennie Whitehead, Dennis 
Meadows, Jay Forrester, Roy Megarry, Ranjit Kumar, Jane Dougan, and Kenneth 
Hammond. That information was further supplemented with correspondence from key 
individuals such as Alexander King, Marshall Crowe, and William Stadeleman. 
The story that emerges from the conversations, correspondences, and documents 
used for this dissertation is one of the power of like-minded individuals to facilitate the 
spread of ideas and to adopt them to different circumstances. This dissertation is also the 
story of the ultimate limits to the influence that ideas and their advocates can have. One 
of the key stories, within this broader narrative is of the like-mindedness of COR co-
founder Aurelio Peccei and Prime Minister Trudeau. 
Any history of the activities of the Club of Rome (COR) has to include a 
discussion of its co-founder, main financial backer and intellectual driving force - Aurelio 
Peccei. The COR was a child of his imagination and ambition.  It became Peccei’s main 
preoccupation from its founding in 1968 until his untimely death in 1984. The spread of 
the COR and its ideas were integrally linked to Peccei’s efforts and it is not surprising 
that when Peccei died, the organization was thrown into a state of disarray.  
 13
Born in Italy in 1908 to a lower middle-class family, Aurelio Peccei came into the 
world on the verge of a tumultuous set of decades.20 He was a child of ten when the First 
World War finally ended in 1918 and Europe was left in disarray. In his home country, 
that sense of disorder planted the seeds for the emergence of Benito Mussolini and his 
Fascist supporters. Peccei believed he was born at a time when humanity could have been 
making great strides towards “the abolition of poverty and a life of dignity for all [but] … 
egoism and narrow views … [transformed humanity] into a grotesque, unidimensional 
Homo economicus (sic),” and the chance for advancement was squandered.21 He claimed 
that he was raised “as a free thinker…. an intense student,” who in the mid-to-late 1920s 
while the Fascist forces were gaining control of Italy, was engaged in academic studies at 
the University of Turin.  He continued his studies in economics and languages due to a 
doctoral scholarship from France’s prestigious Sorbonne. His studies brought him to 
France and the Soviet Union and in 1930 he finished his dissertation on “Lenin’s New 
Economic Policies”.22 
Peccei’s talents attracted the attention of the Italian car company Fiat, which 
subsequently sent him to head up operations in China where he resided until, in 1937, 
Italy’s alliance with Japan (and potential conflict with China as World War II loomed), 
eventually forced Peccei to be recalled.23 Once back in his native country, Peccei used his 
status as an Italian businessman, “not yet on the lists of the political police,” to organize 
support for the anti-fascist Italian underground group Giustizia e Libertà.  In February 
                                                 
20 Moll, From Scarcity, p.49. 
Aurelio Peccei, The Human Quality, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977), p.1. 
21 Peccei, The Human Quality, p.1. 
22 Peccei emphatically claimed that he was never a Marxist and never followed “any other ideology”. 
Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability, p.50. 
Peccei, The Human Quality, p.3. 
23 Peccei, The Human Quality, p.5. 
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1944, he was routed out by the fascist forces, arrested and sent to jail where he was 
roughly interrogated over the course of several months. 24 
Peccei’s incarceration was a pivotal moment that intensely affected him. He 
became a workaholic with a profound social conscience and a strong belief in humanity’s 
ability for progress in the face of adversity. He said of the experience that it was one of 
“the most enriching periods of my life and I consider myself truly fortunate that it all 
happened… [he became] convinced that lying latent in man is a great force for good, 
which awaits liberation; and that modern society has yet to discover the way of liberating 
it.”25 As discussed in this study, that core set of beliefs was to be expanded and enhanced 
in his post-war career as he became heavily involved traveling the world and in 
developing and managing industrial schemes from Italy to Argentina.26 
It was during an address by Peccei to an Argentinean audience in September 1965 
that the seeds were inadvertently planted that led to the emergence of the Club of Rome. 
The speech expressed Peccei’s concerns about the impact of the emerging “second 
industrial revolution” on developing nations, and on the subsequent stability of the entire 
world. He argued that computerization, automation, advanced communications, and 
informational technologies were transforming the world in ways that exceeded the 
disruptions that accompanied the first industrial revolution that multiplied humanity’s 
physical strength. He further argued that the second industrial revolution multiplied 
human intelligence and thus provided the basis for the establishment of a self-
                                                 
24 Peccei, The Human Quality, pp.6-7. 
25 Peccei, The Human Quality, p.8. 
26 After being released from prison in January 1945, Peccei continued to work for the resistance until the 
end of the war. For his efforts, at the end of the war the Committee of National Liberation appointed him a 
Commissioner for Fiat in charge of reconstructing its heavy industry. The task was made difficult due to 
the loss of approximately 60% of capacity during the war and the need to quietly remove known fascists 
and collaborators from Fiat’s ranks, while ensuring their safety.  
Peccei, The Human Quality, p.8. 
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perpetuating cycle of technological advances.27 Peccei also expressed a deep concern that  
the United States  had the potential to become dominant and to create a unipolar world as 
it was the home of computerization.28 
Peccei’s twin concerns attracted the attention of Soviet scientist Dzhermen M. 
Gvishiani, who contacted his friend, Alexander King, who was the Director General for 
Scientific Affairs of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).  Gvishiani inquired whether a meeting could be arranged with Peccei. While 
King did not know Peccei at the time, the three eventually met in 1967 to discuss the 
condition of the world and its future prospects.29  King and Peccei soon discovered 
themselves to be similar in thought and attitude and endeavoured to invite other leading 
academics, bureaucrats and industrialists for further discussions.30 The story of how the 
additional meetings led to the formalization of the Club of Rome in 1968 is provided in 
more detail in a subsequent chapter.  
The importance of the story to this introduction is the notion of similar-
mindedness that became a key feature of the Club of Rome (COR). It was not that its 
members agreed on matters, but they all shared a common concern for the future of 
humanity and the ecological health of the earth. Peccei once remarked that he was 
                                                 
27 Peccei subsequently explained in a 1967 piece that developing countries were at a distinct disadvantage 
as the second industrial revolution tended to strengthen countries already in a stronger position and it was 
difficult for the developing nations to get the requisite technology for advancement. 
Aurelio Peccei, “The Challenge of the 1970s for the World of Today: A Basis for Discussion,” in Gunter 
Pauli, Crusader, p.105. 
Peccei, The Human Quality, p.57. 
Aurelio Peccei, (General Chairman), International Development 1967 International Technical 
Cooperation: Evaluation and Prospects, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968), p.4. 
28 Peccei, “The Challenge,” p.105 
29 Pentti Malaska, “ A Rebellion Against Ignorance,” in Pentti Malaska and Matti Vapaavouri (editors), The 
Club of Rome, (Turku: Finnish Society for Future Studies, 1984), p.39. 
Peccei, The Human Quality, pp.50-52. 
30 Alexander King, “The Club of Rome: A Case Study of Institutional Innovation,” in Pentti Malaska and 
Matti Vapaavouri, (editors), The Club of Rome, (Turku: Finnish Society for Future Studies, 1984), p.4. 
Peccei, The Human Quality, p.63.  
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motivated by “the conviction one gets travelling far and wide in a world observing the 
growing confusion and complexity of the problems and expectations of our age…” He 
quickly added that he was “not a pessimist.”31 Expanding on his thoughts, Peccei 
subsequently stated that he had 
looked at the world through the eyes of a manager who sees that too many 
grave problems remain unsolved and become more serious every year, 
while others emerge ominously and intertwine with them; and who 
proposes to find out how this continuing degradation of the global 
situation amidst peaks and plateaus of material (though uneven) progress 
can be stopped, things thought out anew, and the whole business of human 
affairs conducted in a more intelligent way.32 
 
Pecei sought and found others with similar convictions. The numerous problems 
facing humanity at the time were collectively referred to as the “World Problematique”, 
or the Problematique for short. It was the single aspect that united COR members behind 
a common “conviction that human well-being depend[ed] on how the world 
Problematique [could] be mastered.”33 Peccei proclaimed that ‘if the Club of Rome [had] 
any merit, [it was] that of having being the first to rebel against the suicidal ignorance of 
the human condition.’34  
Peccei had said that any person wishing to be involved in a project as ambitious 
as the COR’s had to believe that it was ‘not impossible to foster a human revolution 
capable of changing our present course’.35 He further thought that it required motivated 
individuals with “a solid scientific and humanistic background, some experience in the 
                                                 
31 Aurelio Peccei, The Chasm Ahead, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p.1. 
32 Peccei, The Chasm, p.261. 
33 King, “The Club of Rome,” p.6. 
34 Eleonora Barbieri Masini, “The Legacy of Aurelio Peccei Twenty Years after his Passing and the 
Continuing Relevance of his Anticipatory Vision: 2004 Aurelio Peccei Lecture Rome, 23 November 2004" 
http://www.clubofrome.org/archive/publications/AURELIO_PECCEI_-MASINI_LECTURE.pdf, 
(accessed 5 October 2005),  p.7. 
35 Masini, “The Legacy," p.7. 
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art of management, a common-sense soundness of judgement – yes, and even that grain 
of folly necessary to stake one’s reputation on a search for the future.”36 
The Canadian COR members encountered in this study, including Senator 
Maurice Lamontagne, civil servant Rennie Whitehead, academic Ranjit Kumar, and 
former Globe & Mail publisher Roy Megarry shared Peccei’s concerns and were drawn 
to participate in his grand endeavour. As shown in the subsequent chapters, COR 
members also tended to share an apparently paradoxical characteristic of being at some 
point high ranking members of large bureaucracies while simultaneously resenting the 
ponderous nature of bureaucratic decision making. It was a paradox that also applied to 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his Principal Secretary, Michael Pitfield.  Common 
concerns about bureaucracies acted as an intellectual link that was an important part of 
the conditions that enabled the Club of Rome to become an influential presence in 
Canada. Like-mindedness with Trudeau was also critical to Pitfield’s advancement 
through the civil service. Pitfield first joined the civil service in 1959 and joined the 
influential Privy Council Office (PCO) in 1965. However, under Trudeau he catapulted to 
the pinnacle of bureaucratic power when Trudeau appointed him Clerk of the PCO in 
1975; at 38Pitfield became the youngest mandarin to ever reach that position.37 
At the epicentre of the COR/CACOR-Canada relationship were two singular and 
deeply intellectual iconoclasts who were also philosopher kings and idea patrons. Both 
Peccei and Trudeau shared a common concern about the future of humanity and desired 
to challenge established structures. Trudeau’s iconoclastic tendencies were evident 
through his efforts to overturn traditional approaches to policy development, and remove 
                                                 
36 Masini, “The Legacy," p.7.  
Peccei, The Chasm, p.258. 
37 McCall –Newman, Grits, pp.187-189, 395-397. 
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the spectre of sentiment from policy considerations. As Canadian Justice Minister under 
Lester Pearson, he led the movement to remove the state from the bedrooms of the nation 
by legalizing homosexuality. Although a devout Catholic, he also led the way for 
legalized abortions. In addition, during the 1970 October Crisis, he enacted the draconian 
War Measures Act and, when asked how far he would go, uttered his famous phrase “Just 
watch me.”38 Commentators Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall argued that the 
period from 1974 to 1979 witnessed Trudeau reverting to “his philosopher-king 
grandiosities.”39 
In a similar direct fashion Peccei, the academic and multinational industrialist 
sought to challenge both existing political philosophy and already-accepted policy 
frameworks. Through his writings, and through the COR organization he led, he 
challenged accepted notions about the intrinsic necessity and inherently beneficial results 
of economic growth. At one point in his career, Peccei said he felt fortunate that heretics, 
like him, were no longer burned at the stake.40 
Trudeau and Peccei: Idea Patrons and Their Organizations 
 
Trudeau and Peccei were idea patrons in that they successfully attracted others 
with similar socio-political views to themselves and helped to influence the operations of 
the organizations they headed. Trudeau, Peccei and the people who became close 
associates held views regarding the primacy of reason and holistic thinking in policy 
development. They also tended to be cognizant of the dangers inherent in the excesses of 
the operations of the unfettered market-based economics. Thus Trudeau became an idea 
                                                 
38 Catherine Annau (producer), Just Watch Me: Trudeau and the '70's Generation, (Montreal: National 
Film Board of Canada, 1999). 
39 Clarkson and McCall, Volume 1, p.136. 
40 Aurelio Peccei, The Human Quality, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977), pp.84-85. 
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patron for the amorphous notion of the Just Society. Pecci became an idea patron for the 
hopelessly complex notion of the Problematique – the vast collection of interrelated ills 
including: threat of nuclear war, youth protests, environmental deterioration, 
overpopulation, resource shortages and the technology divide between Europe and 
America. 
In this dissertation, Peccei and Trudeau appear akin to characters from Book V of 
Plato’s Republic because both men were philosophers in terms of being “lovers of 
wisdom.”41 Plato’s line “the philosopher, the wisdom-lover, desires wisdom so, not 
merely parts but the whole,” applied to Peccei and Trudeau as they quested for greater 
understanding of the political and ecological world as a unified whole in order to 
implement greater governance. As described in this study it was a desire that led to a 
mutual interest in systems analysis and a mutual desire to see the development of rational 
holistic and long-range policy development. 
Peccei, like Socrates, felt that political leaders had to seek knowledge and wisdom 
in order to enact effective governance. Meanwhile the coming to power of Trudeau 
represented a Platonic ideal where “political power and intellectual wisdom” were 
combined in the leader of the state. Even Trudeau associates such as Allan MacEachan 
and Herb Gray referred to Trudeau as the “Philosopher King,” especially during his first 
term in office from 1968 to 1972.42  Peccei advocated a greater use of holistic long-range 
thinking in policy development but lacked any real political power to implement such 
                                                 
41 Italics in the original quote. 
Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse, “The Republic Summary,” in W.H.D. Rouse, Eric H. 
Warmington and Philip G. Rouse, (translator and editors), Great Dialogues of Plato, (New York: Mentor, 
1984), p.121. 
42 Plato, “The Republic,” in Rouse et al. Great Dialogues, p.273. 
MacEachen  Interview. 
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thinking as the basis upon which policy decision-making was made. As the elected leader 
of a country, Trudeau, had the resources, time and legitimacy to implement substratum 
level changes in the approach taken to policy development.  
Some of the key concrete outcomes of Trudeau’s commitment to greater rational 
holistic long-range thinking for policy development are addressed in this work. For 
example, key changes were made to the decision-making operations of cabinet and the 
Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) was formed. In addition, the 
Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) was ordered by Trudeau and his Privy 
Council Office to take on responsibility for supporting futures research and organizing a 
national conference to facilitate the creation of a futures association in Canada. 
As hinted above, as idea patrons, Trudeau and Peccei had the convictions but 
mainly relied upon others and the organizations they headed to devise ways of making 
the ideas become lasting realities. This led Trudeau to associate with similar-minded 
confidants, such as external affairs advisor Ivan Head, Clerk of the Privy Council 
Michael Pitfield and ministers in his cabinet such as Marc Lalonde and Allastair 
Gillespie.  
 Meanwhile, as mentioned above, Peccei sought like-minded individuals, such as 
British scientist Alexander King, to join him. Ivan Head remarked in February 2005 that 
Peccei and King made a fascinating and effective team. Peccei was “the salesman;” the 
exuberant charismatic ideas-man with a passionate gift to motivate others to his cause. 
Meanwhile as the Science Director for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
 21
Development (OECD), King appeared to be grounded and the one who brought a strong 
“sense of legitimacy” to COR activities.43  
Organizational support also became important to Trudeau and Peccei as a means 
of furthering their ideas. Individuals such as Pitfield and Lalonde worked within the 
organization that Trudeau headed – the Government of Canada – to encourage, suggest, 
cajole, and force changes in the policy-making machinery. Changes were meant to have 
the decision-making process largely conform to Trudeau’s vision – a vision they by-and-
large shared. Chapters four and six delve into efforts to bring a rational approach to 
policy development to the civil service during the Trudeau era.  
 Similarly, Peccei used the COR to attract other renowned intellectuals, Nobel 
Prize winners, and other individuals of influence to his cause. It was from the meeting of 
minds that the COR emerged to challenge the decision makers of the world to treat global 
problems seriously and to adopt a new holistic and long-range view in developing public 
policy. COR members tended to view the organization as a catalyst for change and the 
spreading of ideas.  
 One of the drawbacks to Trudeau and Peccei’s leadership as idea patrons was that 
neither paid attention to thoughts of succession. It seems that the two men were 
sufficiently engrossed in the immediate concerns of furthering interest in their ideas that 
they lacked the commitment to groom others to take their place. Ironically, the future of 
their organizations after their leadership roles ended did not appear on their radar screens. 
The Liberal Party’s fortunes after Trudeau stepped down in 1984 are only given cursory 
attention in this work. The Trudeau story is told here, in part, due to it being related in 
existing secondary literature. Commentators such as Lawrence Martin and Greg Weston 
                                                 
43 Ivan Head, Conversation with Author, February 2005. (Hereafter Head Interview.) 
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provide a more detailed analysis of the aftermath for the Liberal Party of Trudeau’s 
retirement.44 That literature makes it obvious that Trudeau did not spend much, if any, 
time dealing with questions related to the Liberal Party after his sixteen-year reign as 
leader ended. As a result John Turner returned from a long hiatus from politics, only to 
lead the party to a crushing defeat in the subsequent federal election. 
 In lieu of a discussion on Canada’s Liberal Party, this work focuses on the 
consequences of Peccei’s lack of attention to succession.  The consequences for the COR, 
and the CACOR, of Peccei’s unexpected death in March 1984 are related in chapter six. 
It is a story of organizational disarray caused largely by the lack of a groomed successor 
to Peccei. It was an oversight on Peccei’s part that nearly tore his COR asunder. 
Idea Practitioners and the Spread of Influence 
While not grooming successors, Trudeau and Peccei did rely upon others in their 
quest to spread and implement their ideas concerning policy development and world 
affairs. The ones they relied upon became idea practitioners who used their positions of 
influence to spread and implement the core ideas of the heads of their organization. 
Trudeau’s main idea practitioner was Michael Pitfield, who was mentioned above and 
whose story is related in chapters two, four and six. This dissertation also focuses on 
COR idea practitioners such as Maurice Lamontagne, Roy Megarry and Ken Hammond. 
Academics Thomas H. Davenport, Laurence Prusak and H. James Wilson argue that 
provided with the right circumstances and sense of determination, it is possible for 
individuals to use the power of ideas to exert an influence within organizations and 
                                                 
44 Lawrence Martin, Chretien Volume 1: The Will to Win, (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1995), 
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beyond. Idea practitioners tended to be deeply committed to an idea, not necessarily of 
their own creation, and to network and popularize the idea in a variety of situations to 
effect change. The writers add that idea practitioners tended to be active in multiple fields 
and thus able to spread their support of specific ideas to a variety of audiences.45  
Fitting Davenport, Prusak and Wilson’s definition, of idea practitioners as “the 
link between ideas and action” was one-time cabinet minister, Senator, and academic 
Maurice Lamontage.46 Chapter four discusses his efforts to institutionalize futures studies 
in Canada. He first mentioned the idea at the 1960 Thinkers Conference in Kingston and 
brought it to fruition as a cabinet minister in Lester B. Pearson’s government. That effort 
proved to be disappointing, but Lamontagne soldiered on and chapters four and five 
relate how his efforts led directly and indirectly to a number of systems-imbued 
organizations such as MOSST and the Canadian Association of Future Studies. Other key 
Canadian idea practitioners were Roy Megarry and Kenneth Hammond, who used their 
business acumen and connections to spread interest and develop initiatives related to the 
Problematique. 
COR as  a Catalyst Organization 
The idea practitioners discussed in this dissertation were able to use their 
reputations and connections and/or financial resources to facilitate change. COR 
members with strong scientific and engineering backgrounds, such as Alexander King 
and Rennie Whitehead, viewed the instigation of projects as a key part of the COR’s role 
and drew the analogy to chemistry to explain the organization’s purpose. COR members 
                                                 
45 Thomas H. Davenport, Laurence Prusak and H. James Wilson, What’s the Big Idea?: Creating and 
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pp.27-29 and p.66. 
46 Davenport, Prusak and Wilson, What’s the Big Idea?, p.21. 
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described their group as a catalytic organization. In chemistry, a catalyst is defined as “a 
substance that accelerates a chemical reaction without itself undergoing any net 
change.”47  
 This dissertation suggests that the COR was a catalyst organization in two senses 
of the term. Chapters three though five illustrate how the group was a catalyst in terms of 
providing the impetus to further action. As mentioned, the COR lacked funding and 
research capacity, but it used the connections of its members to secure funding for 
various projects. For example, Eduard Pestel arranged for the Volkswagen Foundation to 
fund the study led by Dennis Meadows that resulted in The Limits to Growth. Within 
Canada, Thomas de Fayer convinced his Department of the Environment to cover a 
substantial portion of the costs of the Global 2000: Implications for Canada and the 
Canada 2000 reports. Had it not been for the actions and connections of COR members, 
it does not appear likely that the research projects would have ever transpired. 
 The COR, especially in the years following the release in 1972 of The Limits to 
Growth, became a catalyst in accelerating a debate on growth and the global future before 
the full consequences of projected trends became reality. In chemistry a catalytic agent 
speeds up and assists processes that left alone would have occurred, but over a longer 
time frame, and would have exhibited greater dissonance. Biochemist Geoffrey Zubay’s 
discussion of catalytic enzymes has relevant elements to a discussion of the COR.    
Zubay said “An enzyme, or any catalyst, for that matter, affects only the speed with 
which a reaction approaches equilibrium.”48 The Meadows’ team and COR members 
such as Peccei and King, believed that the world was a closed system that strove for 
                                                 
47 Goeffrey Zubay, Biochemistry Third Edition: Volume I Energy, Cells and Catalysis, (Dubuque: Wm. C. 
Brown Publishers, 1993), p.199, pp.204-205. 
48 Zubay, Biochemistry, p.204. 
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balance and a state of equilibrium. Over population, resource depletion, pollution, 
ecological exhaustion could be sustained for some time, but at some future point the 
earth’s finite reality would cause a crash leading to a new state of equilibrium.49  For 
Zubay and for the COR, the idea of equilibrium was fact and the role of catalytic agents 
was not to alter the basic fact but to affect how the eventual end point was reached.  
 The figure below is adapted from Zubay’s description of the catalytic role played 
by an enzyme in a biochemical reaction. It follows the identical progression pattern, but 
the reference points and axes have been altered to reflect the COR’s goals. The Y-axis 
depicts the amount of disruption in the global system. The X-axis depicts an approximate 
time line for events. While the COR was more concerned with process, years are inserted 
for the sake of clarity and are based upon projections presented in the 1972 publication of 
The Limits to Growth. Using the idea of 100 years, the second point is approximately a 
century after Limits’ initial publication with the variance provided in the report.  
 
Figure 1: Contrasting Roads to Global Equilibrium – 
Adapted from Zubay, Biochemistry, 1993, p.205.  
                                                 
49 Meadows, Limits, p. 
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If humanity continued with established behaviours in a business as usual approach 
(BAU), then the descent to the equilibrium state – circa 2072 – would be sudden and, 
most likely chaotic. In contrast, if the COR approach was taken with early anticipatory 
action, then preparations would being early and the descent to circa 2072 would be far 
less dramatic and, presumably, more controlled. According to the COR, two roads 
diverged for humanity and the COR hoped to convince world leaders to take the more 
problematic, and less likely to be travelled, one. Doing so would make all the difference 
to future generations. 
Alexander King once said that the role of the Club of Rome was to act as a 
straight pin and to jab the sides of the established body politic on occasion “to make it 
jump a bit.”50 King’s comments reflect the desire to convince global leaders of the need 
to guide society into the future and to control the consequences of growth on a finite 
planet. The alternative was to have nature impose consequences of reaching the limits to 
growth on a finite planet.  
 
The COR, NGOs and Policy Influence 
Peccei used COR as a catalyst organization in laying the groundwork and starting 
processes that enabled research projects and organizations to come into being. The 
COR’s job was to initiate and not to maintain or prolong initiatives. Peccei’s informal 
organization was set up in such as way that it could not do anything more, as an 
organization, than be catalytic.  The COR hardly resembled any conventional populist-
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based non-government organization or think tank. The COR lacked any budget; it lacked 
any direct research capacity; and it lacked any location or administrative structures 
beyond Peccei’s personal office and secretaries at Fiat. Furthermore membership was 
capped at a maximum of 100 personally invited members. The light-structure was meant 
to ensure that the COR never became beholden to any outside organization, especially 
governments. Peccei considered autonomy essential above all else.  
Unfortunately time and focus has precluded an in-depth analysis of the role of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this dissertation.51 A comparison study of 
COR and conventional NGO means, ends and effectiveness would make a fascinating 
study; however it will have to form the basis of another research project.  
COR/CACOR shared similarities with NGOs because they were active political 
participants, but Peccei and the COR tended to want to influence how decision-makers 
thought about approaching policy, rather than joining the policy process part way 
through. Broad thinking environmental NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, may 
have desired to imbue a greater sense of environmental awareness in the development of 
policy, but their interest is still fundamentally the environment. In contrast, the COR 
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sought to influence the base upon which policies affecting all policy categories —
environment, economics, science and technology, international development and other 
areas of concern  — were built.  The COR was concerned with the guiding principles 
underlying the policy development framework.  Its ultimate concern was nothing less 
than the future of humanity. The COR’s aims were grandiose, theoretical, non-specific, 
not politically feasible (especially in democracies), and/ or often counterintuitive and 
running against accepted political and economic conventions. What separated the COR 
from more conventional NGOs, in large part, led the organization to fall from influence 
in Canada and beyond after the unexpected death of Aurelio Pecei. That is a story told in 
chapter six. 
The Parallel Destinies 
The destinies of both Trudeau’s government and the Club of Rome show 
remarkable parallels.  They were both products of their times. Trudeau’s time in power 
and the COR’s tenets also provide interesting mirrors to witness how culture and politics 
around them changed, but how they remained steadfast in their opinions. To a large 
extent, by the end of this dissertation both Trudeau and the COR in Canada were 
marginalized. The chronologies of Trudeau and the COR’s history from 1968 to circa 
1984 outlined below illustrate the point. Introducing the sketch are passages from a 
telling set of letters that the Prime Minister sent to a close member of his cabinet.  
Nearing Christmas in 1976, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau wrote to his Minister 
of Energy, Mines and Resources, Alastair Gillespie to express his fervent opinion that: 
One of the most difficult tasks facing us as Members of Parliament is that 
of keeping our eyes, and those of Canadians, on the future. Not the future 
of tomorrow or next year, but the period ten or more years ahead; the 
closing years of this century which will be shaped in considerable measure 
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by the decisions we take now. If we yield to the temptation of 
concentrating on today, we will default our major responsibility to our 
children and to hundreds of millions elsewhere in the world who look to 
Canada with trust and who hope that we will contribute to a stable and just 
world order.… We are in the early phase of a fluid and often-turbulent 
period of world history. We must not lose our nerve, and we must not 
under-estimate the weight and potential effect of Canadian participation 
and contribution. We can shape the changes that face us; we can influence 
the future that awaits us.52 
 
In February 1978, Trudeau wrote to Gillespie again.  In part, the letter stated:  
The world is indeed a finite tightly-bound, whole. Events anywhere on 
earth can-and often do- affect individual Canadians. As parliamentarians, 
our anticipation of those events, and our response to them, is as important 
as anything we do. Should we abandon that responsibility, we forsake the 
opportunity to contribute to a preferred future not only for our own 
constituents but for all mankind.53 
 
The letters express a number of key sentiments that were not only shared between 
the Prime Minister and his Minister, but were also echoed by COR founder Aurelio 
Peccei who wrote:   
everything is connected to everything else: causes, problems and solutions 
are all interlinked in one great continuum. If we want to guide ourselves 
sensibly into the future, we must consider the entire dynamic picture of the 
globality of things, not merely examine some of its aspects in isolation.54  
 
It was this commonality of concern and purpose that would lead the COR and its 
subsequent Canadian Association (CACOR) to have an influential presence within 
Canadian public policy making structures from 1968 until the end of the Trudeau era in 
1984. 
                                                 
52 P. E. Trudeau, “Letter to Alastair Gillespie 22 December 1976,” (NAC: R1526 Alastair Gillespie Papers, 
Volume 306 File 150-1 Prime Minister), p.1, p.5. 
53 P. E. Trudeau, “Letter to Alastair Gillespie 16 February 1978,” (NAC: R1526 Alastair Gillespie Papers, 
Volume 306 File 150-1 Prime Minister), p.1 
54 Aurelio Peccei, Daisku Ikeda, (edited by Richard L. Gage), Before It Is Too Late, (Tokyo: Kodansha 
International Ltd., 1984), p.14. 
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 The above-mentioned letters were also written at a pivotal time during Trudeau’s 
reign as Prime Minister. Trudeau had swept into power in 1968 on a tidal wave of 
populist optimism about their Prime Minister-elect and their country’s future. However, 
when Trudeau wrote to Gillespie, the age of optimism was on the wane. Trudeaumania (a 
term used by the press to capture the Canadian public’s enthusiasm and almost blind 
devotion for Trudeau) was effectively dead by 1972, leaving the Liberals barely clinging 
to power. Through shrewd political manoeuvres the Liberals were able to regain a 
majority in 1974; they would lose power completely in 1979, although for only a brief 
period.  
Meanwhile, the 1973 world Energy Crisis and the rise of the Parti-Québéçois cast 
a sobering pall over Canadians’ optimism regarding the future.  That pall persisted 
throughout the 1970s and led to greater stresses and strains being felt in the early years of 
the 1980s when matters were exacerbated by a prolonged recession.  
 In addition to Canadian domestic politics, the mid-to-late 1970s witnessed a 
political transformation in approaches to public policy development that recoiled against 
the Trudeau Liberals’ approach to public policy development. In lieu of an activist state 
in the Keynesian tradition of governance, a new ideology, commonly referred to as neo-
conservatism, emerged.  It was dedicated to retrenching the state and allowing the 
operations of the free market to be the arbitrator of public policy directions. By the time 
Trudeau left office in 1984, the optimism that the Canadian people had held in 1968 had 
vanished and the country was on the verge of taking A Hard Right Turn as it followed the 
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British and American leads into devoting the country’s future to the whims of the 
operations of the free market system. 55 
Meanwhile, the Club of Rome experienced a parallel progression. It formed in 
1968 with its members having great optimism about humanity’s ability to shape its 
future. In 1972, the group sponsored The Limits to Growth study out of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) that brought them phenomenal international notoriety, but 
ultimately saddled the organization with the dual erroneous tags of being “doomsday 
pessimists” and “zero-growth” advocates.56 Despite ongoing controversy and the 1973 
Energy Crisis, the group continued to have influence in Canada and elsewhere throughout 
the 1970s and early 1980s. However, the neo-conservative movement was gaining 
strength. This devotion to market forces and unfettered economic growth was antithetical 
to the COR. By the time COR’s founder and undisputed intellectual, charismatic and 
financial leader Aurelio Peccei, died in 1984, the group’s optimism of 1968 had largely 
vanished and the association was in danger of being torn asunder. 
 
The End of the Beginning 
Both the popularity of the Club of Rome and the rise of Trudeau were integrally 
linked to the time in which they emerged. Consequently, the first two chapters examine 
the overall cultural and political settings on the international and domestic scenes that 
coloured the age at the start of this dissertation. Having established the broad context, 
chapter three provides an overview of the history of systems analysis and its perceived 
                                                 
55 Jeffrey Brooke, Hard Right Turn: The New Face of Neo-conservatism in Canada, (Toronto : 
HarperCollins, 1999.) 
56 Alexander King, “Club of Rome and Canada Questions,” (Correspondence with Author, 28 January 
2004). 
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policy development potentials to answer why both Trudeau’s policy makers and the COR 
were drawn to the discipline.  
Following an explanation of why synergies emerged, chapter four provides a 
discussion of the influence of COR/ CACOR individuals and systems ideas within the 
horizontal axis of Canada’s central policy institutions both established and novel. This is 
followed in the fifth chapter by a discussion of how the COR members, through 
advocating systems analysis, were able to influence institutional developments outside of 
Canada’s formal public-policy-making structures. Both the chapters illustrate that often 
the COR/ CACOR successfully catalyzed initiatives that had cascading effects leading to 
the further spreading of systems ideas and the establishment of new system-minded 
organizations. 
The last chapter deals with the cultural and political settings that led to a waning 
of influence for COR/CACOR during Trudeau’s twilight years in office. Both the 
external and internal challenges that by 1988 left the COR and the CACOR bereft of 
substantial political influence in Canada and struggling to survive will be discussed.  The 
frustrations discussed in this dissertation reflect a coming-of-age of Canadian and 
international society. It begins at a time of great optimism and a strong belief in both the 
future and the ability to “change the world”. The dissertation ends during a period of 
economic recession and growing political cynicism. 
This dissertation provides a multifaceted snapshot of an interesting transitory 
period in Canadian and global political thought regarding approaches to policy 
development.  The twenty-year period illustrates how ideas, political will, and human 
synergy can change the direction of government. The Limits to Influence also illustrates 
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the dichotomous nature of informally based influences on policy. The Club of Rome and 
its Canadian Association discovered both the opportunities and perils for organizations 
relying predominantly upon personal networks to influence public policy development at 
the national and international levels. The dissertation weaves a narrative that oscillates 
between the international and national stages. It also traces an idea, systems analysis 
based public policy development, from its origins, to its being adopted as salient and 
valuable to individuals and organization, to it forming a critical part of the philosophy of 
policy in the Canadian government and beyond. The narrative commences in the 1960s, 
the decade of love, protest and growing ecological awareness and, above all, change. 
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Chapter 1: The Antecedents to Influence (Part 1)  – The International Stage to 1972 
 In the decade before the publication of The Limits to Growth in 1972, to borrow a 
phrase from astrology, the planets began to align themselves, for the emergence of the 
Club of Rome (COR) and its ambitious agenda.1 This chapter deals with events and 
issues in the international arena before turning attention to the domestic Canadian scene 
in the next chapter. While this dissertation nominally begins in 1968, it is essential to 
examine the period leading up to that year in order to understand the context that led to 
the COR’s formation. It is not likely that COR would have evolved into an influential 
organization had it not been preceded by biologist Rachel Carson and the emergence of 
the modern ecological movement. Nor would the COR have likely gained global 
prominence had it not reflected the hopes and concerns of a generation of individuals. 
The COR reflected broader societal concerns related to the transformative, and often 
negative, impacts of science, as well as reflecting concerns over widespread political 
protests and disillusionment with politics in general, especially among youth. The group 
also reflected a concern that through its technological edge the United States would 
mould geopolitics such that it resided at the apex of power in a unipolar world.   
Rachel Carson and the Interconnected Biological World 
The 1960s was a period of growing ecological awareness that led to a questioning 
of the reciprocal relationships between humanity and the physical environment. The spirit 
of inquiry and concern applied to both scientific practitioners and, increasingly, the 
general public.  Such awareness was in large part due to the efforts of biologist Rachel 
                                                 
1 Donella H Meadows,  Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to 
Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, (Washington: Potomac 
Associates, 1972). 
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Carson who in 1962 published her seminal work Silent Spring. The book laid the populist 
foundations for the emergence of the modern environmental movement. Former 
American Vice President Al Gore commented that Silent Spring offered “undeniable 
proof that the power of an idea can be far more powerful than the power of politicians.” 
He added that without Carson’s book “the environmental movement might have been 
long delayed or never have developed at all.”2  
Silent Spring was able to gain and maintain a substantial audience because it was 
a passionately written and extensively researched book that presented complex scientific 
arguments in a manner that was accessible to both lay and technical readers alike. 
Canadian scientist Mark Winston explains that Silent Spring “was not a complicated 
book.” 3 It presented two basic arguments. First, Carson argued that ultimately chemical 
pesticides had the potential to be dangerous to humans, both present and future 
generations, as well as to insects, fish, birds and other animals. 4 Her second argument 
was that if alternatives were available, they ought to be studied and where possible, 
implemented. She was not against the use of pesticides to control problems, but rather 
against the use of pesticides as a first resort and against the blanket use of pesticides over 
                                                 
2 Environmental academics, such as Robert Paehlke, tend to concur with Gore’s assessment of the 
importance of Silent Spring and present Carson as “the founder of environmentalism.” Other academics 
such as Doug Macdonald and Barry Commoner paid homage to Carson for setting the stage for subsequent 
environmental debates over the following decades and for illustrating the importance of educating and 
mobilizing the public to take action to protect the environment. 
Al Gore, “Introduction,” in Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 
p.xv. 
Robert Paehlke, “Democracy and Environmentalism: Opening a Door to the Administrative State,” in 
Robert Paehlke and Douglas Torgerson, (editors), Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the 
Administrative State, Peterorough: Broadview Press Ltd., 1990), p.39. 
Doug Macdonald, The Politics of Pollution: Why Canadians are Failing Their Environment, (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1991) p.9, p.91. 
Barry Commoner, Closing the Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1971), p.202. 
3 Mark L. Winston, Nature Wars: People vs. Pests, (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1997), p.156.  
4 See in particular Winston, Nature Wars , Chapter 12, “The Human Price”.  
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large areas. For her, the key was the judicial use of scientific knowledge and research in 
developing the most effective means of dealing with problems. 5  
That straightforward message was supported by a vast amount of published 
scientific sources that when presented as a package became a compelling and apocalyptic 
warning; excessive use of pesticides threatened not only the intended victims, but also 
other creatures, including humans.6 In addition to the strategic use of evidence, Silent 
Spring had an urgent tone that was designed to capture the attention of an extensive 
spectrum of public opinion. The book often had a folksy yet urgent tenor that presented 
everyday phenomena as being threatened by the reckless use of pesticides that she 
evocatively referred to as “Elixirs of Death.”7  The most potent elixir was dichloro-
diphenyl-trichloro-ethane, otherwise known as DDT. She used it to illustrate how 
pesticide use can spread into an ecosystem and eventually adversely affect humans both 
directly and otherwise.8 In her descriptions she often used ominous phrases such as “No 
                                                 
5 Chapter 10, “Indiscriminately from the Skies,” discusses the counterproductive nature of “blanket 
spraying” and ends with a discussion Florida’s failed experiments to combat fire ants and how a directed 
approach targeting “individual mounds” was more cost and result effective. Similarly, in Chapter 15 
“Nature Fights Back,” Carson lauded the work of Nova Scotian scientists who addressed an insect problem 
with the use of natural alternatives in conjunction with the “minimum use of insecticides.” Thirdly, the 
conclusion, Chapter 17 “The Other Road” is introduced by the plea that in lieu of a chemical solution, “we 
should look about and see what other course is open to us.” 
Activists Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos present Carson’s moderate arguments in the book as part of its 
populist appeal. Carson’s “warnings were directed not against pesticides as such but against the great 
sloshing wave of some chlorinated hydrocarbons.” 
Carson, Silent Spring, pp.171-172, 260 and 278.  
Babara Ward, and Rene Dubos, Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972), p.107. 
6 Political scientist Charles Rubin gives an extensive discussion of Carson’s use of published scientific 
reports to create an impression that scientific opinion constantly supported her arguments. He argues that 
often the original reports did not consistently support all of Carson’s findings and that she deliberately used 
the sources that presented her argument “in the most effective and affecting way.”  
Carson, Silent Spring, pp.301-355. 
Charles T. Rubin, The Green Crusade: Rethinking the Roots of Environmentalism, (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1994), pp.39-44. 
7 Carson, Silent Spring, p.15. 
8 Carson, Silent Spring, pp.18-27, pp.41-42, pp.108-109, pp.131-135, pp.158-60, pp.177-179 and 192-193. 
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one yet knows what the ultimate consequences may be,” to elicit a concerned response 
from her readers.9 
Carson made it clear that she was discussing real, dangerous facts that permeated 
all of people’s lives and especially affected their long-term health.10 She further implied 
that governments were not adequately protecting citizens from the powerful pesticide 
industry. 11 Carson explained how pollution threatened the basic foundations of human 
survival, especially drinking water, soil, and foliage.12  Carson then began explain how 
the overabundance of pesticides in the environment affected individual lives in other 
ways as well. Attention was also drawn to the impact of pesticide spray programs on farm 
animals, especially cats that were particularly sensitive to poisoning.13 Silent Spring also 
piqued the interest of recreational groups such as bird watchers and sport fishermen. 
Carson warned about the “sudden silencing of the song of birds,” and the “obliteration of 
the color and beauty and interest they lend to our world.”14 Similarly, salmon anglers and 
other fishermen had to be concerned about the “rivers of death” that were being created 
by the spraying of pesticides, especially the chief villain DDT.15 
Of most importance to the subsequent COR activities and the reception given to 
The Limits to Growth was the way Carson illustrated “the bewildering degree of 
                                                 
9 Carson, Silent Spring, p.23. 
10 Carson directly linked pesticide use to numerous heath problems associated with the nervous system, 
genetic abnormalities and with alarming rates of cancer, a disease that took her own life in 1964, two years 
after Silent Spring was published. 
Carson, Silent Spring, ch.12, ch.13 and ch.14. 
PageWise, Inc, Biography of Rachel Carson http://wvwv.essortment.com/carsonrachelwh_pid.htm, 
(accessed 1 October 2003). 
11 Carson, Silent Spring, p.181. 
12 Carson, Silent Spring, ch.4, ch.5 and ch.6. 
13 Carson, Silent Spring, pp.93-94. 
14 Carson, Silent Spring, p.103. 
15 Carson, Silent Spring, ch.9. 
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interdependence of natural systems.”16 The interconnectedness of humanity and the need 
to appreciate the reciprocal relationship between humanity and the physical environment 
were prominent messages within COR supported works. The COR argued that to view 
issues in isolation from the broader environmental, societal and political setting and to 
make decisions without consideration of interrelated consequences over the long-term 
was to court disaster. It was a message that built upon Carson’s initial work and expanded 
the idea of interconnectedness beyond the strictly environmental realm. By the time the 
first report to the COR appeared in 1972,  the scientific idea of an interconnected world 
had been established at the popular level, at least in the environmental field. 
 
The OECD and the Impact of Science and Technology 
At the same time as growing environmental and ecological awareness emerged, 
concerns were being raised within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) about the ultimate long-term impacts of scientific and 
technological advances. In November 1968 in Bellagio, Italy the OCED and the 
Rockefeller Foundation co-sponsored the invitation only   “Working Symposium on 
Long-Range Forecasting and Planning.” Twenty leading academics and businessmen in 
the fields of planning and forecasting attended the conference. Included in the list of 
participants were either existing or future COR members: Dennis Gabor, Erich Jantsch, 
Alexander King, Aurelio Peccei, Jay Forrester and Rene Dubos.17 These men played 
                                                 
16 Ward, and Dubos, Only One Earth, p.108. 
17 Erich Jantsch (editor), Perspectives on Planning: Proceedings of the OECD Working Symposium on 
Long-Range Forecasting and Planning Bellagio, Italy 27th October – 2nd November 1968, (NL: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, c.1969), p.5, pp.11-12. 
Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability, pp.279-291. 
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important roles within COR and some established relations with the Canadian 
government. Their stories will be told as the chapters unfold.    
The purpose of the symposium was to discuss and formulate a ‘platform for the 
new planning.’ While disagreements and intense debate prevented the ultimate goal from 
being accomplished, organizers considered the meeting a success. Substantial progress 
towards clarification of terms and identifying the problems of planning was made. 
Participants – many of them renowned scientists and businessmen - signed onto a 
Bellagio Declaration.18 The declaration was surprising for its cautioning about the perils 
of unbridled economic growth and its rejection of science alone as being able to solve the 
problems of the present and future. The group agreed that economic growth could no 
longer be considered in isolation from the broader social implications. Similarly, 
technological advancement should no longer proceed without consideration of the social 
contexts and consequences. 19  
Contained within the declaration was the idea that science had the ability to 
exacerbate problems. The use of science in planning was stated as having the ability “to 
make situations which [were] inherently bad, more efficiently bad.”20 The declaration 
ended with the statement that the individuals present believed that global trends were a 
major cause of concern and that urgent action was needed “irrespective of political, social 
and economic ideologies.”21 What the Bellagio group was advocating were substratum 
level examinations of issues and problems. Problem identifications made in isolation 
                                                 
18 Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning, p.13. 
19 Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning, p.7. 
20 Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning, p.8. 
21 Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning, p.9. 
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often dealt with only “symptoms rather than attack[ing] the basic cause.”22 The COR 
subsequently accepted as its mission to spread the Bellagio message to the world’s 
leading policy makers. 
 
NASA Images and a Finite World in an Infinite Space 
Carson’s environmental warnings and the concerns emanating from the Bellagio 
Conference were amplified by the growing realisation of how miniscule and isolated 
Earth was when compared with the infinity of space.  Such impressions were created by 
the first images of the earth from space in the 1960s. The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) images depicted “a blue orb in a sea of blackness”.23  It 
graphically illustrated the finite properties of earth within an infinite universe.  Cultural 
historian Douglas Miller argued that the poignant image of “the living Earth taken from 
the dead blackness of space served as a dramatic reminder of the planet’s beauty and 
fragility.”24 Ecologist Garrett Hardin further observed that the space images were of vital 
importance in the process of transforming what had been a largely intellectual knowledge 
of the earth’s place in the universe to being something that people felt. The planet was “A 
very little thing in an immensity of space. Limited; confined. A spaceship. (sic)”25 
Using public interest in space images of Earth, activists Barbara Ward and Rene 
Dubos passionately warned of the ultimate fragility of life on earth and articulated the 
stark realisation that there were no alternatives to life on the planet. Ward’s first book, 
                                                 
22 Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning, p.7. 
23 Douglas T. Miller, On Our Own: Americans in the Sixties, (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1996), 
p.329. 
24 Miller, On Our Own, p.329. 
25 Garrett Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle, (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1972), p.16. 
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Spaceship Earth graphically argued that political tensions and divisions, especially East-
West and North-South, had to be subordinated to greater environmental and cooperative 
concerns in order to preserve “the majestic yet vulnerable reality of a single planet 
carrying a single human species through infinite space.”26 Ward’s subsequent book 
written with Dubos, Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet, 
argued that protecting the earth from “degradation and destruction” was essential to the 
survival of the human species.27   
Overpopulation became a major theme in ecological writings from the 1960s. 
Using the spaceship analogy, there were ever-increasing numbers of passengers that 
needed to be supported. Publications in the late 1960s and early 1970s including Paul 
Ehrlich’s Population Bomb, Garrett Hardin’s article “Tragedy of the Commons,” Lester 
Brown’s books Seeds of Change and In the Human Interest and Barry Commoner’s 
Closing the Circle, collectively painted a dismal picture of a crowded planet struggling to 
both maintain sufficient levels of foodstuffs to feed its ever growing population and to 
secure sufficient natural resources to perpetuate economic growth. They further implied 
that the situation was likely to become increasingly problematic over the subsequent 
decades.28 In 1972 Commoner proclaimed that the ecosphere was “being driven towards 
                                                 
26 Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p.146. 
27 Ward and Dubos wrote: “our single, beautiful and vulnerable Planet Earth...Alone in space, alone in its 
life-supporting systems, powered by inconceivable energies, mediating them to us through the most 
delicate adjustments, wayward, unlikely, unpredictable, but nourishing, enlivening and enriching in the 
largest degree.” 
Ward, and Dubos, Only One Earth, pp.290-299. 
28 Ehrlich argued that in the developing world it was not likely that the ability to produce foodstuffs could 
keep pace with rapidly growing populations in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Ehrlich commented that 
with two billion people not getting sufficiently fed in 1968, it was not likely that in the future ample 
foodstuffs could be secured for the burgeoning populations. Hardin concurred and his 1968 article argued 
that the population problem was largely intractable and noted that a finite planet could only support a finite 
population. Environmentalist Brown added the sombre warning in his 1970 work Seeds of Change that the 
advances in agricultural technology during the Green Revolution would provide only temporary assistance 
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collapse,” that humanity’s increasing numbers and abuse of the plant were coming at a 
cost and that “payment” could not be avoided “only delayed.”29  
Other academics joined the chorus of concerned experts in exploring the 
implications of a rapidly expanding global population. Biologists Ingrid Waldron and 
Robert E. Ricklefs acknowledged the multifaceted implications of population growth. In 
their 1973 book Environment and Population, they commented that in addition to basic 
biological considerations, it was necessary to use supplementary material from such 
diverse fields as “physics, economics, history, sociology and psychology” in order to find 
solutions to the problems associated with population growth. They argued that global 
population increases meant that every thirty-five years the number of people doubled.  In 
a similar fashion to Ehrlich, Hardin, Brown and Commoner, they concluded that the 
burgeoning population rates had to be curbed because if they were not, in about 540 years 
the earth would only be able to provide one square yard of land per individual. 30   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the only real hope for the future of humanity was that the extra time being bought would suffice to 
enable “a breakthrough in contraception comparable to the breakthrough in plant breeding.” 
Brown’s 1974 work In the Human Interest argued that in the 1970s disturbing trends that did not bode 
well for the future of humanity were emerging. Non-renewable energy resources were showing early signs 
of becoming in short supply, food demands were exceeding food production, fish catches were levelling 
off, forest areas were deceasing in size and rising affluence among a small part of the global population was 
placing increased stress on the resources of the planet. . 
Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1969), p.xi, pp.21-28, pp.36-44 
and p.45. 
Garrett Hardin, “Appendix B: The Tragedy of the Commons,” in Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for 
Survival pp.251-252.  The original article was Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 
(Vol. 162, 1968), pp.1243-1248.  
Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970’s, (New York: 
Prager Publishers, 1970), p.5. 
Lester R. Brown, In the Human Interest: A Strategy to Stabilize World Population, (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1974), pp.14-16, p.28. 
29 Commoner, Closing the Circle, pp.6-10 and p.46. 
30 Ingrid Waldron and Robert E. Ricklefs, Environment and Population: Problems and Solutions, (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), p.iii, p.5. 
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Lester B. Pearson, Marshall McLuhan and the Interconnected World 
The photos of Earth from space presented a powerful and stirring image whose 
potential was not lost upon former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson. He claimed 
that the images went beyond influencing people’s attitudes toward the environment; it 
also affected how people came to view their fellow planet-dwellers. Pearson claimed 
there was “a new and growing awareness that we belong to a world community, an 
awareness given a new impetus by our move into outer space.”31 In addition to the visual 
images from space, the intellectual basis for the idea of global oneness emerged in the 
1960s through the efforts of media guru Marshall McLuhan who coined the term “global 
village” early in the decade. By comparing new forms of mass communications to tribal 
drums, he argued that humanity was “retribalizing.” People were living in an age of near 
instant awareness of global affairs – “everybody [got] the message all the time,” through 
media, predominantly television that utilised more sensory organs than the traditional 
print media.32 
One of the consequences of living in the global village was an increasing 
awareness of the plight of people living in lesser-developed nations and the challenges 
they faced. Lesser-developed nations were collectively referred to as the “South” or the 
“Third World” to differentiate them from the developed and more prosperous countries of 
the “North”. Pearson explained that the dividing line between the developed and lesser-
developed nations circa 1970 was $500 per capita and that borderline cases tended to be 
difficult to categorize. He went on to state that most of the countries in Asia, Africa and 
                                                 
31 Lester B. Pearson, The Crisis of Development, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp.32-33. 
32 Marshall McLuhan, “World is a Global Village: Interview by Alan Millar, 18 May 1960,” on 
Explorations: Teenager, CBC Television Archives Online,  http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-69-342-
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Latin America tended to be less developed and that the average per-captia income for 
Asia’s approximate 1.75 billion people was a mere $100. The low-income nations 
comprised about two-thirds of the world’s population spread over 100 nations. 33  
The population pressures discussed above, whose consequences were especially 
acute in the lesser-developed nations, were exacerbating economic problems. In the late-
1960s and early 1970s rapidly rising populations were feared to be threatening the 
environmental, economic and political stability of the countries of the South. Pearson 
argued that by extension the operation of the entire international political and economic 
system was in peril. The former Canadian Prime Minister Pearson cautioned that in the 
Third World population growth rates had to “be controlled so that it [did] not thwart 
social and economic progress.”34 Similarly, social historian E. A. Wrigley commented in 
his 1971 book Population and History, that for many countries in Africa and Asia, 
rapidly rising populations threatened economic advances as it became increasingly 
difficult to raise per capita incomes and to secure requisite levels of capital investment. 
Raising domestic capital was close to impossible in a country with a majority of the 
population in poverty as money had to be spent on basic necessities.35 
After he retired from Canadian politics, Lester B. Pearson played a critical role in 
popularizing the debate and the need for action on the part of the world’s wealthier 
nations. His experience as Chairman of the Commission on International Development 
had resulted in the 1969 Partners in Development Report for the World Bank and a 
subsequent book, The Crisis of Development. Both works highlighted the plight of the 
countries of the south and made an urgent appeal for the wealthy northern countries to 
                                                 
33 Pearson, The Crisis of Development, p.5. 
34 Pearson, The Crisis of Development, p.102. 
35 E. A. Wrigley, Population and History, (New York: World University Library, 1971), pp.208-210. 
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take ameliorative action. Pearson said he approached the issue, not as a qualified expert 
in fields such as economics but as  
a practicing political scientist with some years experience … [and 
as] a citizen deeply concerned about the problem of uneven and 
disjointed world development and the effect on the future of 
mankind if we fail to solve the problem in a way which will 
provide for social justice and economic opportunity for all people, 
and not merely for a rich minority.36 
 
The comprehensive Partners in Development report made numerous 
recommendations aimed at developing “a durable and constructive relationship between 
developing and developed nations in a new and interdependent world community.”37 The 
report emphasised the fact that it was evident that the world had become a “world 
community” and that “moral obligations” combined with “enlightened and constructive 
self-interest” dictated action be taken to improve the plight of less developed and 
developing nations.38 The theme of the implications of global problems and the need for a 
holistic approach to deal with a plethora of problems was evident throughout the report. 
The best-known recommendation from the 1969 report was that developed nations ought 
to establish, as quickly as possible, the threshold of 0.7% of its Gross National Product as 
its level of foreign aid. It was strongly suggested that such levels be reached by 1975 and, 
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“A Riotous Time” in the Global Village and ADELA 
In addition to being a time of growing awareness of ecological and development 
issues, the end of the 1960s and early 1970s was also a time of worldwide unrest. Former 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau described the late 1960s, especially 1968, as being “a 
riotous time”.40 In advanced democracies, communist countries and beyond, people 
protested, riots broke out, and critical questions were being asked about the established 
order. In France, Germany, the United States, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Canada unrest and tensions dominated the political, cultural and social lives of the each 
nation. Historians Mark Kurlansky and Robert Paxton argue that 1968 was a singular 
year that witnessed numerous protest movements united “only in that desire to rebel” and 
in the “sweeping rejection of society.”41 
The tumult accompanying the end of the 1960s, the growing recognition of the 
environmental and economic problems of over-population and development created a 
sense of unease in the co-founder of the Club of Rome, Aurelio Peccei. He was a world 
citizen who, through travel and various business ventures, had extensive experience in 
various parts of the world including the Soviet Union, Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
During the immediate post-WWII era, Peccei embarked on a period of extensive travel 
around the world visiting underdeveloped nations. The experience instilled a deep sense 
of empathy with the people of the poorer nations and a resolve to help improve the 
relative position of the lesser-developed nations in the world.  Peccei commented that his 
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travels enabled him “to deepen [his] first-hand knowledge of what underdevelopment 
really [meant] in the heart of so many regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.”42  
As an executive for the Italian car manufacturer Fiat in the years before the 
Second World War Peccei worked and lived in the Soviet Union and in China. After the 
war he was sent to head up operations in Latin America where he lived and worked in 
Argentina and in 1949 helped to establish Italconsult.43  Peccei was Italconsult’s 
Managing Director until the late 1960s and successfully brought together Italian 
industrial and financial interests to form a large construction corporation that sought to 
specialize in working in developing countries on a non-profit basis.44  
Meanwhile in 1961, amidst Cold War tensions and rivalries over influencing the 
development of the Third World, American Senators Jacob K. Javits and Hubert H. 
Humphrey began to seek international support to “launch a movement or establish a 
mechanisms to revamp private initiative in Latin America.”45 Their search for “apostles” 
for the idea in the international business community led to Fiat Vice-Chairman Giovanni 
Agnelli. In turn, Agnelli suggested they contact Aurelio Peccei about joining the 
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project.46  Peccei accepted the task of being the Executive Director for Europe on the 
condition that his role was limited “to working out the blueprint for the project and to 
finding sufficient financial support to launch it.”47  
 With Peccei’s help, Javits’ and Humphrey’s vision became a reality in January 
1964  when the Atlantic Development Group for Latin America (ADELA) officially 
incorporated as a private partnership between European, American and Japanese firms 
whose efforts were coordinated through the European office of the Organization of 
American States. It initially had 54 corporate shareholders and an initial capital fund of 
$16 million; by 1981 it involved 240 investors and $61 million in capital and facilitated 
approximately $2 billion USD in economic activity in Latin America.48 ADELA was a 
catalyst organization interested in assembling deals to facilitate the start of business 
ventures that were to be owned and operated by local entrepreneurs. ADELA launched 
projects and monitored progress and thereby helped to fill the gap left by mainstream 
foreign investors who were more interested in mega-project style investments. In order to 
prevent projects from becoming embroiled in the self-interest of the foreign investors, 
none of ADELA’s 240 supporting businesses had more than one-percent equity.49 This 
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approach of gathering influential concerned actors behind a common cause was an 
important model for the COR. 50 
 
Peccei’s The Chasm Ahead and the Second Industrial Revolution 
 Extensive business experience in Latin America combined with efforts consulting 
European businesses on ADELA’s behalf and other business ventures profoundly 
affected Peccei. 51  Despite his efforts to use his business acumen and connections to 
facilitate development in the Third World, Peccei became convinced that his initial 
efforts to improve conditions in the developing world were not sufficient. He also came 
to believe that there were two key emerging perilous cultural, economic, technological 
and innovative gaps. The first fissure was between the developed and developing worlds 
– the North-South split. The second fissure was between a staid Europe and an 
aggressively innovative United States. He began to take his concerns public in the mid-
1960s. 
                                                                                                                                                 
report further argued that it was a major contributing factor to the problems experienced by the company in 
the 1980s that led to its eventual liquidation in 1992. 
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In September 1965 at the National Military College in Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Peccei began voicing his concerns about the future. Full of foreboding, the speech 
reflected his long experience of conducting business operations in Europe and in lesser-
developed regions such as Latin America. He began with the statement: “The times in 
which we live are full of trouble and danger.”52 He later expanded on the concerns raised 
in the Argentinian speech in his 1969 book, The Chasm Ahead. Peccei said that book 
condensed his fears and  
hopes about the future – something that no longer belongs to us, but 
primarily and basically to the coming generations… in it I tried to indicate 
what we should do so as not to foreclose their possibility of having as 
wholesome a life as we have been able to enjoy ourselves.53 
 
Taken together, the 1965 speech and The Chasm Ahead depict Peccei’s 
worldview, and his theories related to world politics and the relative fate of nations. 
Peccei perceived a world that was continually fracturing and headed for conflict and 
decay if corrective measures were not taken. The key fractures were not being caused by 
ideological differences between East and West, but rather were being caused as a result 
of “the second industrial revolution” accompanying the emergence of the computing 
technology. It was evident to Peccei that the computer revolution had the potential to 
deepen and widen the quality of life and opportunity chasm between the developed 
northern nations and the southern developing nations.  
Peccei alleged that the North-South divide had been the ultimate result of the first 
industrial revolution of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries that started in Britain and 
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later spread “to a certain number of other countries.”  That revolution led to the 
emergence of a powerful industrialised world and a relatively feeble underdeveloped 
world that struggled to catch up and, in many cases, to survive. The first industrial 
revolution augmented humanity’s “capacity for work” but the countries outside of its 
influence  “remained backwards in every way: in social structure, political system, 
economic standards and, above all, capacity for further progress.”54  Whereas the first 
industrial revolution increased the capacity for physical work, the second industrial 
revolution through electronics increased the capacity of the human mind. He further 
added that technological change had the potential to “generate quite incalculable 
consequences.”55 Peccei argued that while there had been United Nations sponsored 
efforts to ameliorate the problem of a lack of Third World industrial development, little 
progress had been made and the prospects for the future of the South did not look 
promising.56  
Peccei believed the world was on the precipice of a second industrial revolution 
before it had fully come to terms with the impact of the first. However, the chasm to 
which Peccei referred in his book The Chasm Ahead was not between the developed and 
the developing world; his biggest concern was the emerging technological gap across the 
Atlantic between Europe and the United States.57 The emergence of computer technology 
had the potential to cause a catastrophic rift within the developed world and it had the 
potential to lead to the United States becoming the dominant unassailable power in an 
unipolar world.  
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The United States both drove and rode the crest of the new technological 
revolution. Massive American research and development programs associated with the 
military-industrial complex were the engines that drove the second industrial revolution. 
The US government invested heavily in research and development programs that created 
an innovative society that was quickly eclipsing similar programs elsewhere in the world, 
including Europe. Peccei used figures showing the US spending over $20 billion on 
research and development, with the US federal government providing approximately 
70% of that amount. While most of that amount went into military associated projects, 
Peccei maintained that there were significant spin-off implications that benefited the 
broader society. In addition the world’s top research workers and scientists were 
increasingly moving to the United States.58 At the vanguard of the American 
technological assault was the Research and Development Corporation (RAND), which 
had been involved in developing advanced computer systems and systems technology 
since the 1950s. While closely tied to the military and strategic thinking, RAND’s 
systems development and planning projects soon began to penetrate the civilian world.59   
Peccei saw early signs of the consequences of the electronics revolution in 1960s 
America. He feared that he was witnessing a “precursor of new disequilibria in the 
already precarious state of the world.”60 Relying upon the works of European academic 
                                                 
58 Peccei, “The Challenge of the 1970s,” p.112. 
59 The broader implications of RAND-initiated research were evident in Paul Baran’s research into 
establishing a secure form of communications in the event of a nuclear war and/or attack from enemy 
forces. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Baran began to develop a secure information system 
that would operate in the event of a near complete nuclear annihilation and attack by enemy forces. The 
system he developed began to get used by scientists to exchange information and subsequently in the 1980s 
and 1990s evolved into the Internet and World Wide Web. 
Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability, p.57.  
Willis Ware, “Computing” in RAND Corporation, 50th: Project Air Force 1947 to 1996, 
http://www.rand.org/publications/PAFbook.pdf, (accessed 17 December 2003), p.33-35, p.37. 
60 Peccei, “The Challenge of the 1970s,” p.107. 
 53
Louis Armand, a picture was created of self-perpetuating exponential technological 
progress. Peccei argued that the unquestioned leader in the process was the United States 
with other nations either having lesser roles or being relegated to the status of mere 
spectators.61 Peccei further postulated that there were significant “multiplier effects” 
where interconnections and advancements spurred on further technological advancements 
and developments in an innovative cultural milieu.62 
In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union, together with the Eastern Bloc 
countries and Western Europe, lacked the organizational and communication 
infrastructures required to excel in the second industrial revolution. In addition, European 
companies tended to be significantly smaller and therefore unable to capitalize on “higher 
profits, greater availability of internal capital, [easy] access to capital markets, superiority 
in research, opportunity for adopting more advanced development programs, and 
management techniques, and of organizing more efficient trading and servicing networks, 
etc.”63 
Beyond the individual company level, the fragmented political and economic map 
of Europe also caused Peccei concern. He said that a fractured Europe was not able to 
compete on a global level with the United States. The end result was likely to be that “in 
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the near future the United States alone will be found at the crest of the wave of 
extraordinary progress being enacted, and will inevitably rise far beyond all other nations, 
those of Europe included.”64 Before the broader problems of the world could be 
effectively dealt with greater European unity and collective presence in the world was 
“an absolute prerequisite.” Europe was strategically located as a bridge between the 
futuristic United States and the parts of the world that lived “partly in the past.”65 Peccei 
further added that a Euro-North American partnership had the potential to “unleash 
uncommon energy to direct it towards the fundamental objective of extending the area of 
prosperity to other zones.”66 For Peccei, a stronger Europe able to interact with the 
United States on relatively equal footing was an essential first step to dealing with the 
broader North-South problems. 
 
“Aurelio Peccei and Friends”: the Emergence of the Club of Rome 
It was likely Peccei’s concern about the emergence of an American leviathan that 
caught the attention of Soviet scientist Dzhermen M. Gvishiani. After reading Peccei’s 
Buenos Aries speech Gvishiani started a series of events that cumulated with the 
formation of the Club of Rome in 1968. At the time Gvishiani was the Deputy Chairman 
of the State Committee for Science and Technology and he became interested in both 
systems analysis and Western management theories. 67 He wrote extensively on the need 
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for Soviet bureaucrats to study and adapt the successful organizational practices of the 
West. He conceded that while according to Marxist philosophy capitalist theories were 
fundamentally flawed, they often contained pragmatic approaches to effective large-scale 
industrial organization. The keys for the advancement of socialist society were to be 
found in the study of capitalist ideas and then to decipher them with Marxist filters in 
order to distil the useful elements.68 
Gvishiani’s interest in the ideas of the West put him in contact with the Science 
Director of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD), Alexander King. He 
sent King a copy of the article with a request to have a meeting arranged with Peccei.69  
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While King had not previously known of Peccei, a meeting was eventually arranged in 
1966. At the meeting King and Peccei almost immediately realized they “were on the 
same wavelength.”70 The two men both believed in a holistic approach to addressing 
global problems and they shared a deep concern about the future of Europe. King said 
that in comparison to long-range futures thinking in the United States, through groups 
like the RAND Corporation, in Europe “there was very little prospective thinking going 
on.”71  
The Peccei-King partnership formed the critical nucleus that would be expanded 
with other like-minded individuals from the ranks of the international academic, business 
and bureaucratic elites to form a loose collection of individuals in the Club of Rome. The 
individuals were united in their common opinion of the necessity to develop a “clear 
understanding of the working of the global systems and the organic interdependence of 
their parts… [as] in nearly all policy formation and administrative actions such 
interactions [were] largely ignored.”72 However the quest to gather like-minded 
individuals had an inauspicious start.  
In 1968 King and Peccei decided to organize a conference of approximately thirty 
key European intellectuals in Rome to discuss Europe’s relative position in the world 
system and Europe’s role in the future of the world. In preparation another OECD 
consultant, Erich Jantsch, prepared a background essay for discussion; it was called “A 
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Tentative Framework for Initiating System-wide Planning of World Scope.” Peccei, as he 
subsequently did on a regular basis, arranged funding for the conference. The meeting 
was a false start; King described the meeting as “a monumental flop.” He was greatly 
perturbed that a large part of the discussion failed to deal with the large global system 
issues but instead focussed on the differences in the English and French definitions of the 
term “system”.73 Similarly Peccei said that at the end of two days of “peripheral semantic 
or theological debates,” the participants could not “agree among themselves, not even on 
a mere prolegomena.”74 He further added that Europe’s deep political, cultural and 
intellectual fissures were evident.75 
While disappointed in the larger meetings, Pecci and King became convinced of 
the need to forge a broad-based forum to develop, exchange and debate ideas on the state 
of the world and its future. Peccei believed that the initial meeting had at least 
accomplished a common recognition that a growing number of interrelated and under-
studied complex world problems existed.76 Over a meal at Peccei’s apartment in Rome, 
six individuals decided to form a broader discussion group and the Club of Rome was 
born and named in honour of the city in which the meeting took place. The six 
individuals represented a broad-based group of scientific and political interest from 
Europe. In addition to Peccei and King, Hugo Thiemann was Director of the Batelle 
Institute of Geneva; Max Konstamm was a Dutch international relations expert who 
worked with the architect of the European Economic Community, Jean Monet. Also at 
the meeting was French financial expert Jean Saint-Geours and systems theorist Erich 
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Jantsch. While not at the meeting, Hungarian winner of the 1971 Nobel Prize for Physics, 
Dennis Gabor was interested in contributing to the emerging association as well.77   
There remained dissention within the smaller group about the practicality of 
examining “problems on a comprehensive global basis.” 78 There was a split between 
individuals who advocated a comprehensive approach and others who felt that such an 
approach was bound to be excessively vague. Despite criticisms, Peccei and King insisted 
that a holistic approach was essential to dealing with global issues.  They reasoned that 
there were already numerous organizations dealing with specific issues and problems, 
such as urban planning and the environment, but there was a dearth of interest in a 
comprehensive study of the interrelations between problems and their interactions. King 
stated that ultimately his and Peccei’s “position prevailed.” Peccei and King came to 
dominate the overall direction of the COR and once established the organization began to 
“co-opt” other individuals into discussions. 79 
After largely informal initial meetings with key individuals such as Austrian 
Chancellor Josef Klaus, pioneering cyberneticist Hansen Ozberkhan, and professors C. H. 
Waddington and Eduard Pestel, it was decided to enlarge the group “to formulate its 
objectives and procedures” and to begin to act. King claimed inspiration from the 
eighteenth century Lunar Society in Birmingham, England. He credited that 
organisation’s “mix of outstanding scientists and entrepreneurs, its future orientation and 
holistic approach” with starting the first industrial revolution that fundamentally altered 
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the course of history.80  It was hoped that in the twentieth century their informal group of 
renowned experts, well-connected bureaucrats and international businessmen could have 
a similar impact on a global scale. 
Peccei and King deeply believed that none of the existing political institutions had 
the wherewithal and credibility to be a catalyst to start the global debate on the 
interconnected problems facing humanity; a debate that was likely to become highly 
controversial.81 While having great respect for the mandate and activities of the United 
Nations,  Peccei felt that it was too politicised and fractured for the endeavour he had in 
mind. Its voting procedures and its membership made “it the antithesis of efficiency.”82 
Meanwhile any US-led initiative would be cynically viewed in some parts of the world. 
The same applied to any Soviet, Eastern Block or OECD initiative. To be successful what 
was required was a strictly non-partisan organization whose diverse membership would 
make it difficult to portray the group as having sinister ulterior motives for delving into 
global problems and arguing for the need of holistic long-term thinking about the current 
and future states of humanity.83 
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The COR as a Non-governmental Non-organization 
After two years of global consultations COR decided to become incorporated in 
Switzerland in 1970.84 Peccei, King and the other initial members decided to strike a 
balance in membership, to have as geographically and ideologically diverse 
interdisciplinary membership as possible, while maintaining a maximum number of 
members at one hundred.85 There was so little formal structure to the organization that 
Peccei referred to it as a “non-organization” and King as “a mobile grouping of 
individuals.”86 The belief was that a formal organization required a bureaucratic 
structure, financing and ultimately patrons. In contrast, the COR was designed to be a 
non-partisan catalyst organization, light on its feet and able to network to secure funding 
for its initiatives. This meant that there were no elected positions, no paid staff and that 
Peccei became the unquestioned leader and main financial backer of the organization.87  
Peccei and King fervently believed that the organization “had to live on the 
leanest budget, in order not to depend even remotely, on any provider of funds.”88 Peccei 
backed his sentiments with his personal fortunes and used a great deal of his own money 
to support the organization.89  Canadian COR member Rennie Whitehead estimated that 
Peccei contributed upwards of $200,000 US per year on Club of Rome activities.90 Peccei 
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also used his personal secretaries at Fiat, Ann Maria Pignocchi and Elena Battistonu, to 
conduct COR administrative work. 91 He also expected a great deal of personal dedication 
from other COR members. Peccei biographer Gunter Pauli said that it became a tacit 
COR rule “that all members of the Club would contribute their time and work free of 
charge.”92 
The “deliberate absence of budget” for the operation of the COR forced the group 
to network extensively with various organizations and national governments to secure 
funding for meetings and projects.93 The annual general meetings tended to be sponsored 
by groups or governments of countries that would invite the COR to hold meetings, 
provide facilities and often pay travel costs. Various groups sponsoring COR meetings 
included the French business community, the Dutch Royal Family, the Austrian 
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, and the national governments in Canada and Japan.94 Peccei’s 
networking abilities were critical to COR operations and activities. 
Peccei’s ability to motivate others, convince them of the rightness of his cause, 
convince them of the need to use their personal positions of influence to help the COR 
and further the quest for solutions to the problem facing humanity were astounding. 
Former Globe and Mail publisher Roy Megarry said that when Peccei went to meet with 
the Kings and Queens of nations or with Presidents and Prime Ministers, he went there to 
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use them, not in any negative sense but to convince them that their elevated positions 
enabled them to make contributions to their nations and the world that others could not. 
Megarry added that more often than not Peccei was successful in gaining help, be it 
financial, moral or otherwise, from world leaders.95 
Similarly the Chairman of the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome 
(CACOR) Ran Ide said that Peccei “was one of the great human beings of the world. I 
haven’t met anyone with the intelligence, ability, insight, charisma and dedication to 
compare with his. He was completely selfless.”96 Other COR members, such as J. Rennie 
Whitehead, Ranjit Kumar, Dennis Meadows and Ivan Head said that Peccei was known 
for his ability to secure funding for major initiatives and COR meetings through the 
strength of his charisma and intellect.97 
A similar pattern of catalyzing financial support from national governments and 
large corporations prevailed for major COR projects. For example, the first major report 
to the Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, was funded in part by the Volkswagen 
Corporation. Meanwhile the Canadian government provided approximately $20,000 in 
1971 to host the COR annual general meeting at Montebello in Quebec. The ideas that 
evolved into The Limits to Growth were first discussed by systems analysts Dennis 
Meadows and Jay Forrester.98   The Canadian government also provided $25,000 for the 
COR project Beyond the Age of Waste by academics Denis Gabor and Umberto 
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Columbo. In 1980 CACOR members were successful in getting the government to 
sponsor a Canadian version of the Global 2000 Report that had been prepared for 
American President Jimmy Carter by Gerald Barney and Associates.99 Meanwhile the 
Volkswagen Foundation also helped to fund Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second 
Report to the Club of Rome.100 
In addition to the principle of financial independence, the COR insisted it had to 
remain an organisation that was politically non-partisan.  Elected politicians were not 
eligible for membership.101 In practice for Canada this meant that elected officials such as 
Prime Minister Trudeau and his elected aide Marc Lalonde were not able to join the 
organization, but that Maurice Lamontagne, who served in the appointed Canadian 
Senate, could become an active member. 
Individuals recruited to become COR members tended to be personal 
acquaintances of, initially the executive, and subsequently of existing COR members. 
One could not apply for membership in the organization; one had to be invited by a COR 
member who would have presented the idea to the COR for approval.102 At the meeting 
that led to incorporation in 1970, the executive had changed when a member of the 
German Volkswagen Foundation, Eduard Pestel, and an economist, who subsequently 
became the Japanese Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, replaced Max Konstamm and Jean 
Saint- Geours.  The membership illustrated the importance to the group of common links. 
King was the Secretary of the OECD Committee on Science and Technology Policy, 
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Okita was the Chairman, and executive member Hugo Thiemann was also a member as 
was Canadian COR member J. Rennie Whitehead. Furthermore Whitehead and Pestel 
were both members of the NATO Science Committee.103  The end result was an 
organization with an amorphous “cross-section of progressive mankind… prominent 
scholars, scientists, civil servants, educators and managers from more than thirty 
countries.”104 
 
The Predicament of Mankind and the COR’s Rationalist Crusade 
Having established the basic parameters of membership and operations, attention 
shifted to formalising the central focus of the organization. Peccei once commented that 
his experience as an industrial manager made him acutely aware of the need for clear 
enunciations of problems in order to ensure effective solutions and the analogous idea 
that if “we have the terms clear in our minds, it is relatively easy to take the right 
decisions.”105 It was this rationalist view that came to permeate the Club of Rome’s 
approach to global problems and the search for solutions. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, it was also an analogous approach to the one advocated by Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau during his first years in office. 
The first step in developing solutions to perceived problems was to explore which 
elements were contained within what Peccei referred to as “the predicament of mankind 
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(sic).”106 Peccei described the predicament as “an all-pervasive, epoch-making crisis that 
penetrates all aspects of human life.”107 He further felt that it emerged from the dual 
nature of humanity’s technological capabilities and scientific advancements. While there 
had been substantial improvements in the human condition and quality of life, advances 
had also created a “Pandora’s Box” with the potential to cause widespread havoc and 
misery. 108   
The most succinct definition of the term was provided in the 1973 submission to 
the United States Congress by COR member and US Senator Clairborne Pell in his 
address “The Club of Rome – the New Threshold.” In that address the Senator stated: 
“What we term the Predicament of Mankind is our own limited perception of many 
individual symptoms of a profound illness of society for which we are unable to prescribe 
an effective remedy in the absence of reliable diagnosis.”109  However, COR members 
felt that Pell’s “individual symptoms” could not be solved in a singular fashion as both 
causes and cures transcended the specific problems themselves. 
Subsequently the practical ramifications of the deeper philosophical problem of  
“the predicament of mankind (sic)” emerged in the form of the “world Problematique”, or 
in COR parlance, simply the Problematique. 110 Peccei defined the Problematique as 
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being “a dreadful mixture of problems, whose roots and ramifications we have not 
managed to grasp, and from which humanity cannot escape.” 111 He elaborated: 
These are problems of all kinds – uncontrolled population growth, gaps 
and divisions between peoples, social injustice, hunger and malnutrition, 
poverty, unemployment, obsession with material growth, inflation, 
economic crises, energy crises, crises in democracy, monetary instability, 
protectionism, illiteracy, anachronistic education, the revolt of youth, 
alienation, the gigantic size and decay of cities, delinquency, neglect of 
rural districts, drug use, the arms race, civil violence, abuse of human 
rights, scorn of the law, nuclear madness, institutional sclerosis, political 
corruption, bureaucratization, militarization, destruction of natural 
systems, degradation of the environment, decline in moral standards, loss 
of faith, a sense of uncertainty, etc.” Each of these problems follows its 
own dynamic of change, and they all interact continuously with one 
another.112 
 
Alexander King’s explanation of the Problematique contained the same ideas but 
was presented graphically. At nodule points around a spherical figure with the word 
“Humankind” at the centre King had listed in a clockwise direction following terms:  
Global Economic Growth (Services, Agriculture, Industry); New Technologies; 
Governance and the Capacity to Govern; Mass Media; Global Food Security; Water 
Availability; Environment; Energy; Population Growth (Migrations, Housing, Health, 
Employment); Learning System; Values/ Religions; and finally Materials.113  Using the 
analogy of a pathogenic disease, King said that the various difficulties identified in the 
Problematique were “intimately interrelated,” and that finding solutions to discrete 
problems was becoming increasing difficult. He claimed an incremental itemized 
approach was akin to “an attempt to remove symptoms of a disease which has not been 
fully diagnosed with the consequence that interactions within the system may lead to 
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further difficulties in other parts which are not obviously recognised as being due to the 
initial remedial action.”114 
Peccei, King and other COR members were not under any illusions over the 
magnitude of the effort needed to deal with global problems. The modernization of Africa 
and parts of Asia, for example was “the greatest enterprise ever faced by mankind” and it 
required “preparations…as never been seen before.”115 Nonetheless initial steps had to be 
taken if there was ever to be any progress. The COR’s approach to the Problematique 
was, as was Pierre Trudeau’s approach to policy development, highly intellectual, 
rational and technocratic.  
There was essentially a four step program of action implied in the COR’s 
ambitious agenda. First, it was essential to identify the various interrelated problems 
facing the world. The second step was to launch an extensive and comprehensive study 
into the causes and interactions between the identified problems. The third step entailed 
developing tools and practical steps to ameliorate global problems. Step four entailed 
convincing global political leaders to summon the political will and courage to implement 
required measures to effectively deal with the “world Problematique.” The final step was 
the most difficult as it relied heavily upon convincing the world’s politicians of the 
necessity of enacting potentially unpopular legislative measures to effectively deal with 
the interrelated issues within the Problematique. The rub lay in the fact that politicians 
were dependent upon their electorate for their positions.  
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Conclusion 
As described in Senator Pell’s address, the COR was to be a catalyst for research 
in “virtually a new and unexplored field.” The organization wanted to “encourage the 
development of methods to elucidate and delineate the elements and interactions within 
the Problematique, to understand better the workings of the world as a finite system and 
to suggest alternative options for meeting critical needs.”116 It was necessary to first 
identify problems, then to conduct extensive research into the problems to discover the 
interrelations and symbiotic relationships in the causes and possible solutions to the 
problems. From such research, it was believed, would emerge tools, strategies and 
alternatives to help ameliorate the “world Problematique.” 
Senator Pell went on to state that the COR wished  
To provoke a dialogue with political decision-makers, industrialists, 
academics and many groups in many places, to arouse appreciation of the 
nature of the crisis and the need to consider new policies, attitudes and 
courses of action to ensure the continuity of mankind and to cultivate a 
new humanism conducive to world peace, social justice and individual 
self-fulfilment.117  
 
The COR hoped to be able to leverage the reputations and contacts of its 
renowned members to influence how decision makers approached questions 
related to policy development. Having relatively easy access to top policy makers 
may have gained preferential audiences at high bureaucratic and political levels, 
but, as will be discussed later in the dissertation, it did not guarantee success. As 
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will be illustrated, Club of Rome members ultimately came to realize that there 
were significant limits to influence. 
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Chapter 2: The Antecedents to Influence (Part 2)  – The Canadian Setting to 1972 
 
As Canadian historians Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein said of the 1960s: 
“The very word conveyed a sense of change.”1 The text of their book, Our Century, 
showed that Canada was not immune to the growing awareness of issues and the tumult 
occurring on the international scene in the 1960s. 2  The decade also witnessed a growing 
sense of unease and desire for change within Canada’s federal bureaucracy. The need for 
change was identified as early as Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s government in the 
late 1950s; under his successor, John Diefenbaker, the modernization process became a 
full-fledged force due to the Royal Commission on Government Organization headed by 
John Grant Glassco. A Conservative, Glassco’s final report influenced the subsequent 
development of the federal civil service for at least the rest of the century. By the time the 
report was completed in 1964, it was left to Prime Minister Lester Pearson, a Liberal, to 
begin to translate the Glassco recommendations into concrete actions. Pearson initiated 
some changes in civil service operations, but the 1968 election of Pierre Trudeau as the 
new leader of the Liberal Party ushered in an era of radical change. In that same year 
Trudeau won a majority government and his first term in office became marked by the 
flourishing of new ideas that transformed the way Canada’s public policy making process 
operated.  
This chapter begins with an examination of the evolution of the perceived need 
for bureaucratic reform up to the 1968 Canadian federal election. Then a closer look is 
taken at Trudeau’s attitudes towards governance and his belief in the possibility of using 
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“functional politics” with its affinity for holistic concepts to create a rational public 
policy making process. It is within the framework of using reason and a holistic approach 
to policy development that the attitudes of the Club of Rome (COR) dovetailed with 
Trudeau’s agenda to “tackle collectively the problems that we cannot solve 
individually.”3 
The chapter will then examine some early reforms enacted by the Trudeau 
government reflecting the holistic approach to policy development. As will be discussed 
in this chapter, Pierre Trudeau in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s satisfied both the 
populist desire for change and addressed the need to modernize Canada’s public policy 
making procedures and institutions. The new approaches to policy development 
advocated by Trudeau fit in with the Club of Rome’s advocacy of a holistic long-term 
approach to policy development. 
Creating a Modern Bureaucracy Part 1: Diefenbaker and Glassco 
From the time of the formation of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in 1908 to 
the decade following the Second World War, the federal bureaucracy was limited in size 
and predominantly operated informally.4 While there was a major expansion in the 
operation of the civil service in the 1930s and during World War II, information transfer, 
planning and coordination among civil servants representing different departments 
continued to operate informally. Historians, political scientists and journalists such as 
Jack Granatstein, J. E. Hodgetts, Robert Bothwell, Reginald Whitaker, Peter C. Newman, 
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Christina McCall and others present an image of the senior civil servants, or mandarins, 
up to the election of John Diefenbaker in 1957 as a relatively homogeneous group who 
shared common intellectual backgrounds, common interests and who, often with their 
families, spent extended time in each other’s company. It was through this informal 
process that key strategies were plotted and public policy decisions taken.5 
The informal system became increasingly hard to maintain due to rapid expansion 
in federal activities initially during the Great Depression and subsequently during the 
Second World War. From 1930 into the 1950s, the Canadian federal government became 
a progressive activist state and, according to public administration expert J. E. Hodgetts, 
witnessed “the unremitting extension of the long arm of Caesar into the lives and homes 
of every citizen.”6 Expansion brought increasing numbers of bureaucrats and pressures to 
adapt traditional structures to new realities.  
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The departure of competent managers who returned to the private sector when the 
war was won was a further complicating factor in the operation of an effective civil 
service in the post-1945 era. There was also a shortage of capable and trained experts to 
help with the reconstruction projects and an expanded welfare state.7 Matters were made 
worse by increased competition with the private sector in attracting highly qualified 
individuals with the requisite skills.8 Historian Jack Granatstein further argued that the 
rapid expansion of civil service numbers, combined with the deaths of key mandarins, 
brought the great age of the “Ottawa Men” to a close by the late 1950s.9  
In 1957, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent appointed Arnold D. P. Heeney to head 
the CSC to inject “new blood into the organization.”10 Heeney had proven to be a capable 
and enthusiastic administrator during his years as the Clerk of the Privy Council during 
World War II when his reforms helped the government to run the domestic war effort 
effectively.11 St. Laurent hoped that he would have a similar innovative effect on the 
operation of the CSC.  However, in June of 1957, an unexpected shock compromised 
Heeney’s ability to enact substantive changes; the Liberals, Canada’s “government 
party,”12 lost power to the Progressive Conservatives under John G. Diefenbaker.   
After 1957 the civil service, had to contend with a Prime Minister who tended to 
cast a suspicious and jaundiced eye towards his bureaucracy.  In contrast to his 
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predecessor, Diefenbaker did not have complete control over, and support of, the 
bureaucracy. Historians Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English stated that 
while there may have been more polished and impressive parliamentarians of the day, 
Prime Minister St. Laurent “was master of his cabinet, and of the civil servants who 
appeared before it.”13  The civil service and government appeared to thrive amidst an 
atmosphere of mutual support and effective governance. Following the 1957 election the 
civil service had to adjust to performing their jobs under the gaze of a suspicious prime 
minister.14  
Diefenbaker’s concerns with the civil service led in 1962 to the appointment of 
the Glassco Commission. It was headed by a private sector chartered accountant and 
supported by a team of non-public sector advisors. The Commission was “concerned with 
the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ of government.”15 Political scientist Nicole Morgan 
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dismissal by the government and a subsequent investigation in which Coyne was exonerated.  
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supporter. Long-time Liberal Cabinet Minister Mitchell Sharp mused that Diefenbaker’s government may 
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commented that the shutting out of the “old mandarins” from the Glassco Commission 
was calculated and implied that the government felt they did “not have anything 
worthwhile to contribute to a new administrative philosophy oriented towards the 
future.”16  
  The Glassco Commission produced a report that laid the foundations for 
fundamental changes in the operation of the decision making process within the federal 
bureaucracy. As Nicole Morgan later stated, the report became “the bible of those who 
put in motion the great administrative reforms of that decade.”17 The Commission was a 
clarion call to “Revolutionary” changes for the operating of the Civil Service.18 The final 
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report’s underlying advocacy of adopting more private business practices in the 
operations of the public service and the idea of “letting the managers manage” became 
mantras in subsequent civil service reforms.19  
Glassco argued that the civil service ought to be conducted in a more business-
like manner and that able public managers had to be given the latitude to effectively 
manage their departments.  The Commission’s final reports made a distinction between 
the political skills of ministers and the required administrative skills of senior bureaucrats 
who needed the freedom and ability to properly execute their duties. While permanent 
officials were key advisors and needed general guidance, they bore “full personal 
responsibility” for day-to-day operations within a department. The final reportstated that 
the power of departmental administrators had to be expanded “to enable department 
heads to do the job for which they [were] accountable [and] to permit a proper delegation 
and responsibility within departments.”20   
The Glassco report was both a beginning and an end. It was an initiator of change 
and was a largely successful attempt to bring private business concepts into the public 
bureaucracy. The report was also the official death knell of an older tradition of 
conducting public affairs described by historian Jack Granatstein in The Ottawa Men. 
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The old informal modes of operation were not sustainable in a vastly expanded public 
bureaucracy.21 
Matters of effective departmental administration had become critical in an age 
that was witnessing the birth, development and expansion of the social safety net. The 
1962 report commented that the traditional means of conducting policy development in 
the relatively small civil service was no longer feasible due to the expansion of the 
bureaucracy in the previous two decades and the ever-increasing complexity of public 
administration issues.22  The ideas associated with the Glassco Commission, especially 
the theme of letting the managers manage have enjoyed substantial longevity.23 Political 
scientist Donald Savoie commented that governments since the Glassco Commission had 
attempted to find ways of ensuring that the managers were allowed to manage.24 The 
Glassco Commission ushered in a cult of the new in Ottawa’s bureaucratic circles, a cult 
that began to have an impact during the government of Lester B. Pearson and persisted 
into the Trudeau era and beyond. 
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Creating a Modern Bureaucracy Part 2: Pearsonian Tinkering 
The task of creating and maintaining a collegial and unified civil service operating 
system became increasingly problematic during the Pearson era from 1963 to 1968 due to 
the vast expansion of governmental activities.  The book Canada Since 1945 stated that 
in comparison to the Pearson and Trudeau governments, the Louis St. Laurent 
government was minimalist in terms of the role of the federal government in the national 
economy.25 Historian John English argued that Pearson’s political philosophy and will 
moved the Liberal Party to the left, “far away from St. Laurent Liberalism.”26  Pearson 
advisor Tom Kent added that the defeat of the Liberal Party in 1957 was beneficial and 
created the circumstances in which the Liberal Party had to seek renewal. The extended 
time in office under Mackenzie King and then Louis St. Laurent had made the Liberals 
into “the complacent, autocratic establishment party, out of touch with the increasingly 
confident social values of a new Canada.” The defeat led to the departure of an old guard 
that created a vacuum and allowed “a new generation of activists to take it over.”27 
A critical step in that process occurred at the Thinkers Conference at Queen’s 
University in Kingston, in September 1960. Pearson had wanted to create a sense of 
renewal within the Liberal Party and reinvigorate it with new ideas. While he claimed to 
look to the grass roots, Pearson opted to look outside the party for inspiration and ideas. 
The individuals asked to speak were chosen based upon reputation and perspectives, not 
political affiliation.28  
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In part as a result from the 1960 conference and the existing ideas from the 
Glassco Commission, the Pearson-led minority Liberal government came to power in 
April 1963 imbued with a strong sense of purpose and reformist zeal.29 The Glassco 
Report had supporters within the Pearson government such as Mitchell Sharp and the 
new government began to implement some of the ideas emanating from the Glassco 
report.30 For example, in 1963, the position President of the Treasury Board was created 
and made into law three years later. The position took on responsibility for coordinating 
managerial matters that had traditionally been within the Department of Finance.31 The 
Board was now to act as a strong central agency to help guide public policy and 
administrative matters. The subsequent Royal Commission on Financial Management and 
Accountability, the Lambert Commission, commented that the Treasury Board’s purpose 
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was to develop “government-wide approaches” for management issues and for ensuring 
that common procedures were being followed.32 The Treasury Board was “viewed 
essentially as the cabinet’s management arm” and set the tone and direction for the 
operations of the broader bureaucracy.33  The Treasury Board was to act as a liaison 
between the Cabinet and bureaucracy with a direct representative in the powerful Privy 
Council Office.34 
Glassco’s themes concerning the need for greater coordination, planning and 
program development spread throughout federal departments during the Pearson era. 
Committees abounded as reforms to the Treasury Board led to reforms in the operations 
of government departments. The idea of program planning and multi-year budgeting 
through the Programming Planning Budgeting System began to emerge during the 
Pearson government. Under the auspices of the Treasury Board Secretariat, this system 
was a substantial shift from the traditional item-based expenditure assessments. Now 
departments had to account for a broader view and to provide extended forecasting. The 
changes required a longer time frame, up to five years ahead, in terms of program 
budgeting. Before this system, short-term pressures tended to dominate the budget 
making process.35 In addition, the Pearson government was active in establishing external 
agencies with a focus on policy matters. The creation of the Economic Council of Canada 
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(ECC) in 1963 and the Science Council of Canada (SCC) were evidence of supra-
departmental agencies being established to develop planning strategies.36  
Pearson’s government began the quest for greater administrative and managerial 
efficiency; however, it took until the end of the decade for the “revolutionary” changes to 
the civil service system to materialize. It is perhaps no surprise that career civil servant 
Lester B. Pearson was hesitant to bring in radical change to the operation of a 
bureaucracy in which he had thrived for years.  Trudeau however was not sentimentally 
bound by any such ties and proceeded to enact substantive bureaucratic changes. 
 
Creating a Modern Bureaucracy Part 3: Trudeau - the Functionalist in Power 
The Pearson government from 1963-1968 began to implement reforms in 
machinery of government that by the end of the decade enabled Prime Minister Trudeau 
to begin a substantial overhaul of the bureaucratic system. The Pearson era reforms 
witnessed the beginning of the Treasury Board as a centralized horizontal institution to 
which other main/ vertical departments and bureaucracies reported. Political scientist J.E. 
Hodgetts commented that when Treasury Board was severed from the Department of 
Finance, and established as a major coordinating force, the move reflected the necessity 
to have a “central focus and leadership” for managerial decisions within the public 
service.37 While a promising initial step, Trudeau felt it was not sufficient to create an 
effective policy-making process. 
Despite the reforms that Diefenbaker and then Pearson promoted, Pearson’s 
Minister of Justice and successor, Pierre Trudeau, was “struck by the amateurism that 
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reigned in the upper echelons of the federal government.”38  Especially disconcerting 
were the lack of coordinated agendas, the quality of Cabinet meetings and their ultimate 
effectiveness.  Pearson and his close advisors tended to have their minds decided before 
Cabinet meetings were held and other members of Cabinet had relatively little influence 
on the final decisions.39  Trudeau was not alone in his opinions.  In the early 1960s he, 
along with Marc Lalonde, was part of The Committee for Political Realism. The 
Committee’s “Canadian Manifesto” was a blistering attack on the state of politics and 
decision-making in Canada at the time. In a document translated by federal bureaucrat 
Michael Pitfield,40 the Committee argued that federal decision-making was characterized 
by “haphazard political expediency” and there appeared to be “great difficulty and little 
success… in coordinating their own activities.”41   
Trudeau advisor Marc Lalonde commented, “Most parliamentarians, the prime 
minister included, and most students of parliamentary government, agree that 
parliamentary reform was long overdue by the mid-sixties.”42 It was the quest for a 
reformed system that drove The Committee for Political Realism who sought solutions to 
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the perceived difficulties of leadership and public policy development in Canada in the 
John G. Diefenbaker and Lester B. Pearson era.  Trudeau, Lalonde and the other 
members of the Committee invited Canadians to join them in building a better country 
founded on rational democratic principles.43  Journalist Peter C. Newman has argued that 
during the 1968 Liberal Leadership campaign it became obvious that people who 
supported Trudeau “would also be subscribing to a managerial revolution in Canadian 
politics.”44 
After gaining power in 1968, Trudeau and his advisors, especially Pitfield, “set 
about overhauling a bureaucracy they considered old-fashioned and inefficient.”45 The 
new managerial approach was to be steeped in the profoundly rationalist approach of 
functional politics.46  As discussed below, it was a highly intellectual approach to 
decision-making that, as far as possible, was theoretically devoid of subjective 
considerations. The arch-rationalist Trudeau who had become known for his reason over 
passion approach to politics was drawn to the functional approach as it offered an 
approach to policy development that was calculating and devoid of subjective instincts 
and whims.  
Trudeau once wrote that governance was unavoidable, but that it was necessary 
“to mitigate as far as possible the damage done by the madness of our rulers”.47 It was a 
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sentiment shared by the other members of the Committee for Political Realism mentioned 
above. In their 1964 manifesto the Committee remarked that “Emotional cries often 
drown out the voice of reason,” and that political leaders, in lieu of rational ideas and 
proposals, campaigned on “propaganda loaded with emotional slogans.”48 It is therefore 
not surprising to find Committee members drawn to the idea of functional politics as it 
offered the hope that it was possible to develop public policy based strictly upon public 
policy makers being “coolly intelligent”.49 
The idea of functional policymaking emerged from the rational school of thought. 
Political scientists Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh explained that rationalists believed 
that once a problem area/ issue was properly identified, it was necessary to first develop a 
list of possible policy solutions. Then all possible and probable consequences had to be 
explored and contrasted. The final policy option chosen would reflect both the most 
efficient and cost-effective approach. While the basic rationalist approach developed 
from the later years of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth 
century, by mid-twentieth century the supplemental idea evolved that to be effective the 
rationalist model also had to be comprehensive.50  
It is the rational-comprehensive approach to policy development that this 
dissertation refers to as “functional” and which held a great deal of attraction for 
Trudeau. However, it was evident by the mid-to-late 1950s, long before Trudeau was 
drawn to Ottawa that the possibility of establishing a functional approach to policy 
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development was inherently problematic.  Functional critics, such as Herbert Simon, 
began to question the utility of the any comprehensive approach to decision-making and 
to dismiss it as being impossible. His three pronged attack argued: first, the human 
intellect was not capable of knowing and considering all possible options to any given 
problem; second, it was not possible to know in advance the consequences of policy 
choices. And third, given the various positive and negative attributes and interactions 
among policy decisions, straight comparisons were not practical or possible.51 
Despite criticisms the future Prime Minister’s enthusiasm for the potentially 
liberating impact of objective-based functionalism over subjective-based emotional 
nationalism was evident in his 1964 address to the Canadian Political Science 
Association. In his speech he said that it was not possible to completely remove emotion 
from politics, but he had hoped it was possible to redirect it away from the parochial 
excesses of nationalist sentiment. Trudeau then said: “If politicians must bring emotions 
into the act, let them get emotional about functionalism.”52 
 
Prime Minister Trudeau: The Holistic Rationalist in Power 
Further evidence that change was coming to the Canadian public policy 
development process came early in the Trudeau years. In 1968, the stage was set for 
fundamental change in the operation of the public policy making process.  Trudeau 
sought to use the notion of “participatory democracy” to emulate the success of the 1960 
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Thinkers’ Conference held in Kingston, but on a larger, more complex, scale. Lester B. 
Pearson government’s vast transformation of Canadian social policy had its genesis in 
Kingston. Pearson’s idea to “convene a gathering of public-spirited, informed, 
experienced Canadians to give us their views on the most important questions of the day” 
flourished in a different way under Trudeau.53  
Evidence of the new Prime Minister’s fresh approach to policy development was 
visible in November 1969 at another Liberal thinkers conference, this time at Harrison 
Hot Springs in British Columbia. Building upon the 1960 Thinkers’ Conference model, it 
was expected that the Harrison Conference was to be the first step in a new approach to 
Liberal policy development.  It was more ambitious than the Kingston conference in that 
it was to be part of grass-roots policy process. Local riding associations were to be 
involved in the policy process from the outset. The process was to cumulate in a major 
policy convention in 1970 where delegates were to help give the governing party, and 
thereby the country, a strong sense of policy direction for the subsequent years. 54  
Trudeau considered the Harrison Conference to be a virtual “‘supermarket of ideas’” 
provided by external experts as well as by rank and file Liberals through their 
associations.55 
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At the inaugural speech of the conference, Prime Minister Trudeau announced 
that for private or public organizations, including governments, planning required a time 
frame sufficient to enable the future to be altered. The examples he used were water 
pollution and an airplane pilot. He claimed water pollution was the result of decisions 
made, or not made, in the previous decade. Similarly Trudeau said that planning in 
government was similar to the need for airline pilots to plan their landings long before an 
airport came into view. He said that planes required radar and political parties through the 
creation of legislation had the potential to “act as a society’s radar.”56 
The speech also included passages that presented symmetry with Club of Rome 
(COR) ideas and opinions. For example, throughout the speech Trudeau developed a 
theme that the COR would also subsequently stress: the future was not set, but was a 
malleable human construct. Trudeau stated, “With the refinement of our techniques for 
forecasting and planning, we are coming to realize that the image we hold of our future is 
itself an important element of that future.”57  In the “Talking Points for Discussion” 
section of a version of the speech, it was noted that Canada had to “forecast the 
characteristics of the world in the next decade… to derive policies which will promote a 
better world environment and hence a united prosperous Canada.”58 The speech and 
talking points sections raised other themes that would be argued independently by the 
COR. For example, the reciprocity of interest between Canada and improving the plight 
of Third World nations was noted. Trudeau expressed a strong belief in the perils of 
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exponential population growth and stated that the world faced a “[d]angerous and 
imminent ecological imbalance.”59 
In addition, the Trudeau approach to the development of policy initiatives tended 
to mirror the Club of Rome approach to the Problematique. As deduced from the 
evidence provided below and in the next chapter, Trudeau advocated a five-step approach 
to policy development. The first step was identifying that there was a problem. The 
second step was to conduct a through study into the nature of the problem and, thirdly, to 
study alternative ways of dealing with the initial problem(s). The fourth and fifth steps 
were to be the development of legislation and implementation of effective policy ideas. 
In practical terms Trudeau’s concern for greater holistic horizontal thinking in the 
process of policy development was evident at the apex of federal power, within the 
Cabinet decision-making processes. One of Trudeau’s earliest reforms was to bring in the 
Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning (CCPP). The Prime Minister handpicked 
this powerful committee. Its purpose was to develop broad policy priorities for the 
government and to have them translated into general guidelines for departments and 
agencies to use in the development of their policies.  From the various sub-committees 
that were established, cabinet ministers would then provide information to the rest of 
Cabinet via memoranda that all were expected to read and be able to both pass educated 
comment on and ultimately to be able to debate the various policy options available.60 
Former Pearson, and subsequent Trudeau, Cabinet Minister Mitchell Sharp commented 
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that the CCPP operated like an university seminar on political science.61 Similarly, 
former Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) head Marc Lalonde recalled with a chuckle that 
other Pearson-era Cabinet ministers like Eric Kierans complained bitterly about Cabinet 
meetings being “those bloody seminars”.62 
The tenor of Cabinet meetings changed from the Pearson era as, according to 
Minister Sharp, Trudeau “gave new substance to the principle of collegiality.”63 Ministers 
were expected to become fully familiar with areas of concern far outside their specific 
departments. Cabinet members had to prepare lengthy memoranda that clearly identified: 
the policy question/ problem being addressed; the advantages and disadvantages of all the 
possible solutions identified; and an indication of the option preferred by the Minister and 
finally why the option was preferred. 64 This meant far more work for cabinet ministers 
who had to become virtually experts within their own areas of jurisdiction and to become 
knowledgeable about the issues in other ministerial jurisdictions as well.65 Trudeau 
advisor Michael Pitfield said that the process was meant to ensure that ministers and key 
advisors were aware of what was happening in all government departments and to 
facilitate debate and the airing of counter arguments before firm opinions could be 
formed.66 
Trudeau’s rationalist approach to policy development at the Cabinet level, was 
also evident in the proliferation of cabinet committees and written documentation. 
Proposals no longer went directly to general cabinet, but rather were first sent to cabinet 
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committees for consideration. It was hoped that the process would lead to stronger 
cabinet proposals. Sharp commented that as most ministers served on at least three 
cabinet committees, it aided in cross-fertilisation of ideas and meant that ministers were 
more aware of other departments than before.67  The new process produced more 
knowledgeable cabinet ministers, who were less dependent on staff for policy guidance, 
but the emergence of increasingly complex problems left “plenty of scope for the 
exercise of the analytic powers and judgement from senior permanent advisors.”68  
According to Pitfield, the greater coordination of government purpose was necessary as 
previous governments had “little, if any, view of the whole.” As a result, “Important, but 
not always obvious, inter-relationships were ignored.”69 
Liberal cabinet ministers however, viewed the new cabinet system with varying 
degrees of interest and suspicion.  Among the more neutral statements came from long-
time Member of Parliament Herb Gray who commented that Trudeau’s rationalist 
approach to policy development led to a massive proliferation of cabinet committees and 
written documentation.70 Gray’s comment hinted at the most obvious consequence of the 
new Trudeau approach - a vastly increased workload on the part of Ministers and their 
advisors. Minister Sharp commented that under Pearson civil servants were told to keep 
briefs to a maximum of two pages whereas under the new Trudeau system it was not 
unusual to have submissions of fifteen pages or more.71 Similarly, fellow Cabinet 
Minister Donald Macdonald commented that there was an ever-growing volume of 
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documents that ministers were expected to have read. He added that by the time he left 
Cabinet in 1977, he was required to carry a four-ring eighteen-inch by eight binder to 
accommodate the volume of material and that “even then I could barely accommodate the 
papers I needed”.72 
In contrast to the aims of a more collegial approach, many Cabinet ministers came 
to view the new approach as more of a hindrance than a benefit. Trudeau later conceded 
that numerous members of his cabinet were not pleased with his new collegial holistic 
approach to policy development. In his Memoirs Trudeau commented that many of his 
Ministers viewed the new Cabinet procedures “as a deplorable waste of time, or as an 
interesting but politically useless intellectual exercise.”73  
Cabinet meetings often became prolonged exercises in thinking about future 
situations and potential approaches to solving the problems discussed. Ministers such as 
Mitchell Sharp, Allan MacEachen, Donald Jamieson and Eugene Whelan thought that 
such exercises did not represent a practical way to address the pragmatic political 
business of running a country. Sharp, who appeared to have generally found the new 
process engaging, said that a conscientious minister could become well informed about 
what was happening in government, but  “could become exhausted if they were too 
conscientious.”74 Fellow Cabinet Minister Eugene Whelan added: “There was no way 
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any minister could go through all that material and also look after his own department…. 
most cabinet meetings were pretty much a waste of time.”75  
Other Trudeau cabinet members were also highly critical of the collegial holistic 
approach. Allan MacEachen felt Trudeau was misguided in attempting to totally supplant 
the predominantly ad hoc system of policy development active in the Pearson 
government. According to MacEachen, Trudeau’s new approach predicated upon 
collegiality and long term planning was fundamentally flawed and incompatible with a 
democratic form of government.  He said that cabinet meetings would often spend an 
excessive amount of time speculating about the future, discussing systems approaches 
and the importance of integrated policy development. MacEachen added that predicting 
the future was an impractical activity as in order to get it right one had to control all the 
variables and, in a democratic system such as Canada and the United States, a 
government could only possibly influence the four to five years of its mandate.76   
MacEachen went on to describe Trudeau as a “philosopher king” who was 
plagued by a perception among the Canadian population for being aloof.  Ministers such 
as MacEachen and Don Jamieson considered the process had two key flaws: it was too 
theoretical and it was a process that failed to emphasise the political realities associated 
with electoral politics.77 Minister Mitchell Sharp also stated that there was a great deal of 
time spent discussing systems approaches, but that many Cabinet members did not pay a 
great deal of attention to its political applications.78 Matters came to a ahead in 1973 
during a caucus retreat at Meech Lake under the theme of “In Search of a New Mandate.” 
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Cabinet member Alastair Gillespie described the meeting as a “brutally candid 
examination of the PM.” 79  
The trauma of having barely won a minority government in 1972 following the 
1968 electoral landslide for the party was evident. Trudeau asked his caucus ‘Have we as 
a government run out of steam… Is it a question of leadership… Are we tired?’ Among 
strategic errors noted in Gillespie’s notes were: “the belief that good government [would] 
be recognized by the voters and rewarded with public support [and]…. the belief that 
consensus decision making [was] the key to cabinet government.”80 Gillespie confronted 
the Prime Minister and a key advisor Marc Lalonde over the size of the 30-member 
Cabinet that exacerbated the problem of finding consensus.  He added that a large cabinet 
in reality led to: fragmentation; individuals speaking on topics in which they had little 
expertise; a thwarted leadership role for the Prime Minister; and, often, poor quality 
decisions due to the need for compromise. 81  
As early as 1976 Pitfield acknowledged that the process changes caused 
politicians to have to spend less time on traditional duties associated with departmental 
administration, meeting the public and representing their constituencies. However, 
speaking as a non-elected bureaucrat without any experience in elected office, he added 
that the making of effective policy was just as, if not more, important that the other 
duties.82  
Despite caucus criticisms Trudeau continued to maintain the importance of 
collective input and collective responsibility for cabinet decisions. Changes enacted at the 
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cabinet level to create a greater sense of collegiality and collective responsibility for 
governmental decisions were part of broader changes aimed at developing holistic policy 
thinking throughout the bureaucracy. Existing central institutions such as the Privy 
Council Office (PCO) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) were strengthened. In 
addition new horizontally minded institutions such as the Ministry of State for Science 
and Technology (MOSST), the Department of the Environment (DOE) and the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) were created.  
Due to the close connection between systems thinking, cybernetics and the 
synergies that emerged between Club of Rome thinking and the Trudeau mandarins, a 
discussion of holistic systems thinking within the horizontal federal bureaucratic 
institutions, such as MOSST, has been deferred to chapter four. To conduct a discussion 
of those agencies before examining the emergence and promise of cybernetics and 
systems analysis, as discussed in chapter three, would be premature. Therefore the 
remaining part of this chapter looks at the DOE’s and IDRC’s creation. Both institutions 
reflect how the themes discussed in the last chapter on the emergence of new concerns in 
the international arena were manifested in Canada and led to their respective creation. 
The discussion of the IDRC introduces a further theme of the perceived importance of 
futures studies that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
The Spread of Ecological Consciousnesses From the US Into Canada 
Philosophy of Science Historian Peter J. Bowler stated that the emergence of a 
vibrant environmental movement in the 1960s was due to it being “a decade of protest 
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against established values.”83 Canadian environmentalist Doug Macdonald and other 
authors have further argued that the tumultuous 1960s, from which the modern 
environmental movement emerged, was in part the result of an age of affluence in which 
a generation came to maturity that had never been exposed to the ravages of economic 
depression or war; a generation that had the luxury of considering quality of life issues, as 
opposed to mere survival.84 It was a time when the modern use of the term “ecology” 
became integrally linked in popular parlance with the environment.85 
The Canadian environmental movement was strongly influenced by events in the 
United States where by the end of the 1960s “the environmental movement had 
developed into a major crusade.”86 Canadians watched with interest in 1969 when 
President Richard Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce 
environmental laws, and on 22 April 1970 when the first official “Earth Day” was held.87 
Interested Canadians could also see the impact that the environmental movement was 
having an American society and politics. For example, recycling programs emerged, car 
manufacturers had to adjust to using unleaded gasoline for fuel, and the electrical 
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generation industry had to face increasing pressure from environmentally minded 
organizations.88   
Strenuous efforts on the part of academics, scientists and environmental 
campaigners would likely not have met with great success in the US or Canada had they 
not been accompanied by what Canadian political scientist Stephen Brooks referred to as 
a “cluster of conscious-raising events.”89  Writers Brooks, Macdonald, and Harrison 
describe a series of major oil spills as being important awareness raising events. In the 
English Channel in 1967 the tanker Torrey Canyon went aground and spilled over 
118,000 tons of oil. Two years later in 1969 over twenty miles of Californian coastline 
were devastated due to a massive oil spill and Ohio’s Cuyahuga River caught fire after 
another oil spill. The danger of oil spills in Canada struck home the following year in 
1970 when a tanker, Arrow, spilled its considerable load into Nova Scotia’s Chedabucto 
Bay.90  
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In addition to oil spills, reports of environmental devastation were emerging 
affecting a wide variety of concerns. Reports emerged that the Great Lakes, especially 
Lake Erie, were polluted with high levels of mercury and other toxins which resulted in 
large numbers of dead fish and other animals. On top of concerns for other creatures, 
reports of human population explosions with resultant famines and malnutrition in 
developing countries became increasingly common.91  
By the late 1960s in Canada public interest in environmental matters had been 
piqued and numerous organizations whose purpose was to raise public interest in 
environmental matters and to pressure politicians and business to take action to protect 
the biosphere emerged. In 1969 in Ontario Pollution Probe began operating at the 
University of Toronto. The following year a group of Toronto-based law students 
organized the Canadian Environmental Law Association who worked to support groups 
such as Pollution Probe in legal matters and to help with lobbying.92 In addition to 
Canadian groups, international organizations such as the Sierra Club and the World 
Wildlife Fund began to establish or expand operations in the country.93 
Meanwhile at the federal level popular pressure was beginning to result in 
concrete policy initiatives during the first few years of the 1970s. During that time the 
Department of the Environment was created and five major pollution acts were signed 
into law including the Canada Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act.94 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who was an avid outdoorsman 
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-a self-professed child of nature – took an active interest in environmental affairs and 
aided the environmental movement in Canada.95 Former Minister of the Environment in 
the Trudeau Cabinet, Charles Caccia, once commented that Trudeau’s grasp of 
environmental policy issues was extensive and that “one never needed to have long 
discussions with the Prime Minister” on environmental matters.96  
According to political scientists Bruce Doern and Thomas Conway, Trudeau had 
his “environmental instincts” influenced by his love of the outdoors “and his early 
exposure to the work of the Club of Rome.”97 They also noted that in the months leading 
up to the creation of the DOE in 1971 he had met with COR members on at least three 
occasions.98 The COR’s quest to study and develop solutions to the Problematique had an 
essential environmental element attached to any deliberations and as such, it resonated 
with the broader themes that interested both Canadians in general, and their Prime 
Minister specifically, in the years surrounding 1970.  
The COR’s belief in a deep sense of complexity and the need for cooperative 
approaches to global problems was also reflected by Trudeau’s opinion on environmental 
governance. In a speech in the House of Commons in 1970, the Prime Minister remarked 
that the struggle to protect the environment went “far beyond the capacity of one minister 
and his department. Indeed it cannot be waged effectively by the federal government 
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alone… or even just by Canada. It is a fight that must be waged by all ministers, all 
governments and all people.”99  Trudeau hoped the newly created DOE would “lead the 
fight against pollution and to help coordinate the efforts of others,” in environmental 
matters.100  
Political scientists Bruce Doern, Thomas Conway and Kathryn Harrison identified 
the era of the early to mid-1970s when the DOE was established as a time of “growth 
[and] enthusiasm for ideas.”101 From the outset the DOE was to be holistic in approach. 
Former Environment Minister John Roberts said:  
The orientation of the new department was to be holistic: the management 
of Canada’s resources was to be undertaken not as a series of discrete 
programs dealing with individual sectors, but as shared aspects of the 
“environment,” a concept that reflected the interrelatedness of natural 
resources and their multiple use.102 
 
While COR’s holistic ideas may not have been the genesis of Trudeau’s opinions towards 
environmental matters, they were certainly in line with the Prime Minister’s thinking and 
with the general thrust of the logic behind the DOE’s creation.  
  
The IDRC, Futures Studies and the Third World 
As with the DOE’s creation, the International Development Research Centre’s 
(IDRC)’s emergence was both the result of popular concerns of the day and in its 
intellectual groundings reflected a dedication to holistic approaches to policy 
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development. The story of the IDRC’s creation provides a case study illustrating the 
merging of holistic thinking with a concern for futures studies that were fashionable both 
internationally and in Canada during the late 1960s and into the mid-1970s. In order to 
set the context for IDRC’s creation it is necessary to examine Canadian concerns about 
the popularization of future studies internationally. 
Future studies were a major growth industry around the world in the decades after 
World War II, especially in the 1960s. Future studies as aids to public policy 
development were already established in several developed nations. For example, the 
United States had a vast network of academic, government, military, and other futures 
studies associations that were publicly and privately funded. Federal advisor Ronald 
Ritchie argued that American organizations, such as the Hudson Institute, the Urban 
Institute, the Institute for the Future and Resources for the Future, represented cutting 
edge multidisciplinary research that used systems analysis to examine existing and future 
problems for society. The American government, the well financed and powerful 
Research and Development (RAND) Corporation and the Ford Foundation were key 
players in establishing the systems organizations.103  
American political scientist Victor Ferkiss’ publication Futurology: Promise, 
Performance, Prospects, illustrated that American futurists had been involved at the 
highest levels of American government since the 1950s. He illustrated that government 
groups such as Central Intelligence Agency, the Internal Revenue Service and the Census 
Bureau were involved in futures studies. In addition, he argued that the Environmental 
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Protection Agency and the Office of Technology Assessment were “essentially futurist in 
outlook.”104  
Outside the United States the influence of futurists varied, with substantial 
influence in countries such as Japan, West Germany, and France. 105 South of the United 
States in Latin America, Mexico and Argentina had established substantial futures 
research capabilities.106 In addition sixteen European nations, including four Communist 
Bloc nations, were actively pursuing futures research.107 In the Middle East and Asia, 
Israel, India, Japan and South Korea had national associations dedicated to futurology. 108  
Ferkiss also made the observation that Third World nations did not appear interested in 
future studies and were often hostile to futurology. There was also a lack of technological 
advancement and contemporary issues of survival supplanted concern for subsequent 
decades. His conclusion was that the future studies movement was most popular in 
technologically advanced and affluent nations. 109  
As an industrially advanced nation, some of Canada’s politicians, bureaucrats and 
industrialists became intrigued by the possibilities offered by futures studies. Future 
studies advocates, such as Senator Maurice Lamontagne and bureaucrat Ronald Ritchie, 
feared that if Canada did not take futures studies seriously there was a danger that the 
country would be left behind by the international community. The conception and 
development of the IDRC reflected the perceived importance for developing and 
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adopting a futures focus and a holistic approach to policy development and global 
problem solving.  
The IDRC had its genesis with Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s June 1967 
speech to the Canadian Political Science Association.  In that address he lamented that 
after twenty years of effort, the international community had learned what it could not do 
and little about what it could successfully do. Pearson also said there was a need to bring 
together politicians, political scientists and other experts in the establishment of a new 
centre to study international aid. The former Prime Minister said the challenge of 
international aid was discovering “new instruments for concentrating more attention and 
resources on applying the latest technology to the solution of man’s economic and social 
problems on a global basis.”110 
The Prime Minister’s idea began to be acted upon by senior bureaucrats. Over the 
next year they conducted extensive feasibility studies and contacted external experts for 
advice. In the September 1968 Throne Speech the Pierre Trudeau government officially 
announced its commitment to establishing the centre.111 IRDC’s purpose was to be 
supplemental to the work of other Canadian institutions such as Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) to help identify “areas where both capital and technical 
assistance [were] likely to have the greatest impact on development.”112 
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The IDRC Steering Committee felt it was vital to utilize systems analysis and 
long-range research strategies to accomplish the goal of creating a more efficient foreign 
aid program. In their April 1969 report, the committee stated “with the system’s approach 
to the identification of problems and the search for solutions it has become feasible to use 
consciously our scientific and technological resources to induce and accelerate economic 
and social change.”113  Furthermore, the IDRC Steering Committee presented an 
argument that was later forcefully made in The Limits to Growth report about the 
indivisible link between current policy decisions and consequences years or decades 
hence.  The Steering Committee report stated that decisions taken in the late 1960s would 
“pre-determine the policies and issues of the 1970’s and 80’s.”114 
However the IDRC was limited in its success in developing internal futures 
capabilities. On the IDRC’s tenth anniversary its President Ivan Head continued to state: 
“Forecasting and planning will become essential elements in the Centre’s processes.”115 
The IDRC’s lack of in-house futures activities were in part the result of its structure and 
mandate. Ninety per cent of its budget went to foreign research projects; by 1975 only 
$4.5 million, had been granted to Canadian researchers. In contrast, developing nations 
had received $45 million in funding.116 The result was the IDRC became a sponsoring 
organization to international futures groups and initiatives.  
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The IDRC contributed $1,800,000 spread over twenty countries looking at the 
present and future possibilities of their science and technology policies. In addition it 
partnered with the American Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in the creation of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute. The IDRC’s $2,250,000 contribution to the 
institute helped provide funding for examining short, medium and long-term food 
problems and potential solutions for poorer nations.117 
Given a commonality of interest it is no surprise to find a close relationship 
evolved between the IDRC and the Club of Rome, including its Canadian Association.  
COR and/or CACOR members such as Maurice Strong, Ivan Head, Rene Dubos, Omond 
Solandt and Rennie Whitehead played an influential role drafting the initial stages of the 
IDRC’s development and operations during its formative years.118 Former IDRC 
President Ivan Head commented that he attended numerous COR meetings, read their 
reports and had semi-regular contact with members such as Alexander King, Aurelio 
Peccei and especially with Japanese COR member Sapuro Okita.119  
Both the IDRC and COR/CACOR shared a strong belief in the similarity of 
domestic and foreign problems and issues.  The IDRC argued that the process of 
implementing new policies, solving cultural conflicts and dealing with environmental 
pollution and urbanization were as relevant in the Canadian Maritimes and Western 
Canadian Indian Reserves as in Africa or Latin America.120 Lessons learned in the far 
                                                 
117 Hopper, “Letter to Maurice Lamontagne, December 5, 1975,” pp.2-3. 
118 Steering Committee, “Report, 15 April 1969,” p.i., p.54. 
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p.11. 
119 Ivan Head, Conversation with Author, February 2004. 
120 Steering Committee, “Report, 15 April 1969,” p.32. 
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reaches of the global village had potential applications at home. The close IDRC 
COR/CACOR relationship led in 1972 to IDRC providing $112,500 to the Argentinean 
Bariloche Foundation to produce a mathematical world model reflecting the view of third 
world nations in response the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report. The initial results 
of the Foundation’s project were presented at Club of Rome meetings in Tokyo in 
December 1973 with a more comprehensive report being presented in Vienna in 
September 1974.121 
Conclusion 
The closeness of the relationship between the COR/CACOR and the IDRC 
evolved due to a commonality of interests, attitude and agreement on the basic 
requirements to effectively deal with global issues. It was a similar process that allowed 
the COR/CACOR to develop a symbiotic relationship with the Trudeau government over 
its sixteen years in office. Key to that relationship was a common belief in the need for a 
holistic long-range approach to policy development. By the end of the 1960s and in the 
first years of the 1970s developments in cybernetics, systems analysis and futures studies 
made it appear that it was possible to both understand political issues in a holistic manner 
and to provide at least a modicum of understanding of the likely interconnections and 
consequences of policy decisions into the future. 
The 1960s was a time of physical, intellectual and political tumult; it was a time 
of ideas when in Canada the term “change” became a mantra that permeated popular 
society and the country’s political and bureaucratic elite. The election of Pierre Trudeau 
in 1968 initially satisfied a populist desire for political change. Once elected Trudeau 
brought to the next level incremental changes that had been occurring in the operation of 
                                                 
121 Hopper, “Letter to Maurice Lamontagne, December 5, 1975,” pp.2-3. 
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the federal bureaucracy under the previous two Prime Ministers. The theoretical 
underpinning of the Trudeau style of public policy development was derived from the 
notion of functional policy development.  At the end of the 1960s it was possible to still 
believe that a functional approach to politics was both possible and pragmatic due to the 
developments in the fields of cybernetics and general systems theory. It is to that story 
that the dissertation now turns it attention. 
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Chapter 3: The Antecedents to Influence (Part 3)  – Systems Analysis to 1972 
 The holistic approach described in 1979 by its executive as “the Club of Rome 
way” could have easily been applied in the Canadian setting as the “Pierre Trudeau way.” 
Both sets of approaches placed a premium on the superiority of reason and its necessity 
in displacing passion when discussing issues of politics and policy. The Club of Rome 
(COR) asked if it was “possible to prime a rational discussion of the [energy] issue 
without getting led astray, one way or the other, by emotions?”1 While this was referring 
to energy specifically, it was indicative of their overarching quest to address the 
interconnected problems facing humanity in the Problematique. The rationalist approach 
was also paramount with Trudeau who allegedly had the phrase “la raison avant la 
passion” hung on his wall at 24 Sussex Drive and, as discussed last chapter, was drawn to 
the deeply rational idea of functional politics.2 Former Trudeau Cabinet Minister Donald 
Johnson commented on the Prime Minister’s “Cartesian reasoning,” and described his 
organizational style as “efficient, disciplined and precise.”3  
It was a rejection of emotion and the quest for reason that led both the COR and 
Trudeau to develop an interest in cybernetics and systems analysis as holistic objective 
policy antidotes to ad hoc subjective policy development. This chapter delves into the 
development of the twin studies of cybernetics and systems analysis from World War II 
to the middle of the 1970s. It then explains how the COR members were initially drawn 
to such ideas and subsequently became key advocates of the use of systems analysis in 
policy development. The previous chapter mentioned the broad appeal of cybernetics and 
                                                 
1 Maurice Guernier, Alexander King, Saburo Okita, Aurelio Peccei, Eduard Pestel, Hugo Thiemann and 
Victor Urquidi, “Foreword,” in Thierry de Montbrial, Energy The Countdown, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1979), p.x. 
2 Kevin J. Christiano, Pierre Trudeau Reason Before Passion, (Toronto: ECW Press, 1995), p.13.                                             
3 Donald Johnson, Up the Hill, (Montreal: Optimum Publishing International, 1986), p.88. 
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systems analysis to Trudeau and other supporters of functional politics; this chapter 
explains how systems analysis ideas in the early Trudeau years began to infiltrate the 
bureaucratic decision-making process in Canada.  
 
Cybernetics and Systems Theory Keys to Functional Public Policy Development 
Cybernetics refers to an interdisciplinary movement that had its origins in the 
twentieth century modernization of Newtonian physics. In the initial decades of the last 
century American physicist Willard Gibbs found that at the molecular level Isaac 
Newton’s laws of motion did not apply. His quest for an explanation led Gibbs to pioneer 
a new field of inquiry, statistical mechanics. In 1920 a cooperative venture featuring 
Gibbs working with French mathematicians Emile Borel and Henri Lebesgue led to the 
introduction of the idea of statistical probability in physics.4  
Gibbsian disciple Norbert Wiener was drawn to the new ideas and grasped the 
broader significance.5 Wiener argued 
Gibbs’ innovation was to consider not one world but all the worlds which 
are possible answers to a limited set of questions concerning our 
environment. His central notion concerned the extent to which answers 
that we may give to questions about one set of worlds are probable among 
a larger set of worlds.6 
 
Wiener’s biographers further explained Gibbs’ significance to the development of 
cybernetics. For him, the idea of probability meant two key things: “the probabilistic 
                                                 
4 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, (Garden City: Doubleday 
Anchor Books, 1954), pp.7-11. 
Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman, Dark Hero of the Information Age: In search of Norbert Wiener The 
Father of Cybernetics, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.88. 
5 Wiener’s biography, Dark Hero of the Information Age, notes that he considered reading Gibbs’ work to 
have been ‘an intellectual landmark in [his] life.’ 
Conway and Siegelman, Dark Hero, p.51. 
6 Wiener, The Human Use, p.12. 
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world could not be pinned down with precision” and a probabilistic approach did not 
determine what events would happen, but what was likely to happen given “specific 
physical conditions.”7  
The nineteenth century established that there were scientific laws that governed 
the operations of the entire universe. The early decades of the twentieth century ushered 
in the idea that in the actual, or physical world, it was not possible to get exact data and, 
therefore, it was not possible to arrive at exact answers to physics-related questions. 
Hence probabilistic tendencies supplanted deterministic results. Wiener argued that pre-
twentieth century scientists ignored the inherent problem within Newtonian physics that 
“No physical measurements are ever precise.”8 However, the idea of probability meant 
that one could make statements with a high degree of probability of being correct and 
closely representing the actual. It also meant that there were numerous outcomes to any 
given phenomenon. As well, the belief that it was possible to identify the range of 
possible outcomes within established parameters emerged. 9  
Philosopher Keith Gunderson and mathematician Yehuda Rav argue that 
proponents of cybernetics viewed the relationship between their theoretical musings and 
reality as being akin to the relationship between geometry and actual geometric objects.10 
By the middle of the twentieth century, Gibbs’ physics theories led to the dissemination 
of the idea of cybernetics. 
                                                 
7 Conway and Siegelman, Dark Hero, p.88. 
8 Wiener, The Human Use, p.8. 
9 Wiener, The Human Use, pp.7-9. 
10 Keith Gunderson, “Cybernetics,” in Paul Edwards, (editor), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Volume 2, 
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Beginning in the 1940s cyberneticists examined communication channels in the 
natural and artificial environments. Wiener and other cyberneticists drew a parallel with 
the universality of laws of physics in their belief that stability, or control, was a universal 
concept, applicable to the natural, human, and mechanized environments. Such control 
was inherently dependent upon the effective gathering and dissemination of information. 
It was a mechanized worldview that further argued that it was possible, through the study 
of informational channels; to create more effective organizations.11 Cybernetics’ main 
goal was to develop an appropriate language and techniques to effectively deal with 
issues surrounding control and communications.12 
Cybernetic advocates foresaw the governance implications of a cybernetics 
revolution. Phrase-originator Norbert Wiener said he coined the term cybernetics after the 
Greek term for steersman from which evolved the political term governor.13 Furthermore 
he used a phrase that would have resonated with the COR and with Trudeau: “To live 
effectively is to live with adequate information.”14 Wiener also made the key argument 
that in both biology and engineering, similar organizational and regulative processes were 
at work and tended to be governed by the idea of feedback. Feedback referred to 
information transferred from within a given system that subsequently affected its 
operations. In their biography of Wiener, Dark Hero of the Information Age, the authors 
claim that Wiener “established the universal principle of feedback as more than merely a 
                                                 
11  As a result of its universality cybernetics subsequently influenced the development of a diversity of 
fields ranging from systems analysis to artificial intelligence. 
-- “Cybernetics,” in Alan Bullock, Oliver Stallybrass, Stephen Trombley and Bruce Eadie, (editors) The 
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13 Wiener, The Human Use, p.15. 
14 Wiener, The Human Use, p.19. 
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good technical idea.”15 As will be discussed in the next section, the idea of positive and 
negative feedback loops became critical to the development of systems analysis theory,  
especially in the World 3 Modelling Program that lay at the heart of the 1972 COR-
sponsored work The Limits to Growth.16 
General Systems Theory and Systems Analysis 
Cybernetics’ overarching concern with the universality of processes and 
interactions led it to become a midwife to systems analysis. As a midwife, it provided 
systems theory with a link to the established Newtonian idea that there were laws that 
governed the operations of the universe. Cyberneticists took Newton’s universal physical 
laws and developed universal theories related to control and communications. The next 
evolution of the idea of the operations of universal processes emerged through systems 
analysis that holistically united the disparate biological, ecological, economic, and policy 
fields.  
It was the idea of being able to link and study various phenomena that excited the 
Club of Rome. Systems analysis offered the hope of being able to study “the interwoven 
factors that [made] the contemporary world unstable, unpredictable and perilous,” i.e, the 
Problematique, in a methodological and scientific way.17  While the task was daunting, 
Peccei had a strong belief in the ability of an emergent field of computer-assisted systems 
analysis and global modelling to explain problems and to point to future difficulties.  
                                                 
15 Conway and Siegelman, Dark Hero, p.178. 
16 Donella H Meadows,  Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to 
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17 Aurelio Peccei, Daisku Ikeda, (edited by Richard L. Gage), Before It Is Too Late, (Tokyo: Kodansha 
International Ltd., 1984), pp.13-14. 
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Systems thinking became a lynchpin to the entire COR mission because the 
ability to understand the world’s interrelated problems was essential.  Effective political 
and economic tools to safeguard the future of humanity could not be developed in the 
absence of a holistic understanding of issues. The need was urgent and the stakes were 
high. According to Peccei, existing challenges could not have been “tackled with 
yesterday’s ideas and methods, which already today are unable to stand the test… Society 
must learn to plan systematically.” He added, “The ever increasing conflict between rich 
countries and poor countries, and between reason and intolerance, cannot last long 
without causing serious prejudice to world peace.”18 
The emerging field of systems analysis grew out of an interest in the 1950s 
associated with general systems theory being discussed by academics such as Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy and Kenneth E. Boulding. Two overriding concerns lay behind von 
Bertalanffy’s and Boulding’s work.  The first was based upon traditional sciences, and 
the second upon emerging scientific endeavours. In part it was a reaction against the 
excessively mechanistic view of the world that had become dominant, at least in western 
thinking, from the Industrial Revolution to World War II.  It was also in reaction to the 
emergence of academic sub-fields, such as biochemistry, organic-chemistry astrophysics, 
social anthropology, and post-modern historicism. Von Bertalanffy hypothesised that the 
mechanistic approach had been responsible for “the catastrophic crises of our times.” He 
further deduced that the future refinement of general systems theory could lead, albeit 
with limitations, to a more “organismic” view of the world and increase society’s ability 
                                                 
18 Aurelio Peccei (General Chairman), International Development 1967 International Technical 
Cooperation: Evaluation and Prospects, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968),, p.1, p.6. 
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to adjust to the problems facing humanity.19 At best it was an early attempt to develop 
and synthesise phenomena common to various scientific disciplines into a general theory 
related to the world.20 Boulding hoped that the theory would, in time, be able to develop a 
generalized language and framework that would “enable one specialist to catch relevant 
communications from others.”21 
General systems theory explored many of the same key ideas and phenomena as 
were contained in the Problematique. Boulding commented that the ultimate hope was to 
“pick out certain general phenomena which [were] found in many different disciplines, 
and to seek to build up general theoretical models relevant to these phenomena.”22 
Included in the list of common concepts were: populations, interaction between “an 
‘individual’ of some kind with its environment”, and the “universal significance [of] 
growth.”23   
Information technology expert Jennifer Rowley commented: “Society and nature 
abound in systems”.24 While von Bertalanffy’s and Boulding’s application of general 
systems theory was limited to looking at specific aspects within scientific fields, there 
was the hope that it could serve to create a more general  “‘system of systems’” theory. 
However, Boulding argued that any overarching theory would not be able to bring an 
understanding of phenomena past the level of exploring basic open systems such as cells, 
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rivers and other self-contained systems. He added a word of caution that “in dealing with 
human personalities and organizations we are dealing with systems in the empirical world 
far beyond our ability to formulate.”25  
Initial attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to develop pragmatic applications of 
systems theory were associated with the United States Department of Defense, 
specifically with the Research and Development Corporation (RAND). In the context of 
the Cold War, the RAND Corporation was deeply involved in  “[s]ystematically 
examining and comparing alternative courses of action in terms of their expected costs, 
benefits, and risks.”26 By the mid-1960s systems analysis’s popularity was spreading to 
the civilian world as business people and others became interested and excited about the 
possibilities being presented by cybernetic analysis.27 Spearheading the civilian 
application of systems research was Jay W. Forrester at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), an electrical engineer by training.28   
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Jay W. Forrester and Systems Analysis 
It is not surprising that when the Club of Rome endeavoured to inquire into the 
causes and consequences of the world Problematique, they turned to a leading guru of 
systems analysis, Jay W. Forrester, for advice.  Forrester believed that systems dynamics 
applied to “anything that [changed] through time... sweepingly, from physical systems 
through corporate systems into social systems, you find the same set of ideas apply.”29 
Forrester’s experiences in the 1950s and 1960s continually expanded the realm of 
systems analysis and created within him an abiding faith in its potential. Forrester became 
far more bullish on the possibilities of systems analysis than were his predecessors – von 
Bertalanffy and Boulding.  He began to take systems analysis to the macro-level as he 
sought to reduce the entire operation of life on Earth to a series of interacting systems. 
Forrester said that his work, and that of his associates, was aimed at describing, “the 
dynamics of systems in general… principles cover systems in physics, engineering, 
management, economics, medicine, and politics.” 30  Forrester’s systems theory applied 
“equally well to controlling chemical processes, guiding space ships, and working out 
policies within our social systems.”31 He added that it was within “such a sweep of 
generality that one discovers the challenge and excitement of systems principles.”32 
In 1956 Forrester decided to move from dealing with questions of defence to 
tackling issues of management. MIT President James Killian enticed Forrester to join the 
recently established Sloan School of Management. From that base, Forrester began to 
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explore the synergistic potentials of incorporating engineering and computer technologies 
within management settings. An early foray into the emerging field led to the 1958 
publication of the article “Industrial Dynamics – A Major Breakthrough for Decision 
Makers,” in the Havard Business Review and laid the foundations for Forrester’s 1961 
book Industrial Dynamics.33  
The next step for Forrester was in 1968 to move from management level problems 
to societal systems. Former Boston Mayor John. F. Collins worked at MIT as a visiting 
professor of Urban Affairs. His contact with Forrester led to a coordinated effort to apply 
systems analysis to the problems confronting major urban American centres at the time. 
Their efforts eventually led to the publication of a controversial text, Urban Dynamics, in 
1969.34 Forrester’s work in urban affairs also led to his first meeting with Club of Rome 
members, such as Aurelio Peccei, at a conference on urban problems at Lake Como Italy 
and the 1971 publication of World Dynamics.35 
What Forrester and his compatriots were advancing was a theory of everything 
that went beyond the physical world to unite the physical sciences and the humanities 
through discovering the basic principles that governed all systems.36 Central to the 
emerging theory was a differentiation between open and closed (or feedback) systems. 
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Open systems referred to traditional types of physical systems where the ultimate outputs 
have no influence on the initial inputs into the system. Open systems were non-historical 
in that the outputs were not dependent upon past actions to affect the future outcomes.  
Neither the past trips of an automobile, nor the operations of a watch, affected the 
operations of the systems.37 
It was the development of the theory of closed or feedback systems that laid the 
methodological foundations for The Limits to Growth report. Forrester defined the 
feedback system as “one in which an action is influenced by the consequences of 
previous action.”38 The closed system applied to systems where inputs and outputs 
interacted with each other.  There were two types phenomena at play within closed 
systems, negative and positive feedback loops where outputs became subsequent inputs 
into the system. The consequences of previous actions had a direct impact on future 
actions. 39 
Positive feedback loops built upon previous outputs to produce further positive 
outputs. Forrester’s example was of bacterial growth where rates of growth were 
dependent upon previous established rates of bacterial growth.40 Positive feedback loops 
tended towards exponential growth up to the limit of resources available.  In a 1971 
reprint of the 1968 textbook Principles of Systems, Forrester presaged the conclusions of 
the subsequent Limits to Growth report when he argued that positive feedback loops 
tending towards exponential growth had the potential to “reach overwhelming 
proportions if unchecked… But growth interacts with parts of the surrounding system to 
                                                 
37 Forrester, Principles of Systems p.(1-5). 
38 Forrester, Principles of Systems p. (W1-5). 
39 Forrester, Principles of Systems p. (1-5). 
40 Forrester, Principles of Systems p.1-5. 
 118
modify the growth process.”41 Positive feedback loops invariably led to unstable and 
unsustainable exponential growth. Increases are initially steady and gradual but after a 
certain point become increasingly rapid. The positive feedback loop is represented in 
geometric terms by an upward parabolic curve.  
Negative feedback loops referred to a system that attempts to adjust to a level 
imposed from outside the system.42 Forrester gave the example of a household heating 
system that continually sought to maintain a temperature and, as a result, its actions were 
directly related to previous outputs in terms of temperature. Failure to maintain the 
desired temperature caused a negative feedback where new outputs, in this case heat 
production, were required to re-establish room temperature.43 Negative feedback loops 
strive for equilibrium and help to create more stable and sustainable processes. The 
consequences and outcomes of closed systems involving either positive or negative 
feedback loops could be determined via the use of computer modelling technology.  
It was a time when computer technology was still in its infancy but was showing 
significant signs of promise. Computer advocates such as Norbert Wiener and Jay 
Forrester could see few, if any, limits to the future contributions from computer-based 
information technology.44 Forrester believed in the superiority of computer modelling as 
compared to mental models due to the explicit nature of inputs and the mathematical 
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logic outputs from the models. In examining large and complex holistic issues as systems 
analysis did with multiple variants, equations and time frames, human reasoning could 
not match the inherent logic of computer programming.45  
Computer programming based on logical mathematical principles was the key-
separating factor. Inputs went through a series of established equations to produce logical 
outcomes. Cybernetic systems analysis had the added advantage that the assumptions put 
into a model had to be identified by the programmer and therefore it was open to further 
discussions by peers. Critics could then subsequently adjust the input assumptions and 
test their results against initial results. Forrester did not maintain that computers were 
perfect. He did insist that when computer-based systems analysis was compared to other 
potential models that lacked clarity of assumptions with additional inherent problems of 
language and translation, systems was a superior mode of thinking and problem solving.46 
It was Forrester’s established reputation and unwavering belief in the potential of 
computer modelling that attracted the attention of the Club of Rome. 
 
Forrester, Meadows, the Club of Rome and The Limits to Growth 
Forrester’s ideas that related to the applicability of systems analysis to various 
global processes made it appear an ideal tool to be used to study the Problematique. Club 
of Rome (COR) members were united by a common concern for the future welfare of the 
world and its inhabitants. COR members such as Aurelio Pecei and Alexander King 
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postulated that various ecological, political, social, and economic problems facing the 
world from the late 1960s to mid-1970s were interrelated. They further postulated that 
any solutions to the interrelated problems would require the use of holistic problem-
solving approaches at a global level. Peccei claimed that one of the problems facing 
humanity had two parts. The first was the rapid ascent of humanity to complete 
dominance over nature. The second was a lack of adequate political institutions, 
arrangements and regulatory systems to deal with the resultant global problems. For him, 
traditional approaches and political structures served to exacerbate, not solve, global 
problems.47  
Systems analysis presented a non-traditional holistic approach to examine the 
interrelated problems facing humanity. It also offered the hope that a better understanding 
of existing problems could both lead to better political institutions and to the 
development of effective ameliorative measures. Forrester emerged on the COR radar at 
the right time, as by 1970 COR members came to the conclusion that their initial low-key 
meetings with various heads of state were insufficient to enact meaningful change and 
increase awareness. 
The initial years of COR activity from 1968 to 1970 tended to be characterized by 
private, behind-closed-door meetings with various international political figures.  Aurelio 
Peccei and the other core members such as Alexander King and Hugo Thiemann visited 
major cities of the world in North America, Asia, Eastern and Western Europe as well as 
holding consultations with numerous Third World nations. However, by 1970, Pecei and 
King began to become impatient with the lack of serious concern on the part of the 
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groups they had met about the Problematique. They were also concerned with the lack of 
specific outputs to indicate that actions were in the process of being taken to address the 
interrelated problems that, according the COR, imperilled the future of the world.48  
While largely discouraged and frustrated, they continued to believe that it was 
possible to create a greater awareness of the Problematique and to catalyze the search for 
its requisite solutions. However, the search for solutions had to be grounded in sound 
scientific research and methodologies. COR executive member Eduard Pestel felt that it 
was necessary for the organization to establish “a quantitative model” by which to study 
the Problematique in order to attract the attention of policy makers who tended to pay 
“scant attention… to verbal statements of the Problematique.”49 
By 1970, the time had come to start the process of finding solutions. It was 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Professor and COR member Carroll Wilson 
who played an instrumental role in starting the process of developing scientific 
methodologies to address the Problematique. As Forrester’s colleague at MIT, Wilson 
introduced Forrester and his systems analysis ideas to the broader COR membership. 
Wilson arranged for Forrester to be invited to the June 1970 COR meeting in Bern, 
Switzerland.50 The meeting had been held, in part, to discuss an offer from Germany’s 
Volkswagen Foundation to sponsor a COR institute to study the Problematique. Forrester 
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1989), p.22. 
50 -- “Activist on the World Stage: Carroll Wilson Remembered,” The MIT Tech Review, (February/ March 
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admitted that he felt like an outsider – “a dirty-American” - and stayed silent for the 
initial portion of the COR meeting.51 
At the meeting, representatives from Volkswagen threatened to revoke its offer to 
fund a European-based institute due to a “lack of evidence of a feasible methodological 
approach.”52 It was at that point that Forrester stepped forward and said that he could 
provide the requisite research methodologies through the application of systems 
dynamics. Forrester presented the way he thought systems analysis could be of use in 
developing solutions to the Problematique. The members in Bern decided to have an 
extended meeting to discuss his approach; it lasted long into the night. As a result COR 
Executive members, such as Eduard Pestel, had their interest piqued by Forrester’s 
approach and decided to accept Forrester’s offer to visit MIT three weeks after the 
meeting for a two week concentrated study on systems analysis and its application to the 
quest for solutions to the Problematique.53 Plans for the European agency were 
indefinitely suspended. 
With only three weeks to prepare, Forrester was concerned that he did not have 
any concrete study to discuss with the COR executive or to use as the basis for a two-
week seminar. However, on the plane trip back to the United States, Forrester was the 
sole passenger in the business-class section and decided to turn it into an impromptu 
office. There he used pencil and paper to map out a preliminary sketch of the global 
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52 Pestel, Beyond the Limits to Growth, p.23. 
53 Forrester Interview 
Dennis Meadows Interview. 
Meadows, “How The Limits To Growth Happened,” p.4. 
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model that served as the conceptual foundation upon which the Limits to Growth was 
based.54 
Upon returning to the MIT campus Forrester found his new graduate student 
Dennis Meadows willing to take charge of the COR project. Meadows and his wife 
Donella had just returned from a yearlong trip to Asia and he did not have any academic 
commitments.55 By the time the COR members arrived Forrester’s preliminary sketch 
had developed into a larger model and simulations had been run showing an eventual 
collapse of the macro world system. Work was also underway to discover what 
stabilizing factors could be introduced to extend the system and to create a stable state of 
equilibrium.56 The initial sketch became known as the World 1 Model, from which two 
subsequent models emerged. Forrester’s subsequent book, World Dynamics, presented an 
expanded version of the model and was dubbed the World 2 Model. Meanwhile, the 
Meadows team referred to their computer modelling system as the World 3 Model.57 It 
was more complex and involved additional equations to determine results. 
At the end of the two week seminar the COR decided to entrust the preliminary 
work associated with its Project on the Predicament of Mankind to the Sloan School at 
MIT. After much emotional debate and controversy, it was decided that in lieu of a 
European-based agency, funding would be transferred across the Atlantic to MIT. Eduard 
Pestel’s belief in the strength of Forrester’s convictions led him to convince the 
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Volkswagen Foundation to endorse the change in funding plans.58  In lieu of the original, 
and more expensive European-based proposal, the Volkswagen Foundation donated over 
$200,000 to the project. It was the first time that the Foundation had ever sponsored a 
non-European research program.59 COR co-founder Alexander King said that the 
organization was seeking a “demonstration of a new technique for studying the 
interaction of the various factors within the Problematique.”60  
With the endorsement of the methodological concept of Forrester’s “new 
technique,” the stage was set for the subsequent Limits to Growth report.  Dennis 
Meadows then assembled a team to do the macro-systems theory study examining the 
world as a single entity. However, as will be explained below, when the COR finally 
sponsored the publication of the MIT study in 1972 it was a substantially different type of 
report than Meadows and his technical team had envisioned.61 
The initial months of the project were spent testing and elaborating the World 1 
Model and seeking the proper quantifiable data to input into the computer models. The 
report was to have been a detailed scientific report replete with technical methodologies 
and data. Eight months into the project the COR asked for a progress report to be 
presented at a special COR meeting sponsored by the Canadian government and held at 
Montebello, Quebec in 1971. Dennis Meadows welcomed the meeting as he claimed that 
up to that point there had been substantial questions and misconceptions from COR 
members about the modelling project and its progress.62  
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Forrester accompanied the Meadows team to the meeting and gave a forceful 
presentation of his view that Problematique’s substratum was, to quote Donella 
Meadows’ recollection, “growth -- exponential growth of the physical economy and 
population against the earth's physical limits.”63 Forrester went on to claim that his 
conclusion was counterintuitive to prevailing concepts that held the belief that economic 
growth was the solution to the world’s ills, and not its root cause. The key message that 
Forrester sought to relate was: there were physical limits that would eventually be met 
and humanity had to choose either to take pre-emptive action or nature would eventually 
impose change once limits were met. In the latter situation, there would be far fewer 
options available and little manoeuvring room in which humanity could adapt to the 
changed circumstances and realities.64  The core message was initially lost on the COR 
members present. They continued to advocate growth solutions to global problems.65 
The initial discussions by the COR members at the Montebello meeting indicated 
to the Meadows team that many of the individuals at the meeting did not understand basic 
terms and/or had misconceptions about the project. As a result it was decided to write a 
brief ten-page memorandum listing in a non-technical manner the basic concepts and 
ideas associated with global modelling. Donella accepted the task of writing the circular 
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while other team members continued to develop and test the World 3 Model.66 
Meanwhile the preliminary conclusions that the Meadows team developed in 1971 were 
being discussed and evaluated at international conferences in cities such as Moscow and 
Rio de Janeiro. While criticisms and suggestions led to modifications to the models, the 
general approach of maintaining a global perspective continued.67 
However, it was through the process of preparing a general, non-technical report 
and defining key concepts for the COR members that the Limits to Growth was 
conceived. Response from COR members to the initial correspondence was replete with 
numerous comments, criticisms and, according to Dennis Meadows, further 
misunderstanding that made a second and more in-depth memo necessary.68 The 
correspondence cycle was repeated. By the summer of 1971, Donella Meadows was 
circulating a fifty-page memorandum among COR members. It was designed to present 
the basic conclusions initially reached by Forrester about the problems of growth. It was 
a general, as opposed to a technical, report that presented the basic arguments and 
conclusions about the problems of growth without going into technical details about 
feedback loops or the computer modelling sessions.69  
As with most COR matters, Aurelio Peccei was the key critical voice in favour of 
the report. Dennis Meadows said that Peccei informed him and the COR that it was 
Donella’s general overview that he wanted published as it had the ability to reach a 
broader and non-technical audience.  Four years after the formation of the Club of Rome, 
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Peccei was becoming impatient with the lack of popular awareness of the Problematique. 
In the general report, he perceived a popular accessible vehicle through which to deliver a 
clarion-call to the world that would convince people of the imminent need to adopt 
longer-range perspectives in their thinking and to ask ultimate questions about where the 
world was heading. He thought the report had the potential to engage the international 
community, at both the popular and elite levels, in a critical debate on the world’s future 
course.70 
Donella Meadows commented that once he had decided that it was the report that 
the Club of Rome needed, Peccei “called, cajoled, arranged, suggested, pushed, 
persuaded, organized publications, translations, and presentations,” drumming up interest 
in the forthcoming report. 71 Dennis Meadows had assumed that the main publications 
would have been the technical reports with a general report later.  However, Peccei’s 
insistence on first publishing the general report reversed the order of release of the reports 
and caused the general report to be published more quickly than the Meadows team 
would have liked.72 Peccei initially wanted 5000 copies of the general report ready for 
distribution as quickly as possible.73 
In addition to Peccei’s efforts, Dennis Meadows approached an academic press, 
Potomac Associates, in Washington to check for interest in publishing the report. 
Potomac agreed to publish the report and proceeded to take charge of building a publicity 
strategy to create a great deal of anticipation for the report’s release in March 1972.74 
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Peccei and Potomac combined to issue approximately 6700 complimentary copies that 
were “sent to the heads of state of all nations, all members of European Parliaments and 
the U.S. Congress, all U.S. state governors, all ambassadors to Washington and to the 
United Nations, and key journalists all over the world.”75 Dennis Meadows became 
involved in media interviews and Limits related events such as a day-long symposium at 
the Smithsonian Institute which attracted a great deal of media attention including 
reporters from the New York Times and the academic magazine Science.76 
The plan worked. Media reports about the upcoming book appeared months ahead 
of the report’s formal release. News of the aims of the project began to circulate among 
the general public early in the project’s life. In July 1971, Playboy provided in-depth 
coverage of the June 1971 Club of Rome (COR) meeting and Forrester’s involvement. 
The article said the COR “represented the best analytical minds of the world, with 
considerable influence to make funds available if a promising approach could be found to 
stop the suicidal roller coaster man now rides on.” It went on to describe Dennis 
Meadows’ role “in what surely [had to] be the least dramatic attempt ever made to save 
the world.”77  
The report was also aided by the release in June 1971 of Jay Forrester’s World 
Dynamics that contained the World 2 modelling system. Despite the technical nature of 
the book, it attracted attention from around the world and from various sources ranging 
from the London Observer, Christian Science Monitor and Wall Street Journal to the 
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decidedly non-academic popular journal Playboy.78 The World Dynamics book argued an 
analogous message to the subsequent Limits to Growth text.  The popularity of the 
Forrester book piqued public interest in the systems approach to world issues and, in part, 
set the stage for the media and academic frenzy that accompanied the Meadows’ text nine 
months later. 
Closer to the date of publication the more mainstream media also began to get 
interested. In January 1972 Time magazine carried the article “The Worst Is Yet to Be?” 
in anticipation of the release of the Limits to Growth.79 Similarly, the lead up to the 
book’s launch was covered by the New York Times as the paper began to run articles 
about its conclusions a month before the release of Limits.80 Advance coverage was not 
limited to the United States. In the Netherlands, where thousands of advanced copies had 
been distributed, historian S.W. Verstegen commented that before the official release in 
March 1972,  “two television documentaries had been broadcast and some important 
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newspapers and political magazines had published page-wide articles about the draft-
report.”81 
In 1972 the Limits to Growth also benefited from being written in a more popular 
style, and from being published at a time when environmental, ecological and economic 
concerns were coalescing.82 Historian S.W. Verstegen has commented that the  
that publication happened against the background of the 'sixties'. Without 
the ‘1968’ (student)-revolts in Paris, Amsterdam and Prague, without the 
Vietnam crisis, without the nuclear-arms race and the strong criticism 
against the American Military-Industrial Complex, the success of the 
Limits to Growth becomes incomprehensible.83 
 
The issues identified by Verstegen were, as previously discussed, also active in 
Canada and were part of the conscience-raising events such the 1970 oil tanker Arrow 
disaster in Nova Scotia and the impact of laundry phosphates on the environment in 
Ontario.84 It was a time in which science, the environment and economics became fused 
into a vast popular and academic debate over the future of the country and more generally 
the world.  From the impact of industrial pollutants in the Great Lakes, to the impact of 
pesticide use, to questions associated with the long term impact of nuclear waste and acid 
rain, Canadians were discussing the environment and economics as never before. 
Pollution Probe’s Anne Wordsworth commented that vast public concerns in the 1960s 
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and 1970s had “prompted the discovery and study of many complex and unresolved 
problems.”85 
1972 also proved to be an opportune year to release a book meant to spark a 
global debate on matters of economic growth and the ecological future of Earth. It was 
the year of the United Nations Environment Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm, Sweden, where the concept of sustainable development was first mentioned. 
The UN’s World Commission on Environment and Development subsequently defined 
the term as development meant to meet contemporary needs “without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 86 
The Limits to Growth illustrated in graphic terms that the world was 
interconnected, that it was possible to perceive likely consequences of contemporary 
action on the future, and that existing attitudes and practices regarding unfettered 
economic growth were not sustainable over the long term. Traditional attitudes towards 
economic growth and expansion were imperilling the future of all of humanity.87 Within 
Canada the Meadows report added to the ongoing debate being conducted by concerned 
groups such as Pollution Probe and the Canadian Environmental Law Association.88 The 
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Meadows report provided visual representations of data through graphs that presented a 
complex argument in an accessible manner that resonated with individuals who had had 
misgivings about the relationship between humanity and the environment.89  As well, the 
report gained credibility because it was produced by one of the world’s leading technical 
research universities, MIT, and it was sponsored by an organization of internationally 
renowned business leaders, academics and bureaucrats, the Club of Rome.90 
Furthermore in the year subsequent to its release, the Middle East Oil Crisis provided a 
proof of concept in terms of how the fate of the developed world was integrally linked to 
external forces in the developing world. Due to its integral connection to the industrial economy, 
questions of energy use and supply could not be examined in isolation. In 1973 the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to restrict oil production in order to inflate 
prices. This precipitated an energy crisis and moved the fears and concerns of many in the 
environmental, ecological and associated communities from the realm of theoretical concern to 
pragmatic reality. Ecologist and historian Anna Bramwell said that the crisis was “a vindication 
of economic ecologism,” and that it led to a “fusion of green values with resource fears.”91 COR 
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member Umberto Colombo said that the Crisis seemed to “confirm that the excessive 
exploitation of non-renewable resources was triggering serious problems.”92  
The strains of exponentially increasing population and industrial activities 
on a finite planet were leading to an uncertain future. The Meadows team stated 
“with some confidence,” that without any change in how the world conducted its 
affairs “population and industrial growth will certainly stop within the next 
century, at the latest.”93 However, the report was not meant to be an exercise in 
pessimistic clairvoyance. The Meadows team found hope in two key 
developments. The first was the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s that 
increased global crop yields.94 The second was the global spread of birth control, 
especially “the pill,” to the developing world. The report’s authors insisted that 
there remained optimism for the future. Humanity could use its collective 
“ingenuity and social flexibility” to change the future; the missing ingredient was 
collective political will.95 
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Dennis and Donella Meadows and their team illustrated that solving one 
or two specific problems within the interconnected global system was insufficient 
to “solve” the inherent problems of growth on a finite planet. For example, in an 
ideal situation with clean unlimited energy source being produced, pollution 
levels at minimal levels, optimum levels of food production in operation and 
effective birth control, there would still be a collapse and an end to growth before 
2100. Land would become exhausted and resources, no matter how efficiently 
extracted, would eventually run out. The resultant food shortage would be 
accompanied by a rise in pollution levels that would, in turn, reduce food 
availability levels. The conclusion reached in The Limits to Growth was that 
technological advances could improve relative living conditions and “prolong the 
period of population and industrial growth” but would not be able to remove “the 
ultimate limits” to growth.96   
The conclusion of The Limits to Growth presented scenarios in which growth 
continued, in a more limited capacity, to produce a stable world existing in a state of 
equilibrium. In such a situation, there would be an exchange of freedoms. People would 
have to give up rights to unlimited offspring and the untrammelled consumption of 
natural resources. In exchange, people could gain freedom from hunger and poverty, plus 
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gain greater educational and leisure opportunities.97 While utopian in tone, the image 
presented was a world in which the various interconnected-problems facing the world 
were effectively managed and the future was safeguarded. The Meadows’ team 
concluded that while there was “cause for deep concern, there [was] cause for hope.” 
There was still time and humanity had at its disposal “the most powerful combination of 
knowledge, tools and resources the world [had] ever known.” What was missing was a 
long-term goal for humanity and the will to move humanity down that road.98 
The success of the Limits publication was evident in October 1973 when 
Time magazine commented:  
Of all the predictions of ecological disaster, none have sounded more 
persuasive—or alarming—than those put forth last year under the banner 
of the prestigious Club of Rome. Based on computer projections of the 
present rate of population and industrial growth, a team of scientists at 
M.I.T. forecast massive economic collapse and global epidemics by the 
end of the 21st century.99 
 
The combination of an aggressive marketing plan, the use of novel 
technology (the computer) in presenting a dire warning about the future of planet 
earth and external conscious-raising events and crises served to make the Limits to 
Growth one of the most widely read books of the twentieth century. It was 
translated into thirty-seven languages and sold over 12 million copies.100 
Influential Canadians including Trudeau political advisor Ivan Head, Trudeau 
Cabinet Minister Allistair Gillespie, Globe & Mail Publisher Roy Megarry, and 
the founder of the Foundation for International Training (FIT) in Toronto Ranjit 
                                                 
97 Meadows et al. The Limits to Growth, p.184. 
98 Meadows et. al. The Limits to Growth, p.188. 
99 -- “Delaying Doomsday,” Time, (15 October 1973), 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,910822,00.html?internalid=related, (accessed 22 
August 2005). 
100 Navas, “The First Report to the Club of Rome,” p.3. 
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Kumar, all commented that their initial reaction to the work was to think of it as 
one of the most important books ever written.101 In terms of grabbing 
international attention and catalyzing debate, the first Club of Rome-sponsored 
report was a resounding success. 
 Despite a lack of agreement about arguments and implications, the COR 
Executive were generally pleased with the report’s impact.102 The Limits to Growth had 
illustrated that systems analysis could be used as a methodological tool to examine the 
Problematique and the report stimulated a global debate that the COR had hoped to 
initiate.103  Executive member Eduard Pestel has commented that modelling systems 
could not predict the future, but could inform the future.104 
 Alexander King said that the COR executive felt that “it was the report [the COR] 
had originally asked for, namely the demonstration of a new technique for studying the 
                                                 
101 Ivan Head, Conversation with Author, February 2004. (Hereafter: Head Interview).  
Allistair Gillespie, Conversation with Author June 2004. (Hereafter Gillespie Interview). 
Roy Megarry, Conversation with Author, May 2004. (Hereafter Megarry Interview). 
Ranjit Kumar, Conversation with Author, January 2004. (Hereafter Kumar Interview). 
102 Given the diverse nature of COR members it was not likely that there would ever be unanimous 
agreement on such a controversial topic as global growth. From the early stages of the Meadows’ report, 
COR members had been expressing both support and strong reservations. The main author of the book, 
Donella Meadows, relates that the correspondence she had from COR members after the 1971 Montebello 
meeting was, “a foreshadowing of what the world's reaction would be.  Some members of the Club were 
elated by the general report.  Some were horrified.” COR member Eduard Pestel, in the year preceding the 
report’s publication, thought the report was a useful popularizing tool, but, conceded the inherent problems 
of using novel methodologies to approach existing complex problems. Pestel said that while it was meant 
for an educated, but non-technical audience, it had to have the ability to withstand the vigour of scientific 
review. 
Meadows, “How The Limits To Growth Happened,” pp.8-9. 
King, “Email Response.” 
103 The Commentary epilogue written by the Executive at the end of the report stated that the group had two 
key objectives that were met. The first was to examine the limits to the world system and the constraints it 
placed on human activity. The second objective was to provide warnings to humanity if existing trends 
were allowed to continue into the future. 
Alexander King, Saburo Okita, Aurelio Peccei, Eduard Pestel, Hugo Thiemann and Carroll Wilson, 
“Commentary,” in Meadows et. al. The Limits to Growth, p.189. 
104 Pestel, Beyond the Limits to Growth, p.37. 
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interaction of the various factors within a Problematique.” 105 He added that it was 
“prophylactic futurology,”106 and “not an exercise in doomsterism.”107  As well, Aurelio 
Peccei described the report as a pioneering success that clearly demonstrated “material 
growth cannot go on forever.”108  Japanese COR Executive member Saburo Okita 
commented that despite the criticisms, “the idea of ‘limits’ shocked people into an 
awareness that they could not continue to think of the earth as an unlimited source for 
exploitation by man.”109 Hugo Thiemann went so far as to claim that it was the COR’s 
most valuable contribution to the world as it “created worldwide awareness of 
environmental problems (Rio, Kyoto, Johannesburg).”110 
 
Systems Analysis and Functional Politics Canadian Style 
Trudeau advisor Ivan Head stated that when the Limits to Growth was 
published “it created quite the stir,” not because of its arguments but rather due to 
the new policy planning possibilities suggested by the use of systems analysis. He 
claimed that individuals such as Jim Davey within the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO) and C.R. Buzz Nixon within the Privy Council Office (PCO) understood 
and discussed the possibilities offered by systems analysis.111 Political scientist 
Richard French commented that within the federal public policy framework of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, traditional areas of expertise such as economics and 
                                                 
105 King, “Email Response.” 
106 King, Another Kind of Growth p.13. 
107 King, “Email Response.” 
108 Italics were in the original quote. The message flew in the face of traditional opinions and Peccei felt 
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Peccei, The Human Quality, pp.84-85. 
109 Saburo Okita, Japan’s Challenging Years: Reflections on My Lifetime, (Sydney: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1983), p.82. 
110 Hugo Thiemann, Email Correspondence with Author, February 2004. 
111 Ivan Head, Conversation with Author, February 2004. 
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political science were augmented by a “a group of “horizontal” disciplines – 
cybernetics and modelling, technological forecasting and futurology – which 
attempted to knit together the concerns of the traditional disciplines.”112  
Prime Minister Trudeau and key policy advisors were drawn to the 
methodology and thinking process advocated by the Club of Rome rather than any 
specific arguments presented in The Limits to Growth. It was the need for a new 
approach to politics and economics that piqued interest in the organization. In 
1976 US Ambassador to Canada Thomas Enders “was struck” by the fact that 
while Trudeau “explicitly disavow[ed] The Limits to Growth,” the Prime Minister 
referred “frequently to Club of Rome thinking on the need for new political and 
moral approaches.”113 
 Canadian political scientists including James Fleming, Donald Savoie, G. 
Bruce Doern and others argue that under Trudeau, the power of horizontal central 
agencies – especially the PMO and PCO – gained greater strength and became 
integral to the policy making process.114 As well the centrality of the Treasury 
Board to the policy process was maintained. Trudeau advisor Michael Pitfield 
said that the Treasury Board fulfilled a crucial role in ensuring that programs and 
objectives were closely linked so that “the government’s policy levers [were] in 
fact connected with the rest of the machine.”115 Some bureaucrats from the 
strengthened central institutions, such as Jim Davey, C. R. Nixon, Michael 
                                                 
112 Richard D. French, How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy Making 1968 – 1984, 
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1984), p.19. 
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Pitfield and others attended meetings with COR individuals, and/or attended 
conferences hosted by the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (CACOR). 
From such meetings and presentations as well as subsequent papers that were 
made available, the possibilities of applying systems analysis approaches to 
policy development were examined.116 
The man most responsible for the radical changes to the operation of the civil 
service was Michael Pitfield, a CACOR member, who was described by political scientist 
Nicole Morgan as “a young alter ego of the Prime Minister himself.”117 His bureaucratic 
obsessions with transforming the public policy process reflected the views and attitudes 
of the Club of Rome.  According to Morgan, the Pitfield-Trudeau approach to a 
rationalized civil service had three key elements. The first was a belief that it was 
possible to rationally plan the future based upon “an analytical understanding of society.” 
Second that it was possible to rationally coordinate all bureaucratic activities. And third 
                                                 
116 Head Interview. 
French, How Ottawa Decides, p.22. 
King Response. 
Hugo Thiemann, “Email Correspondence 5 April 2004.”  
Fred G. Thompson, “Note to Staff of PCO/PMO/FPCO, 15 December 1978,” Material supplied by J. 
Rennie Whitehead from personal archive.  
-- “Appendix: Third Annual Conference – Ottawa, 9 & 10 May, 1977, Canadian Association for the Club 
of Rome,” (CACOR Archives: File 5008: CACOR Newsletter, Sept. 1977), pp.1-4. 
Conference Organizing Committee, “Canadian Conference on Global Modelling April 26-27 1978: 
Summary of Proceedings,” (CACOR Archives:  File 206: Canadian Conference on Global Modelling 
Summary of Proceedings, Report to CACOR), pp.22-28. 
117  Trudeau cabinet minister Donald Johnson commented that Pitfield “did not hesitate to speak unctuously 
in the name of the Prime Minister.” Johnson said that he was never able to fully discern if Pitfield always 
directly carried out Trudeau’s wishes or if the Prime Minister was indifferent and content to allow Pitfield 
to decide upon matters independently. Either way Pitfield enjoyed Trudeau’s full confidence and acted 
accordingly. 
Morgan, Implosion, p.67. 
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there was a strong need to recruit fresh individuals with “new ideas” to the civil 
service.118  
Conclusion 
As mentioned in this chapter and further developed in the subsequent chapters, 
holistic and interrelated thinking permeated public policy development in the Trudeau 
era. The Prime Minister and his key advisors sought to ensure that government objectives 
were clearly identified and that policies were closely related to objectives.119  Pitfield 
lamented that in the mid-1970s a lack of holistic thinking on policy issues remained and 
that people still failed to view government “as a total system.” He went on to claim that 
often policies were viewed in isolation and that politicians, bureaucrats and the general 
public, “increasingly lose sight of the comprehensive web of inter-relationships.” The 
problem with the lack of holistic thinking was that it often led to “erroneous analysis, 
inappropriate and wasteful prescriptions.”120  
However, horizontal, holistic approaches to policy development used vast 
quantities of time, energy, and personnel and often failed to result in concrete policy 
                                                 
118 Within the Canadian federal public policy nexus, the horizontal approach to policy development came to 
transcend such ideas and became increasingly complex as the idea also became associated with the idea of 
consensus building on the part of “stakeholders”. Canadian bureaucratic expert Donald Savoie has argued 
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outputs. Moreover the time required was not conducive to rapid policy development 
meant to attract popular attention and electoral support. Important Trudeau Cabinet 
Ministers such as Allan MacEachen, Eugene Whelan and others came to question the 
ultimate utility of Trudeau reforms to the cabinet meeting and decision-making system 
within the federal government. There were also concerns expressed about the relative 
lack of concrete policy outputs for the general public that would signal an active 
government. Minister MacEachen expressed his opinion that the contrast between the 
volume of policy initiatives during the minority government of Lester B. Pearson and the 
relative lack of legislative outputs during the first Trudeau majority government was a 
key reason for the Liberal’s electoral difficulties in 1972.121  
While there were complaints from within cabinet and there were election 
difficulties, Trudeau remained committed to holistic and rational public policy 
development. The following tw chapters illustrates how that commitment played itself 
out in various federal departments and agencies.
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Chapter 4: The Spread of Influence (Part 1) – Systems and the Horizontal Axis of 
Power 1968-1978 
 
The previous two chapters dealt with the intellectual synergies created between 
the Club of Rome (COR) and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s government. Both 
organizations had a deep interest in holistic rational policy development and were drawn 
to the possibilities being presented by the emergent fields of cybernetics and systems 
analysis. COR was drawn to systems analysis because it offered a scientific methodology 
by which to examine the interrelated problems facing humanity in the Problematique. 
Systems modelling also gained attention within the early phase of Trudeau’s government  
as it dovetailed with Trudeau’s and his advisors’ attempts to introduce a greater degree of 
rationality and holistic thinking into the policy formation process. The interest in a new 
approach was evident at the Cabinet level, the supporting central institutions - Privy 
Council Office, Treasury Board and Prime Minister’s Office  - as well as in the formation 
of new institutions such as the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and 
the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP).1   
This and the next chapter shift attention away from the Prime Minister and 
examine more closely the efforts of COR/ Canadian Association for the Club of Rome 
(CACOR) member and Senator Maurice Lamontagne. Although the modernizing and 
systems-analysis approach to policy development discussed earlier continued on in the 
background, Lamontagne and others were actively promoting the associated ideas of 
systems analysis and futures studies to a wider bureaucratic and lay audience. 
  
                                                 
1 G. Bruce Doern, and Thomas Conway, The Greening of Canada: Federal Institutions  
and Decisions, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p.18. 
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CACOR Established and Idea Practitioners 
As mentioned in the introduction, Trudeau and other influential individuals had 
been in contact with the COR since shortly after its inception in 1968, but there was no 
national COR association into the 1970s.2  In 1974 six Canadian members of the Club of 
Rome: Rennie Whitehead, Ronald Ritchie, Wiliam Stadelman, Senator Lamontagne, 
Pierre Gendron, and Robert Uffen, decided to formalise a COR presence in the country. 
With a letter of support from the Prime Minister, a meeting was called in May for 
interested individuals to meet in Toronto to discuss the possibility of forming the 
Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (CACOR).3 By the end of two days of 
deliberations it was decided to go ahead with CACOR’s formation. The six COR 
members were joined by other influential Canadians including former Governor General 
Roland Michener, and then head of the C.D. Howe Institute Robert Fowler. Fowler 
accepted the position as Vice-Chairman and took responsibility for officially 
incorporating the organization under the Canadian Corporations Act and registering 
CACOR as a charitable organization.4 
CACOR’s principle objectives were to “promote study and discussion” of the 
interrelated problems facing humanity and potentially imperilling its future though the 
lens of the Problematique. It also sought to examine the Canadian implications of the 
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Problematique and “to be a catalyst in seeking solutions and the identification of 
Canada’s possible roles to promote” potential solutions.5  
A large part of the influential presence exerted by the COR and CACOR in 
Canada stemmed from the determination and activities of Senator Maurice Lamontagne 
who became a key idea practitioner for systems analysis within the Canadian context. He 
played a similar role as critical idea practitioners discussed in the book What’s the Big 
Idea? The Senator provided a crucial link between idea and practice to “bring about 
change in organizations.”6 Through his chairmanship of the Special Senate Committee on 
Science Policy- known as the Lamontagne Committee – he was able to encourage the 
adoption of systems ideas in the policy process through the Ministry of State for Science 
and Technology (MOSST).  
Imbued with a strong sense of urgency and believing in the importance of the 
need for greater holistic prospective thinking in policy development, Lamontagne’s 
beliefs echoed the key concerns of the Club of Rome. He set in motion processes that 
raised the profile of systems analysis, global modelling and futures studies in Canada. 
Lamontagne said that the need for systems analysis and futures studies was urgent and 
essential. The Senator claimed “without a better and more widely shared view of 
alternative futures, it [would] be impossible… to generate the collective will necessary to 
build the New Society on the basis of freedom, justice, efficiency and realistic 
expectations.”7 
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This and the next chapter will look at the cascading impact of Lamontagne’s 
efforts. The current chapter describes how MOSST sponsorship of visits by COR 
individuals led to an opportune meeting of minds in support of an initiative by Ranjit 
Kumar of Seneca College. The result of their combined efforts was the establishment of 
the Foundation for International Training (FIT) in Toronto. The next chapter will 
examine additional impacts of the Lamontagne Committee report by examining the 
Senator’s efforts to further promote and institutionalize systems thinking and future 
studies within the Canadian public policy community. 
 
Maurice Lamontagne, The Troubled Road to Being a Senator 
Maurice Lamontagne enjoyed a distinguished career as an economist before his 
election to parliament in 1963 in the Quebec riding of Outremont-Saint-Jean. He received 
a Masters degree in Economics from Harvard in 1943, taught at the universities of Laval 
and Ottawa, in 1955 was an Economic Advisor to the Privy Council, and was appointed 
special economic advisor to future Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in 1958.8 Pearson 
described Lamontagne, along with Allan MacEachen and Tom Kent, as being three of his 
closest advisors: “idea men, with ideas very much in harmony with my own.”9 The value 
and trust that Pearson had in Lamontagne’s opinions was evident in 1963 when the 
recently elected Prime Minister consulted Lamontagne and Allan MacEachen exclusively 
to get critical advice on the formation of his minority government’s cabinet.10 
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Lamontagne was a driving force behind the creation of the Economic Council of 
Canada (ECC). He first proposed the idea at the 1960 Liberal Thinkers Conference in 
Kingston and in subsequent years became the person who introduced the bill to establish 
the organization in parliament.11 The Liberal Party had publicly advocated the creation of 
an economic advisory council since 1962. The initial idea was to bring together various 
economic interests, including business, labour and agriculture, which would work 
together and as a forward-looking unit provide the government with economic advice on 
coordinating economic policies that took into account the national interest. By April 1963 
the idea had evolved into creating a national economic council of planners to “make 
forecasts and prepare programs designed to make the Canadian economy grow and 
flourish.”12 
The ECC was established in 1963 to study medium and long-term prospects for 
the Canadian economy.13 While the new organization began its work in earnest in 1963-
1964, Lamontagne’s career as a Cabinet Minister suffered a fatal blow. In what was 
described by Prime Minister Pearson as “a sorry and a sad business,”14 Lamontagne was 
eventually forced to resign, along with a second cabinet minister René Tremblay, due to a 
controversy the erupted over furniture.15 
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Lamontagne’s arrangement to pay for the approximately $6,800 worth of 
furniture was described by Conservative opposition critic Erik Nielsen as being “unusual, 
to say the very least: he had set up what could justly be called the pay-me-if-you-see-
method.”16 The cabinet minister did not establish a regular monthly payment plan until 
after the Sefkinds had fled the country and their main creditor, the Bank of Montreal, 
demanded that he settle the account. Lamontagne considered the affair to have been a 
strictly private matter with “no public side effect… at all.”17 His colleague Tom Kent said 
the scandal was the result of a strong sense of financial and political naiveté on the part of 
the novice cabinet minister and his honesty in dealing with the press. Kent went on to 
state that there were “few men wiser in large matters than Maurice Lamontagne, but he 
was no tactician.” 18 
The weight of the scandal on Lamontagne caused the Prime Minister to worry 
about both his health and his future. In an interview with journalist Bruce Hutchison the 
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Prime Minister said that Lamontagne had ended up in hospital with a nervous breakdown 
and Pearson did not think that he would “ever be good for anything again.”19   
Lamontagne was not initially asked to resign his cabinet position. The Prime Minister 
described Lamontagne as “a darn good Canadian” and said he would not “destroy a man 
because he made a mistake.”20  
In the subsequent election in November 1965 the Liberals received a minority 
government and some Liberal insiders complained to Pearson that the furniture scandal 
had been at least partially responsible. The next month, Pearson asked the two 
beleaguered cabinet ministers to resign. Lamontagne had asked his party and his long-
time colleague and friend for support to defend himself against the newest attacks. The 
negative response from Pearson left him with a sense of bitterness that persisted after his 
resignation in December 1965. 21 This was not, however, the end of Lamontagne’s 
political career.  
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The Economic Council of Canada and Medium -Range Studies 
While Lamontagne was becoming embroiled in political controversies, the 
organization he helped to create, the Economic Council of Canada (ECC), was busy 
establishing itself and formulating research strategies. During its early operations the 
ECC stated five key goals it hoped to accomplish: full employment, a high economic 
growth rate, price stability, a positive balance of payments and, finally to ensure a fair 
distribution of rising incomes.22 If the goals were taken as benchmarks to measure the 
success of the organization, it was not successful. In the opinion of both critics and 
supporters, such as economists H. Scott Gordon and Lamontagne, the ECC failed to reach 
its benchmarks.23  
Theories about the organization’s inability to achieve its lofty goals are numerous. 
As early as the ECC’s second report, fundamental problems with how the organization 
was established were evident.  Professor H. Scott Gordon commented that its status as an 
independent research institute, its roles, responsibilities, scope of inquiry and how it fit 
into the policy making process were all ill-defined in the 1963 enabling legislation. He 
went on to state “the Council was brought into being on the basis of little more than a 
rather vague feeling that since many other countries had created similar agencies and 
regarded them as valuable, it would unlikely prove a mistake to establish one in 
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Canada.”24 Economist Gilles Paquet concurred and claimed that the level of ambiguity 
and vagueness about the purpose and operation of the ECC was needlessly high and 
hindered its work.25 
In addition to ambiguities emerging from the establishment legislation, the ECC 
suffered further fundamental problems. National Research Council and Canadian 
Association for the Club of Rome member Clive Simmonds argued that the prospect of 
achieving full employment was unrealistic and that Pierre Trudeau was one of the first to 
recognise that the goal was not tenable. In 1972 Trudeau openly pondered the need to 
rethink commitment to the work ethic and to accept unemployment as a permanent part 
of national life. He further added that the hope of full employment was not attainable and 
it was time to develop new values that replaced the traditional notion of the right to 
work.26 
Twelve years into its operations, idea-originator Lamontagne conceded that the 
ECC’s impact had at best been marginal.  In 1975 the country “was still without an 
integrated plan… policies [had] not become more broad-based, long-sighted and co-
ordinated.”27 Academic B. W. Wilkinson added that the ECC appeared to follow rather 
than lead government economic policy development. He explained that the difficulty 
came in part due to a timid reluctance to set priorities for society and also due to the 
relatively simplistic nature of their annual reports. Wilkinson stated that the EEC reports 
tended “not go beyond the first year university economics level in their profundity.”28 
                                                 
24 Gordon, An Assessment, pp.1-2. 
25 Paquet, “The Economic,” p.146. 
26 Simmonds, “Canada’s Social,” p.3. 
-- “PM Ponders Future: Pay Folks to be Idle?” Montreal Gazette, (17 March 1972), p.17. 
27 Lamontagne, “The Conflict,” p.11. 
28 B. W. Wilkinson, The Sixth Annual Review: A Commentary, (Montreal: Private Planning Association of 
Canada, 1969), p.36. 
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Trudeau biographers Christina McCall and Stephen Clarkson subsequently described the 
ECC’s reports as independent but orthodox and said that Trudeau tended to dismiss them, 
as they were often critical of his government.29 
The ECC’s focus on the medium-term prospects, and lack of attention to both 
short and long-term studies, also came in for severe criticism. EEC staff person Fred 
Thompson, who had been with the organization since its inception, said there was a 
distinct reluctance to conduct long-range studies, in part, due to a general reluctance on 
the part of economists to look beyond five-year intervals.30 O. E. Thür, the ECC’s Vice 
President in 1974, admitted that in its first decade of operation, especially in the annual 
reports of 1964, 1967 and 1969, attention had been restricted to medium-term projections 
of five years into the future.31 
Senator Lamontagne’s disappointment, with the ECC was evident in a 1975 paper 
he presented at the “Conference on Limits to Growth ’75” in Texas. His paper, “The 
Conflict Between Frequent Elections and Distant Goals,” was presented as a cautionary 
tale to an American audience who were considering establishing a similar institute within 
                                                 
29 Christina McCall and Stephen Clarkson, Trudeau and Our Times Volume 2: The Heroic Delusion, 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1994), p.126. 
30 Thompson went on to explain that in 1967, he was unequivocally told by ECC Chairman Arthur Smith 
that the time frame for studies was to be five years and that one of the senior staff economists added that 
the organization did not want futurologists.  
Fred G. Thompson, Looking Back on the Future, (Ottawa: Futurescan International Inc., 1992), p.11, 
pp.64-65. 
31 Academics Norman Mogil and B. W. Wilkinson commented that the ECC’s mandate separating short-
term policies from medium-term goals was inherently flawed. Mogil said that the separating of the two was 
“at best difficult and often impossible… commenting on a three-to-five year performance must include an 
implicit comment on the one-to-two year performance.”  
O. E. Thür, “The Economic Council of Canada as a Catalyst,” in Robert A. Mundell and B. Elayne van 
Snellenberg (editors), Policy Formation in an Open Economy: Volume 1, (Waterloo: University of 
Waterloo, 1974), p.62.  
Norman Mogil, The Economic Council’s Ninth Annual Review: Forecasting with CANDIE, (Montreal: C. 
D. Howe Research Institute, 1973), p.21, 44.  
Wilkinson, The Sixth Annual, p.35. 
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the President’s Office.32 The Senator sought to explain why Canada’s first major attempt 
at planning failed “in the hope that [Canada’s] own mistakes [would] not be repeated 
elsewhere, especially in the United States.”33 He argued that the ECC’s focus was too 
narrow and failed to account for all the factors that can influence economic growth.34 The 
Senator’s harshest criticisms concerned the ECC’s lack of ability to influence the 
direction of federal economic policy. According to Lamontagne, the key reasons the 
ECC’s impact had been marginal were because the ECC’s plans for incorporating long-
term perspectives remained in the preliminary stages and, secondarily, it had failed to 
“produce a comprehensive and detailed plan,” about how to achieve its goals.35 
While ultimately disappointed with the ECC, Lamontagne retained a strong belief 
in the need to incorporate long-range thinking into policy development. Fortunately for 
the Senator, he got a second chance to promote and institutionalize long-range research 
and policy development in Canada.  While his elected political career may have been 
shortened by the furniture scandal, his public service career was extended due to the 
generosity of Prime Minister Pearson. It is to Lamontagne’s second political career that 
the chapter now turns its attention. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Lamontagne, “The Conflict,” pp.1-2. 
33 The criticisms of the ECC discussed by Lamontagne often reflected the criticisms noted above. This was 
evident in his discussion of the ECC’s lack of attention to short and long-term considerations, unrealistic 
expectations and a lack of impact on government policy development. Senator Lamontagne commented 
that the early assumptions of the ECC’s reports were predicated upon an unrealistic expectation that the 
international economic environment would remain favourable. The ECC’s O. E. Thür conceded the fact in 
1974 when he said the organization’s methodology used known data and projected findings to a specific 
terminal end date and “the path between the two points of time was assumed to be perfectly regular.” 
Lamontagne, “The Conflict,” pp.3-4, p.12. 
Thür, “The Economic Council,” p.62. 
34 Lamontagne, “The Conflict,” p.7, pp.12-16. 
35 Lamontagne, “The Conflict,” pp.16-18. 
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The Lamontagne Commission and Canadian Science Policy 
In April 1967 Maurice Lamontagne was called to the Senate where he served with 
distinction and great energy.36  As an appointed Senator, away from the pressures of 
electoral politics, Lamontagne was able to devote a substantial amount of time and 
energy to his passion for popularizing futures studies and finding means of incorporating 
long-range planning into the public policy making process. Contemporary Tom Kent 
believed that the former Cabinet Minister was “one of the few brilliant exceptions” to the 
idea that Senators contribute little to the political process and that the Senatorial setting 
“served like a tenured professorship to a man with an active mind.”37  
While both Pearson and subsequently Trudeau attempted to improve science 
policy, it was evident in the late 1960s that serious problems that needed to be addressed 
remained.38 Treasury Board Secretary Simon Reisman alleged that Canadian science 
                                                 
36 On the same day Pearson also appointed Mary Elizabeth Kinnear, John Keith Laird and Andrew Ernest 
Joseph Thompson to the Senate. 
Canada’s Who’s Who, “Lamontagne,” p.566. 
Senate of Canada, “Senators 1867 to Date by Prime Minister - PEARSON, Lester Bowles,” Senators and 
Members – Historical Information, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/people/Senate/SenIdx.asp?lang=E&Hist=Y&param=pm&id=151, 
(accessed 30 August 2005). 
37 Kent, A Public Purpose, p.331. 
38 Attempts to reform and coordinate the development of Canadian science policy had begun during the 
early years of the Pearson government.  With the 1962 Glassco Commission Report as a catalyst, in 1963-
1964 the Privy Council Office (PCO) established a specific Science Secretariat to help with policy 
coordination. It was also mandated to provide science information to the Prime Minister, PCO, Cabinet, 
and subsidiary committees, as well as to other agencies including the Treasury Board. As well the 
secretariat was involved in discussions on science topics within departments and conducted special studies 
if requested. Finally it advised External Affairs about science issues related to international relations. While 
it occupied an important position, it remained strictly a neutral advisory body that had neither granting 
powers nor the ability to develop national science policies.  
Two years later, in 1966, the Science Council of Canada was created as a Crown corporation to provide 
regular overviews (through reports) of Canada’s science research resources and activities. Established as an 
analogous institution to the Economic Council of Canada, the Science Council was to make policy 
recommendations to government concerning research and development programs within the context of 
contributing to solving the country’s various economic and social problems. The Science Council was 
expected to assume responsibility for long-term research and development planning and for assessing the 
role of government science policy in relation to the academic and private sectors. In addition, it was 
responsible for the collection of science research and the development of statistical information. Finally, it 
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policy was ‘the by-product of separate cabinet decisions on individual government 
programs.’39 As a result of a perceived need for reform, in November of 1967 
Lamontagne was asked to chair a special Senate Committee to examine the relative 
position of Canadian science activities and policies in comparison to other industrialized 
nations and to determine “the requirements of the new scientific age.”40 Environmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
was responsible for devising the best methods of cooperation and the sharing scientific information 
between the public and private sectors.  
An Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) review of science in Canada 
commented that prior to the Science Council being made into a corporation similar to the Economic 
Council of Canada in 1969, a great deal of confusion between the Science Council and Science Secretariat 
existed. The OECD said there was a strong need for clarification of roles and responsibilities. The Science 
Council’s status as a corporation helped to lessen confusion as it came to advise the government on issues 
of long-term science development and programs while the Secretariat concerned itself with the ongoing 
issues of administration, decision-making and implementation of science policies. Nonetheless, neither 
organization had the complete ability to undertake the development of comprehensive national science 
policy strategies. A key problem was the fact that their respective roles were consultative; they were not 
mandatory members of the decision making process. They were consulted only by invitation from either 
representatives of the Cabinet or the Treasury Board.  
Meanwhile Pearson’s successor Trudeau also made an initial attempt to improve science policy. While 
admitting “some apparent disadvantages,” Trudeau asked the President of the Treasury Board, C. M. Drury, 
to also assume responsibility for science policy. However, Treasury Board lacked the authority, expertise 
and staff to develop and implement national science policies.  
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Third Session Twenty-Eighth Parliament, Volume VII, 1971, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1971), p.7170.  
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scientist Ronald Hayes argued that most of the twenty-six Senators who served on the 
Committee, with the exceptions of Lamontagne and Conservative Senator Allister 
Grosart, “were, in truth, sleepers.” He went on to state: “[the]chairman, Senator 
Lamontagne, was in complete dominance.”41  
Initial activities for the Lamontagne Commission consisted of laying the 
foundations for subsequent work through national and international correspondence with 
science experts about Canada’s science activities in a comparative context.42 Reflecting 
an approach consistent with holistic systems thinking, the Commission adopted an open-
ended strategy for recruiting groups to appear before the committee and for accepting 
submissions to help with their report. The decision to take a liberal view of the term 
“science” provided the opportunity for the various Canadian research groups from 
government, federal agencies, academic institutions, industry and various professional 
organizations to take part. Hayes claimed that many “surprised professors from the 
humanities” were invited to appear before the Committee. He added that it appeared that 
                                                                                                                                                 
C. M. Drury, “Commons Debates 21 June 1971,” House of Commons Debates: Official Report – Third 
Session Twenty-Eighth Parliament, Volume VII, 1971, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1971), p.7166. (Hereafter 
Commons Hansard) 
Jean Sauvé, “Commons Debates 1 March 1974,” Commons Hansard Second Session Twenty-Ninth 
Parliament, Volume 1, 1974, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1974), pp.96-97. 
41 Senator Grosart’s later questioning of Science Council Chairman O. M. Solandt on potential projects for 
the IDRC further illustrated the extent to which Lamontagne dominated committee proceedings and his 
devotion to systems analysis. In asking Solandt to describe potential IDRC projects Grosart claimed he was 
going to ask Solandt “to draw a ‘picture’ but, as a graduate of Senator Lamontagne’s committee, perhaps I 
should say ‘a structural model’”. 
F. Ronald Hayes, The Chaining of Prometheus: Evolution of a Power Structure for Canadian Science, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp.52-53. 
Senator Allister Grosart, “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 17 March 
1970), Debates of the Senate Official Report (Hansard), Second Session-Twenty-Eighth Parliament 1969-
70, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers, 1970), p.1015. (hereafter Senate Hansard) 
42 The Senate also stimulated a broader public forum for discussing Canadian science policy. However, 
when Parliament was prorogued for the 1968 election all Senate activities came to an end. The subsequent 
year it was decided in the new Senate session to continue the committee’s work. 
Drury, “Commons Debates 21 June 1971,” p.7166. 
Maurice Lamontage, “Senate Debates, 13 and 17 September 1968,” Senate Hansard, First Session 
Twenty-Eighth Parliament, Volume I, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969), p.16, pp.32-34.. 
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Senator Lamontagne saw science being involved in all areas of government with two 
exceptions: the judiciary and French-English relations. Science became equated simply 
with knowledge in any academic form.43 
 It was a definition that echoed Aurelio Peccei’s opinion of science as “profound 
knowledge, orderly thought, systematic research and impartial attitude.”44 The results of 
using a broad definition for what constituted “science” produced approximately 12,000 
pages of submissions and a report that provided a wide-ranging snapshot of research 
activities in the country and opinions on what was needed for the future.45   
At a cumulative cost of $435,000 the results of the Senate’s initial inquiries and 
research were released in 1970 and contained strong criticisms of the state of Canadian 
science policy development. Manitoba MP David Orlikow described the science report as 
“the most systematic and detailed study ever undertaken in this country.” He went on to 
state that it had “made the most scathing comments.” 46 The report lamented the lack of 
effective science policy coordination at the federal government level.  The Lamontagne 
Committee Report argued that a substantial policy vacuum that prevented the 
development of coordinated and effective science policies existed at the central federal 
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level. It further noted that the Science Secretariat and the Science Council of Canada both 
lacked the ability to develop and implement coordinated science policies.47 
The Lamontagne Committee Report often emphasised points that had previously 
been made in the 1969 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) report into the status of science policy development in Canada. The OECD study 
bluntly stated that Canada’s “science policy machinery [was] not complete…. The scope 
of the revised institutions would have to go beyond mere reorganization of government 
functions in regard to science policy; they would also have to include application of the 
decisions.”48 The first Lamontagne Committee Report concluded with the stern 
admonition that Canada “must develop a coherent overall science policy… not only [to] 
meet… economic objectives more easily but also [to] more realistically face… mounting 
social problems.”49 The conclusion echoed the OECD report that said Canada “must set 
up institutions and agencies to guide science policy with an eye to its effects and future 
results, as well as in the light of past experience.”50 Both international and national 
observers examining science policy development in Canada had arrived at similar 
conclusions. The OECD followed by the Lamontagne Committee established the need for 
the federal government to improve how public science policy was developed. 
When taken together both the OECD and the Lamontagne Commission reports 
had a substantial impact on the subsequent development of Canadian science policy. 51 
The Conservative opposition in the Commons used the reports to confront the 
                                                 
47 Lamontagne Report, Vol. 1, pp.183-188. 
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government over an apparent lack of policy coordination. 52 Opposition leader Robert 
Stanfield asked what was planned to address the criticisms of the government’s science 
policy development “by the committee of the Senate on science, following upon criticism 
by the OECD some time ago.”53 
 
MOSST – The Federal Response to the Senate and OECD Criticisms 
The federal response to the 1969 OECD report and the subsequent 1970 
publication of The Lamontagne Report was swift. Within a year, in 1971, MOSST was 
established to fill the science policy formation void and to provide coherent science 
policy leadership.54 The creation of a Ministry, as opposed to a dedicated department, 
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 159
would ensure that project control remained in the traditional departments supporting 
science research and development initiatives.55  
MOSST supporter Keith Hymmen explained that with the help of a secretary and, 
a small number of operational assistants, MOSST’s Minister would be able to work with 
existing agencies and actors, such as the Science Council of Canada, in helping to design 
science policy without excessive numbers of bureaucrats being involved.56 Cabinet 
member Charles M. Drury echoed Hymmen’s sentiments and explained in the House of 
Commons that activity related to science and technology was pervasive throughout 
federal departments.  MOSST’s role was “not intended to fragment the responsibilities of 
other ministers.…[it was] principally one of advising the government on virtually all 
matters relating to science and technology... [and] to foster co-operative relationships” 
nationally and internationally. 57 
MOSST was “made responsible for the overall formulation of policy and the co-
ordination of government programs and activities in the area of science and 
technology.”58 MPs John Maclean and Drury added that MOSST’s most important roles 
were in helping to create coherent science policy, and in “advising, monitoring, 
forecasting and co-ordinating” science policy in coordination of federal spending 
priorities. It was further expected that MOSST would develop and use forecasting 
                                                 
55 Both The Lamontagne Report and the 1969 OECD report that rejected outright the creation of a Ministry/ 
Department of Science. The OECD feared that the creation of a full-fledged department would cause 
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also taken control out of the front-line departments closest involved in the science research and who were 
in closest contact with those who would be most affected by the results. The OECD fervently believed that 
“the closest relationship must be sought between the creators and users of new knowledge.”  
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57 Drury, House of Commons Debates, 21 June 1971, p.7166. 
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methods for the short and long term consequences of the implementation of emergent 
technologies.59 The new ministry was to behave in a similar fashion as the central 
institutions, the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Treasury 
Board; it was to be a horizontal agency. All federal departments involved in science 
activity were to maintain contact and provide information to MOSST who would in turn 
coordinate, where possible, activities and provide an overall sense of direction.60   
MOSST’s role called for a holistic systems approach to the development of 
national science public policy.  Lamontange had used the Senate Committee’s reports as 
a platform to push for the greater use of systems analysis and future studies activities in 
Canada, especially in the realm of policy development. MOSST was the key result of the 
Lamontagne Committee recommendations and consequently it became heavily involved 
in systems analysis studies and futures activities.  
 
MOSST and Lamontagne: the Formative Years 
The Lamontagne Committee report resulted in MOSST’s creation and influenced 
its development and intellectual thinking during the initial years of operation. As the first 
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Minister of State for Science and Technology Alastair Gillespie was heavily dependent 
upon close advisors with previous experience dealing with questions of science policy.61  
In seeking advice, Gillespie was put into close contact with individuals who were either 
existing Club of Rome members or would subsequently become members of the 
Canadian Association for the Club of Rome. Rennie Whitehead, C. R. Nixon, Pierre 
Gendron and Omond Solandt were on the list of those helped the new minister mould 
MOSST.  Gillespie commented that by the time he was given the portfolio, the terms of 
reference had previously been developed by a small group of bureaucrats within the Privy 
Council’s Science Secretariat including Whitehead and Nixon.62 
The close relationship was further evidenced in correspondence between Gillespie 
and Whitehead at MOSST’s foundational stages. On 17 August 1971 advisor Rennie 
Whitehead wrote to Gillespie to discuss the Club of Rome (COR), the impact of the April 
1971 COR meeting in Montebello Quebec, and the activities of systems analysis groups 
at Queen’s University in Ontario and in Vancouver, British Columbia. In that letter, 
Whitehead said that since the COR meeting in Montebello there had been “an awakening 
of interests” on the international, national and regional levels over the potential 
application of systems analysis. He said that pressure was being directed at the new 
ministry from two main sources. The first was Dr. Robert J. Uffen who wanted to start a 
major systems analysis project at Queen’s University where he had recently become the 
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62 Whitehead considered establishing MOSST to be a mistake as it took science policy out of the Privy 
Council Office and as a consequence left science policy more vulnerable to political and bureaucratic 
wrangling and considerations extraneous to effective science policies. However, he decided to work within 
MOSST to help with policy development and established a close relationship with Gillespie. Whitehead 
also created a critical link to the Club of Rome and the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome which 
will be discussed in this chapter. 
Alastair Gillespie, “Conversation with author, June 2004”. (Hereafter Gillespie Interview) 
J. Rennie Whitehead, “Conversation with author, June 2005”. (Hereafter Whitehead Interview) 
 162
Dean of the Faculty of Applied Science. He had served the previous two years as the 
Chief Science Advisor in the Privy Council Office Science Secretariat and was intent on 
asking for federal funds to support his efforts.63 
The second set of pressures came from both the Privy Council Office and the 
Prime Minister’s Office. These offices were keenly interested in supporting futures 
projects. Whitehead further suggested that MOSST might want to support outside groups 
conducting futures research, but only after MOSST’s organization had been clearly sorted 
out and after the futures groups had become involved in their projects.64 
Further discussions were held between the two men concerning what MOSST’s 
ultimate shape ought to have been. Following one of their discussions, Gillespie decided 
to write an official memorandum to Whitehead concerning the objectives and “general 
thrust” for MOSST on 24 August 1971.  Gillespie said that it was not his general practice 
to send out a memorandum based upon a discussion but he made an exception as he felt 
“that the direction that [they took] at the beginning, and the clear understanding [they 
had] of [their] tasks, [was] of fundamental importance.” He further added that his views 
were “very similar to [Whitehead’s] own and of other key persons in the [PCO] 
Secretariat.65 
The importance of Club of Rome members to the shaping of the nascent MOSST 
department was evident to Adolph Schmidt, the American Ambassador to Canada at the 
time. In a November 1971 letter signed by Ambassador Schmidt and sent to the US 
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Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, it was noted that of the initial MOSST staff, the 
largest and most influential group shaping the organization was from the Privy Council 
Office’s Advisory Committee on Science and Technology. He further added that the head 
of the group, Dr. Rennie Whitehead, described as a rapidly emerging powerful figure 
within the nascent department, and other key bureaucrats tended to be heavily involved in 
international science activities through groups such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Club of Rome.66 
Schmidt postulated that as a consequence of the influence of the key 
internationalist scientists within MOSST, the nascent organization tended to place a high 
priority on the concerns of the international groups with which they were associated. He 
observed that MOSST’s outlook tended to mirror the “the theoretical considerations of 
population, environment, and economic interaction of technology” of systems analysis 
guru Jay Forrester. Schmidt continued that the interests of the key scientific advisors 
would probably shape MOSST’s development while the Minister continued to deal with 
pragmatic political considerations of science policy.67  
It was also evident that to Schmidt that Gillespie matched the Club of Rome 
members’ interests in futures studies, systems analysis and their strong belief in its 
importance to policy development.68 The Minister often wrote memos to himself 
concerning futures books and seminars. For example he wrote a five-page assessment of 
The Limits to Growth, a book he considered on first reading to have been “one of the 
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most important books ever written.”69 In addition Gillespie wrote a three-page summary 
of Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock and attended futures seminars hosted by individuals such 
as Toffler and futures organizations such as the Hudson Institute.70  
Part of Gillespie’s interest in futures studies was that forecasting was an integral 
part of MOSST’s first responsibility – advising the government. In a letter to Gillespie in 
August 1971, Trudeau said that MOSST’s “primary task [was] to advise the Government 
on the priorities that it should set… in the development and application of science and 
technology in the national interest.”71  The Prime Minister further added that the “main 
attention and that of [his] Ministry [were] to be directed” to was defining Canada’s 
national interest and objectives for science and technology.72   
When Charles Drury first announced plans for MOSST in the House of Commons 
in June 1971, the advisory role was identified as MOSST’s top priority and forecasting 
was identified as an integral part of that role. Drury further stipulated that the new 
institution would use “forecasting methods to try and foresee, wherever possible, both the 
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short-term and the long-term consequences of utilizing various technologies.”73 Former 
MOSST and Department of the Environment Minitser John Roberts put the creation of 
MOSST in the context of broader environmental concerns, especially related to the 
positive and negative impacts of technological innovations on society and the 
environment. Roberts believed that MOSST was established, in part, due to the Prime 
Minister’s “concerns for the management of technology.”74 
In MOSST’s early months of operations, Gillespie became frustrated with an 
apparent difficulty for MOSST to “come to terms with its objectives.” 75 He insisted that 
in terms of the development of priorities for research and development “an appropriate 
balance between short-term consideration and longer range needs,” had to be developed 
and maintained.76   
In August 1971, Gillespie was given the added responsibility for both the Science 
Council of Canada and the Science Secretariat from the Privy Council Office (PCO).  
MOSST was designated as the department responsible for the units. The move formally 
shifted Whitehead, who had been Science Advisor to the PCO’s Science Secretariat, into 
MOSST. The change in the Science Council’s responsibilities meant that future CACOR 
member Omond Solandt became a key MOSST advisor as well.77 Continuing interest in 
the Club of Rome within MOSST and the federal Cabinet was further evidenced in a 
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December 1971 memorandum on MOSST’s priorities. In the note to civil servant Aurèle 
Beaulnes concerning a discussion they had had on 30 December 1971, Gillespie informed 
him that MOSST’s “submission on the Club of Rome” was a top priority for Cabinet and 
it had to be coordinated with External Affairs.78  
A symbiotic relationship emerged between MOSST and COR/CACOR that was 
in part the consequence of the professional and personal relationships and similarities of 
interests that emerged between MOSST’s first Minister, Alastair Gillespie and Club of 
Rome advocates such as Rennie Whitehead. COR members were able to ensure access to 
fellow COR members  - renowned international scientists such as Alexander King, Hugo 
Thiemann and Denis Gabor. MOSST was able to easily network in the international 
scientific community that was associated, directly and indirectly, with the Club of Rome. 
Included in the list of international scientific organizations that were either directly or 
indirectly involved with the Club of Rome and its members were the Science Committee 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Science Director’s Office of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Institute of 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Batelle Research Institute and the International 
Federation of Institutes of Advanced Study (IFIAS).79 
While Gillespie was only the Minister of State for Science and Technology for a 
year, it had been during the crucial foundational stage. At the end of his tenure, the 
minister was pleased with how the organization had evolved and argued it was “a 
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working and contributing arm to the Government.” He added that MOSST’s “role and 
potential [had] gained acceptance among its several publics – industry, universities, 
provincial research institutes, professional groups and the informed citizen.”80 Although 
Gillespie’s left MOSST, the close ties that had emerged between the government 
department and the Club of Rome remained in subsequent years and led to cooperative 
ventures. 
While Gillespie left his position pleased with MOSST’s progress and optimistic 
about its future, the department continued to face challenges related to being dependent 
upon voluntary cooperation from traditional departments and not having sufficient 
financial control over science budgets.81 Despite questions of operational effectiveness 
MOSST was strategically placed within the federal policy making structure ensuring it 
would be able to spread ideas and to help secure federal support for both futures and Club 
of Rome activities.  MOSST had to develop national science policy “as the composite 
result of policies developed in various areas.”82 
The Lamontagne Committee report and key COR/CACOR individuals such as 
Whitehead and John Bradley, continued to exert an influence after Gillespie. In 
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September 1973 MOSST’s Minister Jeanne Sauvé said that the Lamontagne 
recommendations had either already been accepted or were in the process of being 
implemented. Sauvé added that she and her staff examined “each and every 
recommendation in the Lamontagne report, to [her] great enlightenment and that of [her] 
officials.”83  Her successor, Charles Drury, commented in December 1975 that the 
Lamontagne Committee reports had ‘constituted a significant background to all 
discussions of science policy matters and its influence [would] continue.’84 James Hugh 
Faulkner, who replaced Drury as MOSST’s head in 1976, concurred with his predecessor 
and said “the committee [had] made a profound impact on the development of science 
policy with the government.”85 In addition to being established through the efforts of the 
Senate Committee that was headed by a COR member, key COR members played a 
seminal role in developing MOSST’s initial framework and early activities.  
 
The Close MOSST – COR Relationship 
Implied in MOSST’s initial rationale was the intent to delve into the impact and 
interrelationships between scientific and technological innovations and the consequent 
environmental, economic and societal implications. Operating as a horizontal 
organization, MOSST needed to be interested in the interconnections between various 
science initiatives. It also needed to anticipate both challenges and opportunities at the 
national and international levels. The two components created a holistic approach to 
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science policy development that was in accord with the approach to policy development 
advocated by the Club of Rome. It was an approach that systems analysis was designed to 
aid. 86 
MOSST subsequently became a major sponsor of COR and CACOR initiatives. 
In 1973 MOSST contributed $25,000 to the Denis Gabor study “The New Research 
Imperative” and it was the substantial Canadian contribution that enabled the project to 
be conducted. Support for the project was described as being “consistent with the 
encouragement received by the Prime Minister.”87 Gabor was a Hungarian-born scientist 
who won the 1971 Nobel Prize in Physics for developing the three-dimensional image 
technology known as Holography. The Nobel committee recognized the potential of the 
new technology, especially in the area of medical imaging technology, to enable 
scientists to move beyond inherent limitations of being restricted to two-dimensional 
imagery. They further added that the prize was in recognition of his cultural writings that 
put him in the company of other scientists and technologists who were deeply “concerned 
about the use or damage to which technical development can lead for mankind.”88 
Gabor’s autobiography noted that he had been trained in Germany but in the face 
of the rise of the Nazi Party fled to Britain in 1933. After working for decades in a variety 
of science environments, he became convinced “that a serious mismatch [had] developed 
between technology and our social institutions, and that inventive minds ought to 
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consider social inventions as their first priority.”89 The MOSST-sponsored Gabor project 
eventually was published as the 1978 Club of Rome Report, Beyond the Age of Waste. 
The text was a collaborative effort on the part of ‘technological optimists’ who were 
asked by the COR executive to examine the possible contributions of science and 
technology to overcoming the inherent constraints on growth identified in the 1972 Limits 
to Growth report. They were required to identify science and technology areas that had 
the potential to increase humanity’s “capacity to exploit and regenerate natural resources 
in order to sustain a satisfactory standard of living for the people of the world.”90  
MOSST became an important distribution centre for Club of Rome publications 
and proceedings within the federal bureaucracy.  MOSST’s responsibilities included 
monitoring all federal futures studies activities, keeping up-to-date on private sector 
futures activities, establishing and maintaining international futures contacts, and being a 
contact point for groups and individuals outside government who sought futures 
information. As discussed in the next chapter, to fulfil its mandate the MOSST 
established a futures library and dedicated Secretariat for Futures Studies circa 1975. It 
also became active in helping to organize futures meetings.91 
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The Close MOSST – CACOR Relationship  
MOSST also developed a special relationship with the Canadian Association for 
the Club of Rome (CACOR) officially formed in 1974. CACOR’s Secretary J. T Bradley, 
who also served as a MOSST Policy Analyst, exemplified the extent of the close 
symbiotic relationship between MOSST and the Canadian Association for the Club of 
Rome (CACOR) in the first five years of MOSST’s existence. On 27 August 1976, 
Americans Donald Lesh and Berrin Moore interviewed Bradley as a part of a feasibility 
study into establishing an United States Association for the Club of Rome (USA COR).  
The Americans were particularly interested in the Canadian experience due to the 
similarities of the two nations. As well in Canada, in contrast to other countries such as 
the Netherlands, the national COR association did not emerge as a result of widespread 
public interest in Club of Rome activities. The Canadian Association had been formed 
with the intent of providing “a way for the national membership to influence government 
more effectively.”92 
Lesh and Moore had been struck by the apparent lack of administrative structures 
within the CACOR and noted how it seemed to parallel the “light” structure of the main 
COR organization. Both the COR and CACOR lacked any permanent staff and relied 
exclusively upon members who volunteered their time and effort. In Canada, it was 
estimated that each year CACOR activities occupied approximately three-person-years of 
work. The key activities included a regular newsletter, coordinating the dissemination of 
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COR activities and sponsored reports in Canada, as well as being the COR’s public 
relations arm in Canada. In addition to initiatives related to the international organization, 
the CACOR members were heavily involved in “assisting the government in developing 
procedures which insure[d] the presentation of the long-range view in policy matters.”93 
In explaining the “light” nature and low-key approach of the CACOR, Bradley 
said that CACOR’s “mode of operation [was] very much behind the scenes and they [felt] 
that they [could] accomplish much by encouraging positive initiatives and decisions, and 
ignoring all others.”94 Bradley further explained that the CACOR had few financial 
resources and rarely filed research funding applications. Instead of a direct formal 
approach, Bradley explained “the informal ties of [CACOR] members would lead to 
institutions or individuals competent in a field or special interest, who might already have 
some financial resources at their disposal.” Bradley further added “The Association’s 
close ties with the Canadian government also [had] made possible timely support from 
that source.”95 
 
MOSST/CACOR and FIT 
In the spring of 1974 the close MOSST-CACOR relationship was a catalyst for 
the emergence of a novel educational institution based in Toronto providing specialized 
training for the developing world. The Foundation for International Training (FIT) 
initiative was a product of the imagination and dedication of COR/CACOR member 
                                                 
93 Harris and Moore, “Feasibility Study,” p.13. 
Don Lesh, “Memorandum to The Board of Directors 1 September 1976,” (CACOR Archives: File 200: 
“USA COR-CACOR Correspondence,”) p.1. 
94 Lesh, “Memorandum,” p.2. 
95 Bradley was also an assistant to Rennie Whitehead, helped attain financial support from MOSST for 




Ranjit Kumar. He was Kenyan-born but immigrated to Canada in the 1960s initially to 
work in private industry. Kumar wanted to become involved in the study of relations 
between the world’s developed and the less developed nations and subsequently became 
involved with Seneca College’s Centre for International Programs. However, after 
joining and observing the initiatives of the Club of Rome and its operations in dealing 
with governments and institutions, Kumar decided that it was necessary to form a 
separate organization outside the college. As mentioned in the introduction, Kumar, like 
other COR members, had worked within established bureaucracies but wanted to avoid 
the inherent problems of delay and dependence on others. As a result he was determined 
to establish a new agency that would “not be beholden to any institution.”96 
Kumar’s time at The Centre for International Programs led to important contacts 
being forged with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and its 
Special Programmes Branch Director, Lewis Perinbam. That relationship led to CIDA 
sponsoring a series of seminars on international development hosted by Seneca College 
that, in turn, led Kumar to contact Aurelio Peccei to come and present. It was an 
invitation that Peccei accepted and he added that he would bring with him COR co-
founder Alexander King.97 
To facilitate the visit Kumar approached MOSST seeking $5,700 in financial 
support to cover the costs associated with bringing Drs. Pecei and King to Canada for a 
series of lectures at the college. In his letter of request to MOSST’s Secretary A. 
Beaulnes, Kumar said that King and Peccei had already accepted an invitation from 
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Seneca College to speak there in May 1974 on “The Problematique Revisited.” King and 
Peccei were also to attend CACOR’s inaugural conference in Toronto on 2-3 May.  
Kumar added MOSST’s Rennie Whitehead, who was also a COR member, had suggested 
contacting Mr. Beaulnes at the Ministry for potential assistance.98 
Initially within MOSST there were concerns over setting a precedent for 
providing financial support to a secondary institution for a visiting speaker. However, it 
was decided to approve the request, albeit at a reduced amount of $3,400, due to the 
expected public benefit from media coverage as well as to Canada’s scientific, business 
and academic communities with interests in future studies.99 MOSST’s Policy Analyst J. 
T. Bradley added that MOSST’s sponsorship of the King and Peccei trips “were an 
indirect way of supporting” both Kumar at Seneca College and CACOR.100  After much 
discussion, MOSST decided to contract Drs. King and Peccei at $1600 and $1800 
respectively: 
To attend at the invitation of the Ministry, the meeting in Toronto, Ontario 
on 2 and 3 May, of Canadian scientists interested in the Club of Rome 
Problematique, to present a public lecture at Seneca College of Applied 
Arts and Technology and meet with representatives of the government in 
Ottawa, if required.101 
 
In providing a positive response to Kumar’s request A. Beaulnes said that there 
was “widespread support within” MOSST for the initiative and he asked to be informed 
                                                 
98 Ranjit Kumar, “Letter to A. Beaulnes12 March 1974,” (NAC: RG 102 Acc. 1984-85/520 Volume 4 File 
1038-C7-2 pt.2), pp.1-2. 
99 G. Tremblay, “Letter to A. Beaulnes 8 April 1974,” (NAC: RG 102 Acc. 1984-85/520 Volume 4 File 
1038-C7-2 pt.1), p.1. 
100 J. T. Bradley, “Letter to Aurelio Peccei, 1 August 1974,” (NAC: RG 102 Acc. 1984-85/520 Volume 4 
File 1038-C7-2 pt.2), p.1. 
101 J. A. F. Vieni, “Letter to Alexander King 29 April 1974,” and “Letter to Aurelio Peccei 29 April 1974,” 
(NAC: RG 102 Acc. 1984-85/520 Volume 4 File 1038-C7-2 pt.1), p.1 and p.1. 
 175
of future initiatives related to addressing global problems.102 The Peccei/King events 
were a success with over a thousand people in attendance at the seminars.103 Other 
Canadian members of the Club of Rome, R. J. Whitehead, Ronald Ritchie and William 
Stadeleman were also present at the seminars and it became an occasion to hold further 
discussions about international affairs.104 
Alexander King recalled that during the Seneca visit, Kumar approached Peccei 
and himself with a novel approach to improving the plight of lesser-developed nations. 
Kumar argued that “a grass roots approach with a multiplier mechanism” would be far 
more effective in bringing about real change in the Third World than the traditional top-
down approaches that took far too long to trickle down and, in the process, became 
                                                 
102 A. Beaulnes, “Letter to Ranjit Kumar 11 April 1974,” (NAC: RG 102 Acc. 1984-85/520 Volume 4 File 
1038-C7-2 pt.1), p.1. 
103 Kumar Interview. 
104 Stadeleman used his connections as head of the Ontario Research Foundation to have members of the 
Ontario government attend the conference. The 1974 Seneca Seminars subsequently led to broader 
discussions of the Problematique and the interrelated nature of global events within the Ontario provincial 
government. In previous years Stadleman had arranged for King and Peccei to meet with scientists, 
industrialists and provincial government officials at the Sheridan Park Research Community to discuss the 
World Problematique. Subsequent meetings between Peccei, King and provincial bureaucrats, especially 
the 1974 meetings, led to King being asked to serve as an external science advisor to the provincial 
government. 
King reflected that he had enjoyed advising the provincial government as it put him in “close and 
uncontroversial contact” with senior bureaucrats and provincial cabinet ministers. He said that his periodic 
visits, among other things, included dinner discussions about taking “one global topic and try to follow its 
impact in many different sectors. Such conversations lacked the sophistication of computer driven 
mathematical systems modelling but reinforced the basic idea of the interconnected relationships between 
global events at the macro and micro levels. It was a means to take the theoretical modelling ideas and 
discuss them in concrete terms. King gave an example of examining the issue of global warming with a 
resultant rise in ocean levels and how that would impact transportation in the Great Lakes. He added that 
the dinner conversations tended to be met with “a little scepticism on the part of a few, but the general 
reception was highly positive.” King felt that those present “achieved a deeper understanding of the 
practical importance of the problematique.” Ranjit Kumar said that having King as a Science Advisor kept 
“the Ontario government very much in the loop and interested” in COR initiatives. 
Kumar Interview. 
W. R. Stadelman, Email to Author, 8 March 2004. 
Alexander King, Email to Author, 28 January 2004.  
 176
diffuse.105 In contrast, the FIT idea was to strengthen “managerial capacities through 
training of trainers at management institutes and supporting organizational development 
of host agencies.” 106 Kumar related that King and Peccei became especially interested in 
the human development aspects of his proposal and that of using public administration as 
a means to improve the lot of the developing world by providing training to 
bureaucrats.107  
 Convinced of merits of the proposed institution King, Peccei and Kumar agreed 
to pursue matters further. The next major step in the creation of FIT came at a COR 
Conference in Algiers in 1976. At the conference Jan Tinbergen was reporting on his 
COR-sponsored Reshaping the International Order (RIO) initiative and one of the 
external invitees to the conference was the CIDA’s Paul Gerin-Lajoie.108 King, Peccei 
and Kumar approached Gerin-Lajoie to further discuss the idea of establishing FIT.109  In 
Gérin-Lajoie, the COR members found an individual who was both deeply interested in 
international affairs and already convinced of the critical role of education in the 
advancement of international development. 
Gérin-Lajoie’s background as Quebec’s Education Minister during the Quiet 
Revolution of the 1960s made him familiar with the potential role of education in 
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October 1976,” (CACORA: COR Algeria Meeting, Oct. 1976), p.1. 
COR, Special Meeting of the Club of Rome on The New International Order, Algiers, Algeria, 25-28 
October 1976: Participants Confirmed up to 20 September 1976,” (CACORA: COR Algeria Meeting, Oct. 
1976), pp.1-2. 
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international affairs. As a provincial minister he was one of the key initial proponents of 
Quebec establishing an international presence separate from Canada.110  Gérin-Lajoie 
became convinced that Quebec’s educational systems had much to contribute to the 
French speaking countries of the developing world.111 During a 1963 speech to the 
Canadian Education Association (CEA) Gérin-Lajoie emphatically stated: “If Canada has 
a part to play in international affairs, advanced education, that will give rise to the 
establishment of centres of learning and to intellectual creativeness that will meet the 
highest standards, is an absolute necessity.”112 
Gérin-Lajoie later discussed with French President Charles de Gaulle the 
possibility of establishing multilateral educational institutions in francophone nations.113  
In addition, Gérin-Lajoie secured $300,000 from the Quebec government to fund a 
cooperative educational venture in Tunisia.114 Thirteen years after Gérin-Lajoie’s CEA 
speech, the Foundation for International Training aimed to play the critical educational 
roles in international affairs that Gérin-Lajoie had previously felt to be of the utmost 
importance. 
At the October 1976 Algiers meeting, Gerin-Lajoie became convinced of the 
merits of the FIT initiative and pledged to find ways to get CIDA to back the project.115  
Kumar said that Gerin-Lajoie acknowledged that established international cooperation 
                                                 
110 National Archives of Canada, Fonds Paul Gerin-Lajoie, http://data4.collectionscanada.ca/netacgi/nph-
brs?s1=lajoie&s2=&s6=&s10=&s11=&l=20&Sect4=AND&Sect1=IMAGE&Sect2=THESOFF&Sect5=M
KDOPEN&Sect6=HITOFF&d=MIKA&p=1&u=http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/02012302_e.
html&r=7&f=G, (accessed 15 March 2005), p.1. 
111 John Daniel Allison, “Federalism, Diplomacy and Education: Canada's Role in Education-Related 
International Activities, 1960-1984,” (Unpublished PhD. Thesis: University of Toronto, 1999), p.54, pp.60-
65, pp.75-77 and p.93.  
112 Quoted verbatim from Allison, “Federalism,” p.57. Allison’s footnote #118: 
Canadian Education Association, 1963 Convention: Proceedings and Addresses (Toronto: CEA, 1963). 
p. 30. 
113 Allison, “Federalism,” pp.62-63. 
114 Allison, “Federalism,” pp.76-77. 
115 Kumar, “Conversation”. 
 178
and aid programs “did little to strengthen indigenous institutions capable of managing 
self-reliant national development,” and that he “welcomed ideas that would open new 
avenues.”116 Gerin-Lajoie suggested that Kumar arrange a meeting with CIDA’s Lewis 
Perinbam. Perinbam enthusiastically endorsed the FIT initiative and instructed Kumar to 
incorporate the organization and to apply to CIDA for funding.117  
Alexander King recollected that due to a meeting of minds, “Our intervention was 
successful… and quickly led to the creation of the Foundation for International Training 
for Third World countries with Ranjit as full time executive director.”118 Kumar’s 
previous experience with Perinbam, combined with the support of CIDA’s Gerin-Lajoie, 
King and Peccei meant that the process was fast tracked. By the end of 1976, within three 
months of the COR October meeting at Algiers, FIT was incorporated, successfully 
applied to CIDA for sustained funding, established an international Board of Directors 
and was fully operational, although it did not begin its first formal international 
development project until 1978.119  In the end ten COR members were involved in 
establishing FIT and in serving on its International Board of Directors. Alexander King 
served as its Chairman for the first eight years of operation and Aurelio Peccei served as 
the Chairman of the International Relations Committee.120  
Aurelio Peccei was a strong supporter of the FIT initiative as he viewed it as 
making a major contribution to improving the lot of developing nations. Peccei had 
previously helped to establish the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis to 
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encourage the development of research into mathematical modelling techniques and 
applications.121 He viewed FIT as being the critical humanitarian component of the quest 
to find lasting solutions to the interconnected problems facing the developing world. 
IIASA operated at the scientific theoretical level and FIT was to operate at the pragmatic 
humanitarian level to produce local leaders who would return to their respective 
homelands to apply their knowledge and training to improve the relative lot of their 
constituents.122 Having played a key role in FIT’s establishment, Kumar said the COR 
had “inspired FIT’s mission and the orientation of its activities in subtle ways for many 
                                                 
121 While tangential to this dissertation, the story of Canada’s involvement with IIASA is long, lasting from 
the organization’s beginning up to budget cutbacks in the 1990s that caused Canada to sever its ties.  The 
History of the IIASA notes that Lord Zuckerman, who represented the British Royal Society, did not share 
Peccei’s views. His name carried weight as the British were critical financial backers of the IIASA project. 
Zuckerman threatened to withdraw British support for IIASA if Peccei’s suggestions were followed. 
Author Alan McDonald commented that Peccei took great pains to avoid confusion between the IIASA and 
the separate Club of Rome initiative that he was also developing in 1968. McDonald added “his efforts 
were not always enough for Zuckerman, who was unenthusiastic about the global modeling that came to be 
featured in Limits to Growth.”  
A compromise was eventually reached where the IIASA agreed to host and document global modelling 
conferences. For example in from 29 April to 2 May 1974 IIASA hosted a large multi-national conference 
dealing specifically with the regionalized multi-level world models developed by Mihajlo Measrovic and 
Eduard Pestel in Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome. Canadian 
representatives at the 1974 IIASA conference included A. J. Coleman and A. Demirdache of the Ministry 
of State for Science and Technology. In 1984 the IIASA established the Peccei Scholarships for 
outstanding members of its Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) in honour of Peccei’s integral role 
in establishing the IIASA and for his dedication to “a humanistic approach to the problems confronting the 
modern world.” 
The concluding chapter of this dissertation returns to the Canada-IIASA story as the contributing factors 
that led to Canada opting-out of the organization are analogous to the factors that led to the decline of 
influence of the COR in Canada. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, How IIASA Began, 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/docs/history.html?sb=3, (accessed 3 March 2005). 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, “The YSSP at IIASA: Peccei And Mikhalevich Scholarships,” 
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Alan McDonald, “Scientific Cooperation as a Bridge Across the Cold War Divide: The Case of the 
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Sciences, (Volume 866, 1998), pp.55-83. 
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in Austria, April 29- May 2 1974 Under the Auspices of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis,” (CACORA: File 814 Related Reports (Unpublished)), pp.1-3. 
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years.” He added that Peccei and King “had set FIT on a path that will remain their 
legacy as we move into the next century.”123 
 
Conclusion 
A thumbnail sketch of the events leading up to FIT’s establishment illustrates the 
cascading effect mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Senator Lamontagne used 
his position as chair of the Special Senate Committee on Science policy to push for a 
stronger, more rational, holistic and long-range approach to science policy development. 
His committee’s voice had extra weight added to it when COR members Alexander King 
and Saburo Okita presented similar criticisms and suggestions in their 1969 OECD 
Review of National Science Policies for Canada. MOSST was the end result and the 
government’s response to both reports. Within MOSST key figures such as Rennie 
Whitehead and J. T. Bradley had a strong interest in systems analysis and futures studies. 
Their interests melded with the first MOSST head, Alastair Gillespie’s, interests and 
translated into a symbiotic relationship emerging among MOSST and COR/CACOR. 
The story of FIT’s formation also provides an excellent case study in how the 
COR was able to leverage its connections to further a cause. Despite being foreigners, 
Pecei and King decided to contact CIDA on behalf of a Canadian citizen, Ranjit Kumar, 
who worked within a Canadian organization, Seneca College, and was attempting to 
establish a separate Canadian organization, FIT. Peccei and King’s efforts to introduce 
                                                 
123 Chapter six will discuss the decline of influence at the federal bureaucratic level associated at least in 
part to a paradigm shift in terms of attitudes towards the role of the marketplace in the creation of public 
policy. It was a problem that was also faced by the individuals at the Foundation for International Training 
in the 1990s. Kumar commented that in the 1990s there was a profound shift in the lexicon of international 
development and a shift in focus as “focus turned to good governance, democracy and privatization.” 
Kumar further added that changes at CIDA in terms of programs and personnel meant FIT lost formal 
linkages to the funding agency and as a result FIT had to refocus its activities. 
Kumar, “Humanizing Development,” p.20, p.27 and pp.28-30. 
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Kumar to the right people, especially Paul Gerin-Lajoie, led to a successful initiative with 
strong federal government support. 
The existence of sympathetic members within MOSST led, at the behest of 
COR/CACOR member Ranjit Kumar, to the sponsoring a trip to Seneca College by COR 
co-founders Aurelio Peccei and Alexander King. At the Seneca conference Kumar 
presented his idea and as a consequence was invited to a COR meeting in Algiers 
discussing a COR-sponsored project, Reshaping the International Order. That meeting 
led to an informal meeting with CIDA’s Gerin Lajoie who himself was sympathetic to 
FIT’s aims and who had the ability to arrange a meeting with CIDA’s Lewis Perinbam, 
and to give the initiative his full support. The subsequent CIDA meeting went 
exceedingly well and FIT was fast-tracked for funding and was established by the end of 
1976. While FIT was not a direct Lamontagne or COR/CACOR initiative, the Senator 
and these organization(s) played critical roles in its establishment as it was the ultimate 
result of events catalyzed by Kumar, Lamontagne, Whitehead, Peccei and King. 
The COR sought to be a catalyst organization that would initiate interest, arrange 
studies and funding for projects, and then allow them to take on a life of their own. It was 
an attitude shared by Lamontage. From his time as economics advisor in the Lester 
Pearson government he had tried to imbue the policy making process with a sense of the 
importance of long-range thinking in policy matters. He had several setbacks but this and 
the next chapter explain that by the mid-1970s he may have well felt successful at last in 
raising the profile of systems analysis and futures studies and entrenching them within 
institutions. In tandem this and the next chapter illustrate the zenith of influence of COR 
ideas in Canada.
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Chapter 5: The Spread of Influence (Part 2)–Systems Beyond the Horizontal Axis 1971-
1988 
 
Club of Rome/ Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (COR/CACOR) 
member and Senator Maurice Lamontagne was a long time idea practitioner of the 
importance of incorporating holistic long-range futures studies into the policy making 
process.1 It was a view that echoed COR co-founder Aurelio Peccei’s sentiments. As the 
Chairman of a major 1967 international conference on development and technical 
cooperation, Peccei said: 
We have not yet well understood, nor thoroughly analyzed, the new 
relationships linking man to society and environment; nor the 
interrelations between the various societies of men in today’s world…we 
need an entirely new type of anthropology to understand and manage 
today’s world and pave the way for that of tomorrow – a world that will be 
marvellous or dreadful to live in depending on our success or failure.2 
 
Two years later he stated in his 1969 work, The Chasm Ahead: “I am 
afraid that one day we will suddenly discover that something is irreparably 
changed in the world around us, and find ourselves face to face with some grave 
ecological crisis… we must not back into the future, but plan our way ahead.”3 
Lamontagne’s and Peccei’s sentiments resonated within Canada’s bureaucratic 
setting and beyond. Chapter four dealt with how that resonance was evident in the 
creation of the Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) and in its 
initial operations. This chapter takes a wider view to show how concerns about 
the future and the need for holistic long-range studies captured a wider audience.  
                                                 
1 Maurice Lamontagne, “The State of Future Studies in Canada,” (NAC: MG 32 B-32 Volume 5, File 
“Discours,”) p.6. 
2 Aurelio Peccei (General Chairman), International Development 1967 International Technical 
Cooperation: Evaluation and Prospects, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968), p.3. 
3 Aurelio Peccei, The Chasm Ahead, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p.239, p.281. 
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Building on the previous chapter’s foundation, this chapter explores further 
ramifications of the Lamontagne Committee and discusses the popularization of holistic 
futures studies from the mid-1970s to circa 1980.  Specifically, this chapter deals with the 
developing interest in futures studies at the nascent Institute for Research on Public 
Policy (IRPP). The chapter then explores the creation of the Canadian Association for 
Future Studies (CAFS), CACOR’s role in attaining Department of the Environment 
(DOE) sponsorship for doing a Canadian version of an American report prepared for 
President Jimmy Carter called Global 2000, and, finally, the role of COR/CACOR in the  
creation of the 5000 Days Project at the University of Guelph. The mid-1970s would 
prove to be the apex of achievement for Lamontagne’s efforts to promote future studies 
efforts. It was also a time at which COR/CACOR influence in Canada reached its zenith. 
The chapter begins with a look at a second chance for Lamontagne to institutionalize 
futures research in Canada due to initial start up difficulties experienced by the IRPP. 
 
A Futures Focus for the IRPP 
The IRPP’s story begins with long-time political and economic analyst Ronald S. 
Ritchie. He was asked by Trudeau to follow up on a promise in the 1968 Throne Speech 
to conduct a feasibility study for establishing a new public affairs research institute. After 
reviewing existing domestic public policy research institutes, such as the Economic 
Council of Canada and the Science Council of Canada, Ritchie’s report concluded there 
were not enough research institutes doing research. The existing organizations were 
limited in the scope of their inquiries. With this in mind, he argued that Canada was in 
need of an additional research institute to deal with questions of public policy. He added 
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weight to his conclusions by arguing that Canada was in danger of falling behind the 
United States and Europe where well-organized, well-funded and active policy research 
institutes were examining questions of public policy, often incorporating futures studies 
elements into their analysis.4  
Echoing Senator Lamontagne’s belief that Canada was on the cusp of creating a 
new society, Ritchie said that the “certainties” that had guided the country for the 
previous decades had vanished and the country was in a transitional era. In order to 
effectively cope with the changing world, he thought it essential to establish an institute 
that would be sufficiently general in mandate to be of use to all levels of Canadian 
government. Ritchie further added: “Almost without exception the major questions which 
face Canadian makers of policy… cry out for multidisciplinary systems analysis, for 
studies which attempt to identify desired ‘futures’ and to chart the paths to them.”5  
Further support for a new research institution came from Canadian administrative 
expert J. E. Hodgetts.  Published in the same year as the Ritchie Report, Hodgetts’ 1971 
article, “Public Power and Ivory Power,” argued that healthy democracies required policy 
research centres outside the civil service to facilitate discussion without taking away the 
power of the bureaucratic decision-making machinery. While such forums were likely to 
lead to dissention and arduous public debate, it was not healthy to have policy knowledge 
concentrated in the hands of an inherently secretive civil service. Furthermore, attempts 
to involve the public through information officers, advisory bodies and royal 
commissions had proven to be ineffective. Hodgetts suggested establishing a Foundation 
for Applied Policy Research. In his view, the close relationship between the existing 
                                                 
4 Ronald S. Ritchie, An Institute for Research on Public Policy - a Study and Recommendations, (Ottawa: 
Canada Privy Council, 1971), p.13, 17-40, and 59-88. 
5 Ritchie, An Institute,pp.41-42. 
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Canada Council and the government prevented it from assuming public policy research 
responsibilities. He argued that Canada required an “institutionalized applied research 
resource that would encourage continuous study of the prominent policy issues 
confronting the nation… a more careful and systematic planning of research.” 6 
Likewise, Ritichie’s final report emphatically supported the creation of a public 
policy research institute with broad terms of reference, with a $10 million investment 
from the federal government, and with the ability to attract top-quality publicly spirited 
experts in various fields. In accepting Ritichie’s recommendations Trudeau’s government 
pledged for the seven-year period after its inception to match contributions up to $10 
million. Federal contributions were based upon a matching formula in which the 
provinces would contribute one third of the funds with a remaining third from the private 
sector. If maximized, the end result would have been a $30 million IRPP endowment 
fund.7  
Ritchie insisted that it was essential that the IRPP look beyond short-term 
concerns to medium and longer term issues. Immediate or short-term decisions would not 
involve the policy-oriented approach advocated for the proposed institute. A focus on the 
longer term and policy directions would help to keep the institute out of contemporary 
political controversies. Short-term considerations, especially economics, would have to 
                                                 
6 Italics in the original quote. 
Ritchie, An Institute, p.13. pp.16-17.  
J. E. Hodgetts, “Public Power and Ivory Power,” in Trevor Lloyd and Jack McLeod (editors), Agenda 
1970: Proposals for a Creative Politics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp.269-271, pp.275-
279. 
7 Ritchie, An Institute,pp.51-52. 
Institute for Research into Public Policy (IRPP), “Background Paper, December 1975,” (NAC: RG 102 
Acc. 1984-85/520 Vol. 33, File 2120-S1-2 pt.1), pp.8-9. 
Pierre E. Trudeau, “Commons Debates, 21 February 1973,” Commons Hansard First Session Twenty-
Ninth Parliament, Volume II, 1973, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1974), pp.1496-1497. 
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be addressed by other research institutes.8 The year after the publication of The Ritchie 
Report the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) was formally established in 
April 1972 under the direction of the University of Calgary’s A. W. R. Carrothers. 9  
However Carrothers and the IRPP staff encountered numerous challenges in 
establishing the IRPP as an active, credible research organization. IRPP historian Peter 
Dobell claimed that there were two key problem areas hampering progress. The first was 
a structural issue within the IRPP. There were organizational ambiguities over structure 
and the role of trustees who had to cope with a largely undefined, all-encompassing 
research mandate. And the second was an issue of focus. There was no clear 
identification of the specific IRPP research areas and utility of research results upon 
which to design a program of work.10 By 1975 Prime Minister Trudeau and his 
government were beginning to lose patience and were beginning to be pressured in 
parliament to justify the substantial public investment in the organization. By 1975 the 
federal government had contributed in excess of one and a quarter million dollars and the 
provinces and private sector had contributed an additional $1,245,000. Despite the 
                                                 
8 Ritchie, An Institute,pp.53-54. 
9  Fred G. Thompson, Looking Back on the Future, (Ottawa: Futurescan International Inc., 1992), p.11. 
IRPP, “Background Paper,” pp.1-3. 
10 Dobell further argued that Carrothers lacked the requisite skills to launch the new and ambitious institute 
on a trajectory that would have satisfied the exalted expectations that were associated with the IRPP. While 
Carrothers, President of the University of Calgary from 1969 to 1974, was an able and effective university 
administrator due to his abilities to find common ground between disputing parties, he was not fully 
prepared for the additional role as IRPP President. According to Dobell he had not expected to be 
responsible for fund raising activities and had limited abilities in that regard. Furthermore, while he had 
proven his ability to develop strong academic law courses he was not prepared to launch programs in a 
institute that had to be built from scratch. Carrothers’ problems were exacerbated by a cautious approach 
based upon prolonged careful reflection. Dobell concludes that the IRPP first President “was out of his 
depth” and as a result the institute languished. 
Peter Dobell, IRPP, Institute for Research on Public Policy: The First Thirty Years, (Montreal: Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, 2003), pp.17-19. 
--- “Carrothers, Alfred William Rooke,” in The Canadian Who’s Who Volume XIII 1973-1975, (Toronto 
Who’s Who Canadian Publications, 1975), p.167. 
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investment the IRPP had not completed any major studies or projects and, according to 
Senator Lamontagne, had “not established its credibility.”11 
Fortunately for the Prime Minister and IRPP supporters, Volume II of the 
Lamontagne Committee report presented a potential focus and way forward for the 
directionless IRPP. Chairman Lamontagne used the second volume of the final 
committee report as a platform to launch a concerted effort to institutionalize long-range 
futures research in Canada. In the wake of his earlier unsuccessful attempt to imbue the 
Economic Council of Canada (ECC) with a long-range focus, the IRPP was his second 
chance to institutionalize futures studies. The purpose of the second volume had been to 
“build a coherent policy for Canada” by examining immediate and future problems and 
opportunities and through suggesting structural changes and innovations to better 
improve both the creation of science policy and the conduct of Canadian scientific 
research.12   
The Lamontagne Committee report expressed a strong belief that while the future 
was not precisely knowable, “goals, problems, and options that [lay] ahead [were] not 
                                                 
11 In May 1975 in the House of Commons Liberal MP Francis Fox asked the President of the Privy 
Council, Mitchell Sharp, when Canadians, who had come to expect much from the IRPP, would “really 
start its operations and start issuing the kind of reports and work which [were] expected from it.” In 
response Sharp said that it was “hoped” that the IRPP would “get underway with some major project in the 
field of research and public policy in the next few months.” 
IRPP, “Background Paper,”pp.8-9. 
Trudeau, “Commons Debates, 21 February 1973,”pp.1496-1497. 
Francis Fox, “Commons Debates 22 May 1975,” Commons Hansard First Session Thirtieth Parliament, 
Volume VI, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers, 1975), p.6029. 
Mitchell Sharp, “Commons Debates 22 May 1975,” Commons Hansard First Session Thirtieth 
Parliament, Volume VI, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers, 1975), p.6029. 
12 The Senate committee utilised the Club of Rome-sponsored research at MIT to help provide the overview 
of global challenges and concerns for the future. Volume two of The Lamontagne Report used a 
preliminary report from the MIT Systems Dynamics Group, a report that would evolve into The Limits to 
Growth, to illustrate the dangers of complacency, “the dark side of technology,” and for the need for 
careful consideration of science and technology to stop “the collision between nature and mankind.” 
Lamontagne Report, Vol. 1, p.15.  
Maurice Lamontagne (Chairman), A Science Policy for Canada: Report of the Senate Special Committee 
on Science Policy, Volume 2: Targets and Strategies for the Seventies, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for 
Canada, 1972). (Hereafter Lamontagne Report Volume 2) 
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completely unknown… by study [they could] attempt to understand some of the things 
[they had to] do to achieve… long term objectives.”13 The committee further expressed 
its opinion that the ECC had neglected long-term studies in their work and that it ought to 
expand its areas of study to establish a specific Committee on the Future examining the 
years 1985 and 2000.14  
While the Lamontagne report indicated that the ECC would assume major 
responsibility for conducting and disseminating long-term research at the national level, 
higher powers had different plans. Prime Minister Trudeau and the Privy Council Office 
(PCO) perceived future studies initiatives as a means to provide the IRPP with a much 
needed defined purpose and focus for its attention.  Suggestions geared towards the ECC 
in the Lamontagne report were suggested as goals for the IRPP.15 The idea of a futures-
orientation for the IRPP was not new. In October 1971, MOSST’s head Alastair Gillespie 
announced a plan to establish the IRPP at an Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) meeting. He described it as a combination of a think tank and a 
“futures operation”. He added that the new institution was “another attempt to come to 
terms with the future and to anticipate the future.”16 However, it took until the 
Lamontagne Committee’s second report for the IRPP to make significant progress in the 
futures field. 
In February 1975, Trudeau responded to Senator Lamontagne’s letter concerning 
the possibility of federal support for a Senate-sponsored conference on the future. In the 
                                                 
13 Lamontagne Report, Vol. 2, p.406. 
14 Lamontagne Report, Vol. 2, pp.407-408. 
15 Maurice Lamontagne, “The State of Future Studies in Canada,” (NAC: MG 32 B-32 Volume 5, File 
“Discours,”) p.18. 
16 Alastair Gillespie, “Transcript of a Statement by the Honourable Alastair Gillespie Minister of State for 
Science and Technology Meeting of Ministers of Science of O.E.C.D. Countries October 13-14, 1971,” 
(NAC: R1526 Volume 14 OECD File 2), p.7. 
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reply Trudeau stated that the IRPP had “taken longer to start than I had hoped… It would 
seem in effect that this organization should initially be given the responsibility of the 
important tasks which [Lamontange Committee had] so well defined.”17  Subsequently, 
in April 1975, CACOR member C. R. (Buzz) Nixon, Deputy Secretary to Cabinet, wrote 
to IRPP director A. W. R. Carrothers suggesting the institute use current data as a base 
and then to conduct trend analysis into the future using the suggested dates of 1985 and 
2000 as benchmarks to see how trends might develop. The letter also suggested the 
drafting of an IRPP proposal that could form the basis of a contract providing PCO 
funding for IRPP projects. 18 This was to generate revenue beyond the attempts to 
establish the $30 million endowment mentioned previously. As a result the IRPP worked 
in conjunction with the PCO “with a view to serving as a catalyst and clearing house for 
forecasting studies in Canada.”19 
The IRPP appeared to be an excellent candidate to take charge of futures studies 
initiatives. A 1970-1971 Science Council report had recommended the establishment of a 
Futures Canada Institute that was similar in structure and intent to the suggestions 
contained in the Ritchie Report that laid the IRPP’s foundations. The Science Council’s 
Arthur Cordell found that there was a great deal of commonality between the ideas 
presented in the two studies. He further added that there appeared only to be “minor 
                                                 
17  Pierre Trudeau, “Letter to Maurice Lamontagne, 21 February 1975” quoted by Maurice Lamontagne, 
“Senate Debates, 10 July 1975,” Senate Hansard First Session, Thirtieth Parliament Volume II 1974-1976, 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1975), p.1171.   
18  IRPP, “Background Paper,”p.4. 
C. R. Nixon, “Letter to A. W. R. Carrothers 1 April 1975,” quoted by Maurice Lamontagne, “Senate 
Debates, 10 July 1975,” pp.1171-1172. 
19 IRPP, “Background Paper,”p.4. 
  Senate Committee, “Senate Debates Appendix,” pp.1171-1173. 
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differences” in terms of time horizons and the extent to which systems could be changed 
to accommodate future Canadian needs.20  
By 1975, the IRPP’s initial director, A. W. R. Carrothers, had been replaced by 
former Senator John Aird.  Carrothers, however, remained involved with the IRPP. Aird 
asked Carrothers to meet with Buzz Nixon and Senator Lamontagne to discuss the 
potential futures studies role(s) for the IRPP. As a result, a series of meetings were held 
in May and June of 1975 and George Lindsey from the Department of Defence was asked 
to prepare a background paper on the institute to discuss the feasibility of it working in 
the futures field.21  Lindsey used the wording of the initial letter from the PCO’s Nixon to 
argue against the IRPP accepting substantial responsibility for the bulk of 
recommendations from The Lamontagne Report. While not averse to conducting PCO 
funded trend analysis, Lindsey argued that the organizing of an international conference 
and the establishment of an information centre for future studies went “beyond the 
program implied by the PCO letter.”22 In lieu of a full-fledged futures studies program he 
proposed the IRPP initially conduct a program “modest in scope, more in the nature of an 
exploratory beginning than a Great Leap Forward.”23 
The IRPP’s four criteria used for proposals reflected The Ritchie Report 
recommendations in terms of being supplemental to existing research and examining 
                                                 
20 Arthur J. Cordell, “‘An Institute for Research on Public Policy’ Ronald S. Ritchie: A Summary and 
Comparison with the “Futures Canada” Institute Proposed in Science Council Annual Report NO., 1970-
71,” (NAC: R1526 Volume 13 File Science Council), p.3, p.5, and p.6. 
21 G. R. Lindsey, “Proposal for Future Studies, 17 November 1975,” (NAC: RG102 AC.1984-85/ 520 
Volume 33 File – 2120-S1-2 pt.1). 
Special Committee of the Senate on Science Policy, “Senate Debates Appendix: First Report, 10 July 
1975,” Senate Hansard First Session, Thirtieth Parliament Volume II 1974-1976, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1975), pp.1171-1173. (Hereafter Lamontagne Committee) 
22 Lindsey, “Proposal for Future,” p.1. 
23 Lindsey, “Proposal,” p.2. 
 Thompson, Looking Back, p.11. 
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medium and long term considerations. The first concern was that the study be based five 
to twenty-five years in the future and in a topic area in which significant change was 
likely to occur. Secondly preference was given to novel research areas or to applying new 
means for examining established research topics. Projects also had to exhibit an obvious 
use for the results of the research and, finally, projects had to be able to be completed 
within the allotted time and financial constraints.24 Finally, four years after the release of 
the Ritchie Report the IRPP appeared poised to begin active public policy research. 
A major step forward for the organization and for its futures studies initiative 
occurred in 1977 when, future President of the Canadian Association for the Club of 
Rome, Michael Kirby was appointed to lead the IRPP.25 Anxious to provide concrete 
outputs “to demonstrate the Institute was in business,” 26 Kirby orchestrated a publication 
                                                 
24 Echoing Lamontagne’s criticism of the Economic Council of Canada’s initial assumptions based upon a 
stable international situation, Lindsey argued that long term forecasting was of questionable value to 
Canada whose economic future was sensitive to international changes. Instead the IRPP suggested initial 
reports deal only with the matters affecting economic and technological trends and Canadian society.  
In 1975 the first major IRPP work being researched involved general Canadian population trends. It was 
a most basic consideration that was likely to impact future Canadian public policy in a wide range of policy 
areas. The second report was to be more specific on the impact of aging populations with the results being 
applicable in the social services, housing, health care and income security policy areas.  The Institute also 
planned to conduct a through study on communications and transportation with the expectations that the 
results could help forge a consensus between the federal and provincial governments on related policy 
issues. 
IRPP, “Background Paper,”pp.2-3. 
Lindsey, “Proposal,” p.3. 
25 Kirby’s credentials were impressive. He had taught at various universities including the University of 
Chicago, and Kent University in England before settling in at Dalhousie University in Halifax in 1969-70.  
There he became the Assistant Dean of Arts and Sciences while teaching courses on Communications and 
Business Administration. From 1973 to 1974 he was both the Director of the Government Studies Program 
at Dalhousie and the Principal Assistant to Nova Scotia Premier Gerald Regan. In 1974 he moved to federal 
politics where he served as Prime Minister Trudeau’s Principal Assistant Secretary until 1976.  
In addition Kirby had previously been Canada’s representative on the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. It was an organization that was tangentially associated with the Club 
of Rome whose founder, Aurelio Peccei, was also instrumental in establishing the IIASA. Prior to 
becoming IRPP president, Kirby arranged to have the IRPP become affiliated with the IIASA. 
Elizabeth Lumley, (editor), “Kirby, Hon. Michael J. L.,” in Canadian Who’s Who 2003 Volume XXXVIII, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), p.723. 
Dobell, IRPP, p.21. 
26 IRPP, “Publications Available, July 1982,” in W. T. Stanbury and Fred Thompson, Regulatory Reform in 
Canada, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982), pp.135-137. 
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schedule that witnessed the publication of thirty-nine books, including four in French, 
from 1978 to 1980 inclusive. He also established Policy Options as a regular journal to 
disseminate IRPP research. 27  In addition Kirby and Chairman John Aird successfully 
attracted funding from the American Ford Foundation, the Canadian Donner Foundation 
as well as from Canadian provinces and the private sector. Personal requests to the 
provinces netted over $6 million with an additional $2 million from the private sector. 
Eventually Kirby succeeded in creating a $20 million endowment for the IRPP, two-
thirds of the $30 million envisioned in the Ritchie Report that led to its creation.28   
With new revenues and an active research program Kirby decided it was time for 
a change. In 1977, he introduced organizational reforms that created six key research 
areas including a $1.3 million Futures Studies section headed by David Hoffman.29 
Hoffman had previously held the position of Director of the Intergovernmental Planning 
Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Relations Branch of the Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs.30 IRPP’s futures research efforts were aided by the insistence from Prime 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dobell, IRPP, p.22. 
27 IRPP, “Publications,” pp.135-137. 
Dobell, IRPP, p.22. 
28 As mentioned above the federal government had committed for the first seven years of operation to 
match contributions to the IRPP dollar for dollar up to a maximum of $10 million. By 1979 the deadline 
was supposed to have expired; however, Aird and Kirby successfully convinced the Trudeau government to 
extend the time frame and to include revenues from contract work as being eligible for matching funds. The 
end result was the federal government fulfilled its $10 million commitment. 
Ronald Ritchie, An Institute,pp.51-52. 
IRPP, “Background Paper,” pp.8-9. 
Trudeau, “Commons Debates, 21 February 1973,” pp.1496-1497. 
Sharp, “Commons Debates 22 May 1975,” p.6029.  
Dobell, IRPP, p.22, pp.29-31. 
29 The other five sections were: Ethnic and Cultural Diversity, Regulation and Government Intervention, 
International Economics, Regional Employment Opportunities and Natural Resources. 
Dobell, IRPP, p.22. 
30 - “Biographical Sketches of Speakers and Discussants: David Hoffman,” in Walter Baker (editor), 
Shaping the Future: Canada in a Global Society 1978 Conference Proceedings, (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa – Centre for Policy and Management Studies, 1979).  
Dobell, IRPP, p.22. 
Fred G. Thompson, Looking Back on the Future, (Ottawa: Futurescan International Inc., 1992), p.13. 
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Minister Trudeau and the PCO that the IRPP take responsibility for catalyzing future 
studies on a national scale.31 
Senator Lamontagne lamented that from the initial 1972 suggestion of the 
creation of a futures institute to the IRPP taking responsibility in 1977, there was a lost 
five-year period. However he was pleased that there appeared to be significant movement 
forward on the issue.32 The IRPP received substantial financial support from the PCO and 
produced numerous studies on futures topics such as the future of trading relations with 
Japan and the future of technology in specific resource sectors. In addition, the impact of 
emerging computer and communication technologies on business, governments and 
society was examined. Other topics examined the impact of Quebec nationalism and the 
future of health policy.33  
In addition to conducting future studies, the IRPP was also asked to take 
responsibility for establishing a broader national network for future studies and for 
organizing an initial conference to lay its foundations. It became apparent to the Special 
                                                 
31 Pierre Trudeau, “Letter to Maurice Lamontagne, 21 February 1975” quoted by Maurice Lamontagne, 
“Senate Debates, 10 July 1975,” Senate Hansard First Session, Thirtieth Parliament Volume II 1974-1976, 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1975), p.1171. 
C. R. Nixon, “Letter to A. W. R. Carrothers 1 April 1975,” quoted by Maurice Lamontagne, “Senate 
Debates, 10 July 1975,” pp.1171-1172. 
32 Maurice Lamontagne, “Notes for an Address by Senator Maurice Lamontagne at Conference of the 
Canadian Association for Futures Studies held at Queen’s University, Kingston June 9-11, 1977,” (NAC: 
MG32 B32 Volume 5 File Discours 3), pp.4-5. 
33 Thompson, Looking Back, p.13, p.89. 
Zavis Zeman, The Men With the Yen, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980). 
C. C. Gotlieb, Towards a National Computer and Communications Policy: Seven National 
Approaches,(Toronto : Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980). 
W. E. Cundiff, Nodule Shock? : Seabed Mining and The Future of the Canadian Nickel Industry, 
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978). 
Robert Arnold Russel,  The Electronic Briefcase : The Office of the Future, (Montreal: Institute for 
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Zavis P. Zeman and David Hoffman (editors), Dynamics of the Technological Leadership of the World : 
Report of a Round Table Sponsored by the Futures Studies Program of IRPP held in Montreal, 11 April, 
1979, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980).  
Leroy O. Stone, Canadian Population Trends and Public Policy Through the 1980s, (Montreal:  
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Senate Committee on Science Policy, known as the Lamontagne Committee, that the new 
IRPP responsibilities made their role redundant. As a result the Lamontagne Committee 
recommended that its “mandate to hold a conference for the purpose of determining the 
feasibility of establishing a Commission of the Future be terminated.”34  
The removal of the Senate from the organizational and planning stages of a 
proposed national conference caused concern for Lamontagne, his committee and 
external supporters of an activist Senate. While the transference of a futures conference 
responsibility to the IRPP would deny the Senate an active role in organizing and in the 
operations of the conference, Lamontagne, supported by other Senators, refused to be 
relegated to the sidelines. The Senate reluctantly accepted that the IRPP would take 
responsibility for a national futures conference, but then subsequently decided to 
reinvigorate the Special Senate Science Committee with a new mandate designed to both 
aid the IRPP in its task and to assess the relative impact of its initial report.35 
The Senate Committee was of the opinion that if the IRPP were to accept 
responsibility for organizing a national futures studies conference to be the catalyst for a 
new national association, it would need substantial help. As a result the 1975 updated 
questionnaire was designed to provide the IRPP with the most current picture possible of 
Canadian futures studies activities.36 Largely due to Lamontagne’s insistence, continued 
                                                 
34 Senate Committee, “Senate Debates Appendix,” pp.1172-1173. 
35 Senate Committee, “Senate Debates Appendix,” p.1173.  
J. E. Carter, “Letter to Maurice Lamontagne 12 January 1976,” (NAC: RG102 AC.1984-85/ 520 Volume 
33 File – 2120-S1-2 pt.2), pp.2-3. 
36 Being cognisant of asking departments and various organizations to re-answer questions that had been 
addressed a few years before, Lamontagne and the Committee went to great lengths to have responses as 
succinct as possible and agreed to the central organizations submitting a response on behalf of the various 
departments.  Ministry of State for Science and Technology’s (MOSST) D. B. Dewar related that 
Lamontagne stressed his desire not to create unnecessary duplicative work and his willingness to rely on 
existing data supplied from MOSST, if it were deemed sufficient by the Senate Committee. Beneath 
Lamontagne’s desire to avoid duplication of effort, was a message that the Senate review had to be taken 
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pressure by the Senate as a “watch dog” over futures studies in the federal government 
began to pay dividends beyond governmental circles. However the institutions of 
government that had developed a close relationship with COR/CACOR, such as the PCO, 
MOSST and IRPP, were also instrumental in establishing a national organization 
dedicated to futures studies — the Canadian Association for Future Studies (CAFS). 
 
The Creation and Growth of the Canadian Association for Futures Studies 
Federal support for futures initiatives in the mid-1970s was part of a broader 
futures movement that appeared to be gaining national recognition and momentum at the 
governmental, business and popular levels of Canadian society. Evidence for the growing 
support of the futures movement was found at the initial “Future Studies in Canada” 
conference hosted by the Education Faculty at the University of Western Ontario (UWO) 
in London, Ontario in February 1976. The success of this meeting led to the formal 
creation of the Canadian Association for Future Studies (CAFS) later in the year.37 
 Senator Lamontagne’s Committee had envisioned increasing interest in futures 
studies at the national and international levels. The Senate’s interest in the topic led to an 
opportunity to create a national futures organization along analogous lines to what had 
been advocated in 1972 in the Lamontagne report’s Volume Two. 38  The IRPP, MOSST 
and the Senate played leading roles in the organization and operation of the conference. 
Conference planners were motivated by a belief that if fifty to sixty futures-minded 
                                                                                                                                                 
seriously and that the Committee would ultimately decide if sufficient information had been received, or if 
departments would have to be consulted. 
D. B. Dewar, “Notes for Meeting with Departments 6 November 1975,” (NAC: RG102 Acc. 1984-
85/520 Volume 33 File 2120-S1 pt.1), pp.1-3. 
37 -- “Formation of the Canadian Association for Future Studies,” Futures Canada, (Volume 1 No.1, 1976), 
p.1. 
Robert Bradley, “Futures Studies in Canada,” Futures, (Volume 8 No.2, April, 1976), pp.185-186. 
38 Thompson, Looking Back, p.13. 
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individuals could be gathered together to discus their respective work, a basis could be 
laid for the establishment of a national organization. To the organizers’ delight over two 
hundred attended the conference with two-thirds of that number becoming founding 
CAFS members.39 
Included among the list of participants at the inaugural futures conference were 
representatives from the federal government and federally supported agencies.  The 
IRPP, Treasury Board, Privy Council Office, the Economic Council of Canada, the 
Science Council of Canada, and Environment Canada played active roles in presenting on 
their respective agencies’ futures activities and its role in policy development. Futures-
minded organizations such as the Club of Rome, the World Futures Society were 
involved as well as numerous universities from Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba.40 
The 1977 meeting at Queen’s University attracted approximately 600 people to 
discuss the theme of “Shaping the Future.”41 It was decided to have an open-ended 
conference title to attract a wide range of interests and to prevent specific futures areas, 
such as the future of energy, or international relations concerns, from dominating 
proceedings. Despite, or perhaps because of, the undefined criteria for the conference the 
initial call for papers in November 1976 met with little response, with only two or three 
abstracts being submitted. Conference organizers decided, with success, to directly 
recruit futures individuals from a variety of backgrounds with experience in presenting at 
conferences. The Senate Office of Maurice Lamontagne, as well as MOSST’s Mike 
                                                 
39 -- “Formation,” p.1. 
40 -- “Program Extracts from the Founding Conference – February 6 and 7, 1976,” Futures Canada, 
(Volume 1 No.1, 1976), pp.2-3. 
41 Maurice Lamontagne (Chairman), A Science Policy for Canada: Report of the Senate Special Committee 
on Science Policy, Volume 4: Progress and Unfinished Business, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 
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Stevens, aided conference organizers by giving administrative support and advice. The 
end result of their efforts produced an intense conference that hosted seventy sessions 
spanning eight key topic areas including basic overview of futures studies and various 
methodologies, Canadian concerns and activities, as well as images of the future and the 
role and development of futures education.42  
Building upon the success of the first two Canadian Association for Future 
Studies (CAFS) national conferences, the CAFS Executive decided to further explore the 
Shaping the Future theme but to do so within the Canadian context. As a result the 1978 
CAFS annual national conference, held at the University of Ottawa, brought together the 
public, private and academic sectors to discuss “Shaping the Future: Canada in a Global 
Society”. The conference was a collaborative effort involving the Canadian Association 
for Future Studies, the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome, the Science Council 
of Canada, the Economic Council of Canada, the Institute for Research on Public Policy 
and the Centre for Policy Management Studies at the University of Ottawa. Funding for 
the conference was provided by the collaborators with additional funding and in-kind 
contributions from the Department of Public Works, the Privy Council Office, the Public 
Service Commission of Canada and the Pitney-Bowes Corporation.43  
The honour of chairing the conference and delivering the opening remarks was, 
appropriately, given to Maurice Lamontagne. In his address he described the conference 
as “an important, indeed unprecedented, event in Canadian history… a conference that 
                                                 
42 Don Nightingale, “Personal Reflections on the 1977 Futures Conference,” Futures Canada, (Vol.2 No.1, 
1977), pp.8-9. 
Cathy Starrs, “Reflections on the Kingston Conference,” Futures Canada, (Vol.2 No.1, 1977), p.9. 
43 Baker, Shaping the Future,  p.ix, pp.xiv-xv. 
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has as its goal shaping the future of Canada in the global society.”44 Due to the efforts of 
civil servant, CACOR and CAFS member Fred Thompson, the 1978 “Shaping the 
Future” Conference Papers were later distributed and discussed at the federal 
bureaucratic level. At a combined meeting of the Privy Council Office, the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the Federal Provincial Relations Office staff in December 1978, 
Thompson had the conference papers distributed.  In addition to ensuring a presence for 
the CAFS at the senior bureaucratic level, Thompson and others hoped the move would 
help with additional sales of the published conference proceedings slated for 1979.45  
The 1977 supplemental Senate Science Committee Report held out optimism for 
CAFS’ future, but added that to be effective it would have to be an effective impartial 
observer and critic and would need substantial public and private support to succeed.46 
Based upon the success of the first two annual national CAFS conferences the 
organization appeared to be well on the way to becoming a major national public policy 
player. The 1976 conference surpassed expectations when approximately two hundred 
attended a conference that was initially expected to attract 50 to 60 experts.47 Similarly, 
the 1977 conference attracted over 600 attendees, 40% of whom were not CAFS 
members; approximately 500 had been anticipated to attend.48 
 At the same time, the organization was establishing a presence in regions across 
the country. Under the direction of Janice Tait, the Montreal Futures Society decided to 
support CAFS by reconstituting itself as a CAFS affiliate.49 CAFS coordinators were 
                                                 
44 Maurice Lamontagne, “Opening Remarks,” in Baker, Shaping the Future, p.3. 
45 F. G. Thompson, “Note Re: “Excerpts of Papers From the Conference “Shaping the Future Ottawa 
August 23-27, 1978” 15 December 1978,” (J. Rennie Whitehead Personal Archive, Ottawa), cover. 
46 Lamontagne Report, Vol. 4, pp.65-66. 
47 -- “Formation,” p.1. 
48 Nightingale, “Personal Reflections,” p.8. 
49 -- “Recent Events,” Futures Canada, (Volume 1 No.1, 1976), p.5. 
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established in eastern and central Canada at Halifax, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, St. 
Catherines, London and Windsor. In Western Canada CAFS coordinators operated in 
Regina and Victoria.50 From this base the organization positioned itself for expansion to 
become a major national organization. 
The network continued to expand. Liaison efforts with external groups, such as 
the CACOR, were established early in the CAFS’ operations. CAFS members, and future 
CACOR members, Fred Thompson, Leon Katz and Janice Tait along with CAFS member 
Saul Silverman, attended the June 1976 CACOR conference in Ottawa to discuss 
cooperative ventures and possibilities.51 By the end of 1976, CAFS membership stood at 
435 and a new affiliate chapter in Edmonton had been established.52 In 1977, the CAFS 
executive was pleased that they had active members in all Canadian provinces except 
Newfoundland and Labrador. New branches had been established in Peterborough, 
Winnipeg, Calgary, and Prince Albert. 53   
However, CAFS was cognisant of a relative lack of regional members. Its 
executive was drawn only from four central provinces - Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan. In terms of membership the vast majority of CAFS members, 310, were 
from Ontario followed by Quebec with 84 members and Alberta with 31 members. Both 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan had 18 members while Manitoba had 10 members. 
The Atlantic region had a scant seven members with five from Nova Scotia, and one each 
from New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.54 
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In 1980, CAFS partnered with the United States-based World Futures Society 
(WFS) to organize and host the First Global Conference on the Future that brought 
futurists from around the world to Toronto. Approximately 6000 individuals attended the 
conference including approximately a hundred from lesser-developed nations. The three 
main categories of the conference dealt with humanistic, global and management 
concerns. Humanistic concerns covered such topics as social organization, food supplies, 
health, values and religion. Global concerns reflected the interrelated nature of the world, 
challenges such as: natural resources, population, the state of the oceans, science and 
technology. The third main section, management concerns, dealt predominantly with 
future studies methodologies and controversies.55 
 While not all presentations were printed, the conference resulted in the book 
Through the ‘80s: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally being published later the same year. 
In addition to a foreword by Canada’s Governor-General Edward Schreyer, an 
introduction by Canadian activist Maurice Strong and a postscript by Club of Rome 
Founder Aurelio Peccei, the book contained sixty articles. The contributing authors 
included the author of the widely popular book Future Shock Alvin Toffler; noted 
international physicist Isaac Asimov; long-time environmentalist Lester Brown; founder 
of the Hudson Institute futurist Herman Khan; and Club of Rome members Clive 
Simmonds and Ervin Laszlo.56  
                                                 
55 The conference combined the third general WFS conference with the fifth CAFS annual conference.     
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The conference and 1980 publication were the high point of activity for the 
CAFS. The next chapter examines political, popular and intellectual shifts in the 1980s 
that caused prospective holistic thinking to fall out of favour and lose resonance among 
the general population and among policy makers. First, however, this chapter examines 
the last two major CACOR initiatives. The first was federally supported while the second 
was the result of the efforts and sponsorship of a private citizen. Taken together, the two 
initiatives foreshadow the elements of decline that are explored in the following chapter.  
 
CACOR/ the Department of the Environment and the Global 2000 Project 
Like the Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST), the Department 
of the Environment (DOE) was envisioned with systems thinking in mind. Political 
scientists Bruce Doern and Thomas Conway argue that the interest at the Privy Council 
Office (PCO) and Treasury Board in rational planning techniques influenced the shape of 
the DOE. For example, CACOR Member C. R. “Buzz” Nixon of the PCO was a strong 
advocate of having systems analysis applied to the DOE. The idea was to augment 
economic planning assumptions with the environmental concept of feedback loops. The 
DOE was to have been a horizontal organization that would review the initiatives of any 
other department whose initiatives had any environmental impact. The DOE would then 
report to Cabinet, where its opinions were – in an ideal policy world- to have influence. It 
was hoped that, at minimum, the DOE, would have a broad mandate, and be able to 
convince other government departments to include environmental considerations into 
traditional feasibility studies.57 
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Former Environment Minister John Roberts commented that the DOE was created 
as a holistic organization and that systems analysis with its inclusive and future-oriented 
perspectives fit with the broader DOE mandate. However, the initial years of activity 
tended to concentrate on more immediate concerns and on “catching-up” with existing 
problems. Roberts claimed that there were two distinct periods of activity for the DOE. In 
the initial years, efforts were concentrated on dealing with existing problems and the 
development of legislation and regulations to control pollution and other phenomena 
related to environmental degradation. He characterized this approach as relatively 
ineffective “band-aid solution.”58 A second phase emerged by the mid-1970s.  Concern 
shifted to “better understanding of complex relationships… emphasis began to be placed 
on anticipating problems.”59 Holistic systems thinking became important to understand 
interrelationships between society, industry, technological advances, economics and the 
environment.   
 By the mid-1970s the DOE had accepted the necessity for a long-term approach 
to environmental policy development and for situating such policies within the context of 
environmental limits. That concern translated into substantial support for futures studies 
activities. By 1976, the DOE had established a futures-focussed Advanced Concepts 
Centre that with a $50,000 per year budget. In addition the department had contracted out 
approximately $660,000 worth of futures research contracts on various initiatives.60  
 Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (CACOR) members such as Tom de 
Fayer were able to use their positions of influence within the DOE to capitalize on the 
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department’s interest in futures studies.61 De Fayer’s efforts lead to the DOE sponsoring a 
Canadian version of a report initially conducted for American President Jimmy Carter, 
Global 2000 by Gerald O. Barney.62 The Barney report painted an ominous image of the 
world at the turn of the twenty-first century. It claimed that if ameliorative measures were 
not enacted the world in 2000 was expected to be more crowded, polluted and less stable 
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than in the 1975 to 1980 era. World population would increase by a third and population 
growth in 2000 would likely by 40% higher than when the report was written.63    
 While Barney was directing the Global 2000 project in the United States, he 
approached CACOR with an offer to do an equivalent study with a Canadian focus. The 
DOE’s Thomas de Fayer led efforts to accept Barney’s offer by first convincing the 
CACOR Executive of its merits. The purpose of the Global 2000:Implications for 
Canada report was to use an outside perspective (Barney was an American) as a basis for 
Canadians to look ahead at the final two decades of the twentieth century.64 While 
interested, the CACOR lacked sufficient funds to directly sponsor the project. CACOR 
Chairman at the time, William Stadelman, spearheaded efforts to locate and convince 
private Canadian companies to contribute to the project. Approximately forty private 
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the more disadvantaged nations. There were also major natural resource and environmental concerns as the 
former were expected to be less available than in 1980 and the later was expected to begin to lose some of 
its life-carrying capabilities. Once again the lesser-developed countries were expected to fare worse than 
the developed world as environmental concerns such as deforestation was expected to be worse than in the 
industrialised nations. Prices for vital natural resources, especially energy and food resources, were 
expected to increase. In general, the world at the cusp of the twenty-first century was expected to “be more 
vulnerable both to natural disaster and to disruptions from human causes.”  
The report had substantial Presidential backing and it was distributed to all embassies in Washington and 
a special Presidential Cabinet task force to examine its implications was to be established. President 
Carter’s reaction was to add weight to the findings by describing them as being “of great concern to all of 
us.” Strong political support was critical as Global 2000 argued that the effects of developing problems 
were not likely to be fully evident until 2000 or later. Moreover Carter argued that if changes of approach 
to public policy were not enacted the world would lose opportunities to change the course of future 
developments and actions “to change trends [could not] be postponed without foreclosing important 
options.” President Carter added that the report indicated “the potential for deepening global problems over 
the next two decades if policies and practices around the world,” continued as they were currently being 
conducted. Time magazine noted that while Global 2000’s message was analogous to previous futures 
studies, such as the 1972 Limits to Growth, its significance lay in the fact that it was “the first time the U.S. 
Government had added it full voice,” to the organizations and reports expressing deep concern for the 
future state of the world. 
-- “Toward,” p.46. 
Gerald O. Barney, Global 2000: Implications for Canada, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp.31-32.  
Executive  Office of the President, et. al.“Press Release 24 July, 1980,” pp.1-3. 
64 Tom de Fayer, “Attachment: Tentative Report Structure: “Global 2000: Implications for Canada,” to a 
Letter to J. Rennie Whitehead, 21 January 1981,” (CACORA: File 310 CACOR Correspondence 1981), 
p.1. 
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Canadian companies were approached about making donations in the range of $2,500 
each to support the initiative. In the end seven companies responded positively.65    
With private sector support being insufficient to complete the project the CACOR 
had to seek public funding to supplement costs.66 CACOR member Rennie Whitehead 
said de Fayer  “stick-handled [the proposal] through his own department until he had 
ministerial approval for funding to match the contributions of industry.”67 De Fayer 
believed in a traditional pragmatic Hungarian axiom warning: “Don’t run after a carriage 
that has no intention of giving you a ride.”68 However within his department it was not 
likely that he would be ignored and as a result his chances of gaining support were high. 
In addition to successfully securing DOE funding de Fayer was able to secure support 
from the following government departments and agencies: Industry, Trade and 
Commerce; External Affairs; Agriculture; Canadian International Development Agency 
and Statistics Canada.69 de Fayer described the process in a letter to futurist Adam Shaff 
who was seeking similar funding for a subsequent futures project. After receiving the 
support of the CACOR Board, de Fayer obtained funding support from governmental 
sponsors to facilitate Barney’s Canadian report being published by Pergamon Press.70 
                                                 
65 The companies were: The Alberta Gas Trunk Line Company Ltd.; Dofasco Inc.; The Royal Bank of 
Canada; The Seagram Co.; Thorne Riddell & Co. and Canadian Pacific Ltd. 
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66 T. L. de Fayer, “Invitation, circa1981,” (CACOR Archives: File 105: 7th CACOR Conference, November 
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67 Whitehead, “Tom,” pp.7-8.  
68 Tom deFayer, “A New Perspective on the Global Problematique,”in Stewart, Thomas L. de Fayer, p.24.  
69 Tom de Fayer, “Attachment: CACOR: Seventh Annual Conference – Friday, November 13, 1981, 
Theme: The Global 2000 Report: Implications for Canada, to a Letter to J. Rennie Whitehead, 21 January 
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 While there was a great deal of interest in the Global 2000: Implications for 
Canada project, CACOR chairman, and author of the original report laying the basis for 
the IRPP, Ronald Ritchie wrote to de Fayer warning that if the report were to lead to “any 
concrete results,” there had to be follow up. He further suggested that the CACOR might 
be an excellent medium to use for that purpose.71 The suggestion was in line with de 
Fayer’s thinking and as a result three gatherings were planned dealing with the report’s 
release at the end of March 1981. A pre-release seminar was planned for February 1981 
with a second coinciding with the report’s March release and finally the annual CACOR 
Conference in November was to have had as its focus the report and its implications.72  
Approximately 150 individuals attended the late fall conference. In addition to the 
sponsoring organizations mentioned above, sixteen other federal departments and 
agencies were invited to participate in the conference. Outside the federal government, 
numerous research institutes were invited to take part including the C. D. Howe Institute, 
the Conference Board of Canada, the Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Labour 
Congress and the Canadian Environmental Law Association.73 The conference had the 
report’s author, Gerald O. Barney as the keynote speaker. Participants were asked ahead 
of time to sign up for one of three concurrent seminars: Energy – Problems and 
Prospects; Food – Canada in a Hungary World; or Economic Development – The 
Canadian Outlook Amidst Global Adversity.74 
Thomas de Fayer described the publication of the Global 2000 reports as “a 
trigger mechanism encouraging people to look at the questions being posed. The year 
                                                 
71 Ritchie, “Letter to Tom,” p.1. 
72 de Fayer, “Attachment,” pp.1-2. 
73 de Fayer, “Attachment,” pp.1-2. 
74 Tom de Fayer, “Letter to Members and Guests 1981,” (CACORA: File 105 CACOR Conference 
November 1981), p.1. 
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2000 [was] an arbitrary figure to draw attention to things we should be looking at.”75 
Unfortunately, for de Fayer and the individuals who worked on the projects, the 
publications failed to attract much attention from the general public and the media. Three 
years after the initial publication, Pergamon Press’ Senior Vice President W. D. Crawley 
informed de Fayer that the Global 2000: Canada book had attracted virtually no media 
attention and that sales of it and the previous DOE-sponsored report had “fallen to a bare 
trickle.”76 
 Crawley’s January 1987 letter to de Fayer mentioned several factors that helped to 
explain a decline in influence and activity for the Club of Rome in Canada compared 
with the previous two decades. Crawley was at a loss as to why the Canadian books, as 
well as the original Barney Global 2000 book, were not attracting attention or selling 
many copies. The best explanations he could think of was the timing of the releases and 
the fact that “immediate pressing economic problems” not the content of the reports 
received media scrutiny.77 Numerous issues and crises focussed public attention on 
domestic issues rather than broader questions of global significance that besieged 
Canadians and their Prime Minister for the majority of the 1980s.78  
                                                 
75 Michael Keating, “Problem Seen For Canada With World Food Shortage,” The Globe And Mail, (2 
December 1981), p.4. 
76 Roder D. Voyer and Mark G. Murphy, Global 2000: Canada A View of Canadian Economic 
Development Prospects, Resources and the Environment, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1984), pp.xi-xii. 
W. D. Crawley, “Letter to Tom L. de Fayer 29 January 1987,” (CACORA: 5013 Report to the Club of 
Rome – What are we Heading For?), p.1. 
77 Crawley, “Letter to de Fayer,” p.1.  
78  Reflecting upon Canadian society during the early 1980s political pollster Allan Gregg wrote: “In the 
early 1980s, with the economy in a tailspin, an energy crisis threatening both treasuries [federal and 
provincial] and lifestyles, and the country politically divided over social issues, somehow the most critical 
matter of the day was to bring Canada’s constitution home from Britain, and to knit Canadians together as 
one nation, with all its citizens subject to the same rights and responsibilities.” 
Historians Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein commented that in the late seventies and into the 
nineteen eighties “National unity was a government preoccupation, as Quebec separatism strengthened.” In 
1978 Trudeau had written to Cabinet Minister Alastair Gillespie to explain “during this period of Canadian 
constitutional turmoil, Canadians should never forget that our international stature, our potential for 
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 For example, the skyrocketing price of energy at the turn of the decade was an 
important factor in Joe Clark’s inability to win the 1980 election. It also led to Trudeau’s 
much-loathed National Energy Policy (NEP).79 Meanwhile, Quebec’s sovereignty 
movement was presenting a formidable obstacle to the future unity of the country with 
potentially strong sentimental and economic consequences should Canada fail to survive 
intact.80  
In addition to potential unity problems, Canadians were dealing with severe 
economic difficulties in the early 1980s. Stagflation and a deteriorating Gross Domestic 
Product figure from the mid-1970s onward into the 1980s did not augur well for the 
economic stability of the country. Economic matters were being exacerbated by a 
mushrooming national debt being accumulated by the federal government who, lacking a 
sufficient tax base, was borrowing increasing sums of money to pay for services. Deficits 
were being accumulated to cover the costs of governmental programs developed in more 
prosperous times and were not being put into capital investments. In 1975 the deficit was 
                                                                                                                                                 
effectiveness and accomplishment, and even our identity are all dependent on our ability to maintain unity. 
Our identity, and the essential recognition on which we depend, will be much more resilient and resistant to 
erosion should we continue to pursue an active, sympathetic, responsible role in the world.”  
Allan Gregg, “Quebec’s Final Victory,” The Walrus, (Volume 2, Issue 1, February 2005), p.51. 
Robert Bothwell and J. L. Granatstein, Our Century: The Canadian Journey, (Toronto: McArthur & 
Company, 2000), p.207. 
Trudeau, “Letter to Gillespie 16 February 1978,” p.7. 
79 For an excellent account of the strong connection between the NEP and Western Alienation see David 
Kilgour’s Uneasy Patriots, especially chapters one and five. The NEP cost Alberta alone in the area of $60 
billion in revenues and economic activity and has become a sore point in that province’s and the region’s 
relations with the rest of the country. 
Bothwell, Drummond and English, Canada Since 1945, p.367, pp.421-423. 
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Publishing, 1988), pp.38-42, p.93, pp.94-99, p.102 and p.107. 
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$3.8 billion. By 1982, it had grown to $20.3 billion.81 Meanwhile, by the last quarter of 
1982, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was 12.8%82 
All the immediate concerns noted above distracted most Canadians from issues 
related to prospective thinking and the need to plan today for the well being of future 
generations. Thus the evidence and arguments presented in the Global 2000 reports failed 
to garner support among traditional allies and were ignored by the media. For CACOR, 
the problem of attracting media and public attention was about to get worse. 
In addition to sluggish sales, Crawley’s 1987 letter to de Fayer mentioned a 
further problem that was emblematic of the crisis discussed next chapter that 
COR/CACOR faced in the 1980s. Crawley said that the COR/CACOR’s main publisher, 
Pergamon, was restructuring and closing their Toronto office. Responsibility for social 
science and political publications was, as a result, being transferred to Oxford in England. 
He was quick to add that the move did not preclude any future collaboration between the 
publisher and the CACOR but it did “present some hindrances (particularly in a 
“political” sense).”83 Crawley’s comment was likely a reference to the political and 
intellectual landscape in the United Kingdom at the time under the leadership of Prime 
                                                 
81 Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, Canada, 1996), pp.437-440. 
Richard Pomfret, The Economic Development of Canada Second Edition, (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 
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82 John Turner used the numerous problems affecting both individual Canadians and the country as a whole 
in June 1984 to call a snap election for September. At the press conference announcing the dissolution of 
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Canadians are unemployed and need jobs. The pressure on our exchange rate and our interest rates gives 
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Minister Margaret Thatcher. As discussed in the next chapter, the UK led the way in 
placing the idea that there could be limits to growth, or that the state should interfere with 
the free markets beyond the pale of journalistic, popular, political and academic 
discourse. 
 
CACOR, the University of Guelph and the 5000 Days Project 
While de Fayer led activities in Ottawa, in southern Ontario industrialist and 
CACOR member Kenneth Hammond was active in promoting new awareness and 
research initiatives. At the University of Guelph (UofG) the Club of Rome was an 
inspiration behind the eventual creation in the 1980s of the 5000 Days course.  The 
CACOR subsequently became involved in supporting the project. Motivated by the 1972 
Limits to Growth report, scientist Dr. Keith Ronald led the charge to have greater 
university level teaching on matters relating to the relationship between humanity and the 
natural environment.84 
 The impact created by the publication of The Limits to Growth was evident at the 
University of Guelph during the May 1972 convocation, just two months after the report 
was first published. The Dean of the Ontario Agricultural College, Richard Norval 
Richards, delivered the first address of the day. In that speech, the Dean discussed the 
importance of the Limits to Growth’s message and said to the graduating students that the 
                                                 
84 Ronald was a zoologist by training who was an advisor to federal Environment Ministers as well as 
becoming the UofG’s Dean of Biological Sciences and the head of the university’s Arboretum. 
Kenneth Hammond Conversation with Author, March 2005. (Hereafter Hammond Interview). 
Keith Ronald, Conversation with Author April 2005. (Hereafter Ronald Interview). 
Donella H Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to 
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real issue for them was to determine if humanity could control itself before it was too 
late.85  
Following Richards’ address, Professor Ronald outlined his concerns about the 
state of university teaching and raised the issues that would eventually form the focus of 
the 5000 Days course. Taking the Dean’s message one step further, Ronald was inspired 
by the Limits to Growth to criticize the isolated nature of university teaching and argued 
the need for universities to expand their curriculum and to focus, within a broad 
ecological framework, on four critical areas: population, pollution, use of finite resources, 
and development. It was an odd address to give to a graduating class who had just 
completed their university training, but it was controversial and stimulated a discussion 
that eventually led to the development of the UofG’s first for-credit distance education 
course. 86 
Ronald’s interests were soon paired with those of the owner of the Guelph-based 
multinational corporation Hammond Manufacturing, Kenneth Hammond who served on 
the University of Guelph’s Board of Governors. Hammond had similarly been “scared” 
and inspired by the 1972 Limits to Growth study to begin a further discussion on the 
growth controversy. 87 He first invited a set of approximately fifteen leading individuals 
from Guelph to his boardroom at the main Hammond Manufacturing office. Having met 
with some success it was decided to hold a second meeting on the topic with a few 
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revisions to the invitee list and as a result of the second meeting it was decided to form 
“The Club of Guelph” as an informal discussion group.88  
Not content with a discussion group, Hammond believed the university should 
have been doing more to address critical issues related to the future health of the planet 
and its inhabitants. He once wrote: “the best way to effect change from the destructive 
direction humanity is going to one of survival is through the educational and 
informational systems throughout the world… a difficult task and challenge indeed.”89 It 
was this similarity of interest that led Hammond to provide Ronald with a $10,000 grant 
to facilitate the creation of the 5000 Days project as the UofG’s first for-credit distance 
education course.90   
Hammond’s external funding played a critical role in allowing Ronald to develop 
the course without the constraints of university budgeting. Hammond’s grant was strictly 
directed and was not available for other use.91 In addition to Hammond’s support, Ronald 
found administrative support from another person who believed in new directions, Janet 
Wardlaw. In 1984 she became the UofG’s first female executive when she was appointed 
Vice-President Academic.92  In addition Ronald found support from the Distance 
Education Coordinator Marc Waldron, who had first introduced Ronald to Hammond.93 
                                                 
88 Hammond Interview. 
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As Ronald’s 5000 Days ideas were inspired by the first report to the Club of 
Rome in 1972, Hammond suggested that CACOR should sponsor the course. He 
suggested that the interrelated problems of the “Problematique” be used as a focal point 
for the course’s design.94 Hammond and Ronald saw the 5000 Days course as a means to 
further a broad discussion of the Problematique. Hammond also hoped it would provide 
CACOR with a concrete initiative to help draw more attention and interest to the 
organization. However, financial difficulties meant that CACOR contributions had to be 
in-kind rather than monetary. 
In September 1984 CACOR President Michael Kirby wrote that the CACOR 
stood ready to assist any way it could but it did not have the wherewithal to contribute 
financially to the course. In lieu of direct funding, Kirby suggested that there were 
individuals in the organization who had substantial experience with the Problematique 
who would be willing to help.95 Rather than financial contributions then, CACOR 
donated a number of publications and moved its archive to the UofG’s Arboretum 
Interpretation Centre. 
To help with preparing written course materials and with instruction, Ronald 
recruited the assistance of Jane Dougan, Alan Watson, and Pam Healey. They were to 
organize, research and write the course textbook and to help with administration.  
Dougan had worked with Ronald as an editor and shared his concerns for the 
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environment and humanity.96 Reflecting CACOR concerns, Dougan said that the course 
outline and material was developed to “weave together the Problematique… social, 
economic and spiritual issues together with environmental considerations.”97 The course 
was finally unveiled in 1985 with an initial enrollment of 20 students. However, mainly 
via word-of-mouth, the course rapidly attracted the attention of UofG students and others 
who enrolled in increasing numbers. After six years the course was attracting hundreds of 
students and required the assistance of hired markers.98  
A part of the course’s appeal, beyond being a distance education course for credit, 
was that it was open to anyone who could work from home on the material, either for 
credit or out of personal interest.99  The course has continued and has spawned the 
creation of a second UofG distance education course called Beyond the 5000 Days. Both 
courses are a part of a broader Certificate in Environmental Citizenship program offered 
by the university. 100 In addition Ronald and Dougan subsequently used and expanded 
upon the 5000 Days material to create a second distance education initiative at Nova 
Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale Florida.101  Internet technology has enabled 
the course to become part of a global classroom with participants from all over the world 
at the undergraduate and graduate student levels, as well as at the guest speaker levels. 
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Dougan says that she has taught the 5000 Days and its derivative courses around the 
world from Canada to the US, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.102 
 
Conclusion 
In the mid-1970s Senator Lamontage had reason to be pleased with his efforts to 
promote and institutionalize futures research in Canada. The Institute for Research on 
Public Policy (IRPP), the Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) and 
the Canadian Association for Future Studies (CAFS) had been created and were actively 
involved in the futures field.  Lamontagne commented that although there had been 
significant delays the country had “made significant progress toward the building of a co-
ordinated national network of futures research as envisaged by our Senate Committee 
since 1972.” He added that with the three key components, the IRPP, MOSST and CAFS, 
in operation, the futures “network now [had] all the basic institutions and links to operate 
properly.”103    
The IRPP’s interest in futures studies had been foisted on the organization 
through a combination of factors with the Senate Special Committee’s recommendations 
on the need for greater futures studies being critical. In addition there was a growing 
impatience on the part of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, members of his Cabinet and the 
broader House of Commons, about the IRPP’s seemingly perpetual problems in 
becoming an active research organization. Those two factors came together in the Privy 
Council Office (PCO). The PCO decided to use futures studies as a means of providing a 
research focus for the nascent IRPP. Futures studies were to provide the IRPP with a 
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sense of purpose and direction and additional funding through PCO-granted research 
contracts. 
 Meanwhile, MOSST had been a direct result of the Lamontagne Committee 
recommendations and its futures activities continued to be influenced by the Senate 
Committee’s report and follow-up activities. Other key federal agencies, such as Treasury 
Board, acknowledged the importance of Lamontagne’s efforts to promote futures 
activities within federal policy-making circles. The Treasury Board’s Deputy Secretary T. 
E. Reid commented: “there had been a casual relationship between the sending of [the 
Senate’s] questionnaire in October 1975 and the creation the following December of the 
Coordinating Committee on Evaluation and Planning.” In addition, an Interdepartmental 
Committee on Futures Research was established within the federal government with the 
assistance of MOSST’s Secretariat for Futures Studies.104 
While the CAFS was an indirect outcome from the Lamontagne Committee 
Report, its creation was greatly assisted by the Canadian Senate, the IRPP and MOSST. 
Moreover in the mid-1970s, futures activities appeared to be on a major upswing. Under 
Michael Kirby’s direction, the IRPP including its dedicated Futures Section quickly 
began publishing at a feverish pace and holding seminars and conferences. MOSST was 
heavily involved in supporting various futures activities, both of its own initiatives and 
working with other futures-minded groups. The CAFS was rapidly increasing in size and 
in terms of membership, publication activities and the size of its conferences. Likewise, 
the University of Guelph’s 5000 Days course, and the subsequent Beyond 5000 Days 
attracted substantial public and academic attention.  
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In addition to federal activities, the creation and spreading popularity of the CAFS 
and the 5000 Days course gave reason for optimism for futures studies advocates. While 
it was not to last, Senator Lamontagne had a right to feel that he had attained success in 
popularizing and institutionalizing systems analysis and futures studies as integral parts 
of the Canadian public policy making process. The next chapters explore why things fell 
apart for systems analysis advocates in general and for the Club of Rome and its 
Canadian Association more specifically. The loss of contacts in the publishing world 
mentioned above was a relatively minor setback compared to the larger issues discussed 
next that threatened the viability of both the COR and CACOR.
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Chapter 6: The Decline of COR/CACOR Influence in Canada 1979-1988 
 
While the previous two chapters discussed the fruits of the influence of the Club 
of Rome (COR) and the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (CACOR) in 
Canada, this chapter examines the circumstances that led to COR/CACOR’s decline in 
influence in Canada and beyond. An intellectual paradigm shift regarding approaches to 
public policy development and the loss of key idea patrons and practitioners from the 
ranks of the civil service were the primary factors complicating COR/CACOR activities 
in Canada in the 1980s and beyond. Such problems were exacerbated by the untimely 
death of COR co-founder Aurelio Peccei, and a corresponding loss of momentum in 
COR/CACOR activities in the 1980s. A combination of the numerous factors discussed 
in this chapter imperilled, at least in Canada, COR/CACOR’s future existence because 
the organization ceased to be an influential presence in the corridors of power.  
 
From Keynesianism to Monetarism 
For advocates of holistic long-range systems approaches to policy development 
such as the COR/CACOR, Prime Minister Trudeau and his key aide Michael Pitfield, the 
1970s and early 1980s witnessed the emergence of disturbing political trends that 
presaged a paradigm shift in the approach to public policy development.  The 
international economic crisis of the 1970s caused widespread political and economic 
turmoil. One of the consequences of economic difficulties was a questioning of the 
assumptions that had guided policy development since the Second World War. Political 
scientist Isabella Bakker observed that the 1970s saw the emergence of a major debate 
between Keynesians, who believed in a strong role for the state, and the monetarists who 
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refuted traditional Keynesian ideas about a positive role for the state in the life and 
economy of a nation.1 
There is much debate within academia concerning the extent to which Canada 
did, or did not, implement practical Keynesian economic theory during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century.2 However, it is evident that during Trudeau’s 
government, that the Prime Minister, his cabinet and civil service broadly accepted the 
idea fundamental to Keynesian philosophy: the state had an active and positive role to 
play in the operation of the market economy and in ameliorating its negative 
consequences.  It was a line of reasoning that led  Prime Minister Trudeau at Christmas 
1975 to comment on the failure of the capitalist system and the potential need for lasting 
government intervention.3 The Prime Minister’s comments were largely met with scorn 
by the business community and led to a loss of support for the Liberal Party from the 
business sector. The Globe & Mail commented, “So loud was the outcry, even from 
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within his own caucus that Mr. Trudeau recanted and never again seriously questioned 
the free market.” 4 
However, Trudeau’s subsequent meeting with US Ambassador Thomas Enders 
clearly indicated that, at least in private, he continued to believe in the necessity of 
governmental interference in the operation of the free market economy. During an 
August 1976 visit, the Prime Minister stated: 
the great inflation and the ‘great wastefulness’5 of the seventies shows that 
something is fundamentally wrong… the market system intended to 
mediate greed for social benefit, is instead being dominated by it… a new 
social contract is needed. Canada’s wage and price controls are the first 
step in an integrative process intended to establish it. The second step 
would be the post-controls business/labor/government structure.6 
 
The Prime Minister’s conversation with Enders reflected both the tone of policy 
development in his government and his belief that the state needed to play a positive role 
in controlling the excesses of the operations of the free market system and its greatest 
vice – greed. Trudeau’s comment was made at a moment when Keynesian ideas related 
to the potentially positive role of the state in economic affairs were not yet passé. 
Enders commented that Trudeau remained committed to a long-term solution, 
even though a shorter-term proposal would have been easier to sell to sceptical labour  
unions, the business community, and the electorate. Enders further added that the Prime 
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Minister was “convinced of his vision but [was] trying to govern by fiat rather than 
[using] his very considerable skills as a practical politician.”7 Trudeau attempted to 
govern based on principles first and electoral/political considerations second. 
Regardless of the views of Canada’s Prime Minister, as the 1980s approached, the 
winds of intellectual change on the international front were shifting the political spectrum 
to the right. The early 1980s, according to academic Isabella Bakker were “a decade of 
uncertainty for state policy-makers.”8 A 1980 Canadian Institute for Economic Policy 
report exclaimed that the international system in the West that had evolved and become 
dominant since the end of the Second World War was “de-stabilizing, with all the 
problems, challenges and opportunities arising from that process.” 9  Commentators Philip 
DeMont and J. Eugene Lang explained that the economic crises of the 1970s and early 
1980s “killed” Keynesianism  as it was developed to fight deflationary pressures, not 
inflationary ones. As a result when governments “turned to the Keynes tool box… they 
found to their consternation that it was empty.” 10  
British commentator David Marquand said that followers of Keynesian thinking 
often remained in positions of power, but “the intellectual system on which they based 
their claim to power was patently crumbling.”11 Political scientist Peter Aucoin concurred 
and added that it was a problem faced by all Western nations who were forced to develop 
new strategies for the future. He further commented that in the late 1970s, Britain stood 
out due to the eagerness of its Prime Minister to tackle existing economic and policy 
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problems.12 In Canada and in the UK, Keynesian thinking “ended in the realm of ideas 
well before corresponding changes took place in the realm of governmental power.”13 
In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher – elected Prime Minister in 1979 – 
believed that the economic crises of the mid-1970s had placed Britain “on a knife edge” 
and that her radical economic and moral program of government was “required by the 
practical circumstances of the time.”14 For Thatcher, the basic problem facing the UK 
was that the state that was too involved in the economic and social life of the nation.15 
Meanwhile, across the ocean in the same year as Thatcher became the British leader, 
future US President Ronald Reagan commented in an address called Telescope I: “the 
miracle of the free market place is all around us. It makes you wonder why we don’t have 
more faith in it.”16 He later postulated that America’s inflation problem could be solved if 
only the government “would lift some of the paper burden from the back of [the US] 
industrial system.”17   
Former Trudeau Cabinet Minister John Roberts said of the 1980s that it was the 
start of an ongoing period of disillusionment for small “l” liberals around the world.  A 
period of “social frustration and economic confusion” caused basic liberal political ideals 
to become “contested on all sides”.18 The same phenomenon that was wreaking havoc on 
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liberal-minded individuals and organizations around the world also sounded the death 
knell for the Club of Rome and its Canadian Association’s influence in Canada and 
undermined its core message of the need for long-term holistic planning and to control 
the forces of economic growth. Academic David Marquand marvelled at how the new 
monetarist “paradigm shaped the political agenda and controlled the intellectual 
weather.”19 
The solution to economic problems proposed by followers of Thatcher and 
Reagan was termed monetarism. It was antithetical to Keynesian ideas about a positive 
role for the state in economic and social affairs. Believers in monetarist doctrine, 
alternatively referred to in secondary literature as the New Right, or neo-conservative 
doctrines, placed an “emphasis on market freedom, social and monetary discipline and a 
tightly concentrated state.”20 Monetarists believed that government intervention in 
economic affairs was counterproductive as markets operated best free of governmental 
interference.21 A strong economy tended to be integrally linked to a nation’s health and 
the well being of its citizens. Therefore, it was not much of a leap in logic to have 




                                                                                                                                                 
the Keynesian approach was not able to deal with the stagflation problem and, Roberts added, that the idea 
of “fine tuning” the economy at the macroeconomic level proved extremely difficult. 
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The End of the Trudeau Era 
As long as Trudeau was Prime Minister, the likelihood of Canadian public policy 
becoming subservient to market-based pressures was slight. However in the final years of 
his time in power, the commitment to systems-based holistic policy development waned. 
As discussed in chapter three, Michael Pitfield and Pierre Trudeau were political 
functionalists who believed in using systems analysis and imbuing the policy making 
process with a holistic long-range perspective. Journalist Christina McCall-Newman 
wrote that Pitfield did not invent a new bureaucratic system on his own and that “it would 
have never been put in place without Pierre Trudeau’s fascination with cybernetics and in 
the efficacy of planning.”22 Having firmly established himself at the pinnacle of the 
Canadian civil service during his first tenure atop the PCO from 1975 to 1979, Pitfield 
returned from teaching at Harvard to once again command the most influential civil 
service position within the federal government, Clerk of the PCO.23  
Unlike his controversial appointment ahead of senior bureaucrats in 1975, he now 
had a firm grip on the civil service. The battle to entrench a systems approach to public 
policy development was largely won. There was still work to be done in that regard, but 
on the whole, a modern approach to policy development supplanted the largely ad hoc 
individualistic policy development that had endured in Canada from Confederation until 
the end of the Lester B. Pearson era.24 
However, by the 1980s, the national media and numerous cabinet members were 
growing wary of both Pitfield’s influence on the Prime Minister and on the use of 
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systems research in the public policy making process. In July 1980, the Globe & Mail’s 
Wayne Cheveldayoff wrote a blistering attack that illustrated both the security of 
Pitfield’s position within the PCO and the resentment it caused amongst some 
contemporaries. Cheveldayoff described Pitfield’s influence as “pervasive” and 
suggested that his fifteen-year-plus friendship with Trudeau meant that he “could well 
have [had] more influence on affairs of state…than any elected federal politician other 
than the Prime Minister.”25 Cheveldayoff further went on to condemn Pitfield’s use of 
“technocratic, ''systems" approach to problems” that was being applied to constitutional 
negotiations with the provinces.26  
Cabinet Ministers such as Donald Johnston, Eugene Whelan and Mark 
MacGuigan shared Cheveldayoff’s criticisms. Johnston lamented: “The combined power 
of the PMO and Privy Council Office (PCO) had grown far beyond anything reasonable 
in a parliamentary democracy.” Specifically he went on to target the Clerk of the PCO: 
“The PCO headed by Michael Pitfield, speaking with the authority of the Prime Minister, 
did not hesitate to interfere with ministerial authority.”27 Cabinet members Eugene 
Whelan and Mark MacGuigan were left questioning the pertinence of Cabinet meetings. 
In his memoirs, Whelan stated that he “thought most Cabinet meetings were pretty much 
a waste of time.”28 Similarly, MacGuigan said that he was “not sure how much cabinet 
decisions really mattered.” He added that “the matters discussed had been, or would be, 
settled by the PM and a small group.”29  
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As if oblivious to criticisms, Pitfield continued to believe that the greatest 
contributions to be made by members of the civil service (or bureaucrats) were “to think 
things through,” challenge established ideas and to examine potential implications of 
policy decisions within a broad based framework. Pitfield believed that if a bureaucrat 
were to provide a single bit of advice to his minister it had: “to be grounded in knowledge 
and careful consideration.”30 Trudeau and Pitfield’s attitudes dovetailed with a systems 
approach to policy that was advocated by the Club of Rome. However, the use of systems 
research as a policy tool was the subject of scorn within the bureaucracy and numerous 
anonymous bureaucrats interviewed by Christina McCall-Newman for her book Grits 
commented that while Pitfield and Trudeau were sincere in their efforts to improve public 
policy development the systems approach was “a model that belonged in a university, not 
in the real world… it was completely rational but deeply impractical.”31  
At the approximate mid-way point of Trudeau’s final term in office, the media 
began to speculate about the end of the Trudeau era and focussed on Michael Pitfield as a 
key indicator of the Prime Minister’s intentions. The belief was that if Pitfield left the 
civil service, Trudeau would not be far behind in terms of leaving public life.32 Pitfield 
formally left the PCO in December 1982 and in March, 1984, Trudeau appointed him to 
the Senate. It was the end of an era within the federal bureaucracy. With Pitfield’s and 
Trudeau’s departure in 1984, the zenith of systems ideas as applied to public policy had 
also passed.  
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Without systems champions at the apex of the Canadian public policy 
development structures, interest in holistic long-range policy development quickly 
waned. As the COR and CACOR influence at the highest levels was integrally linked to 
an active interest in systems analysis, its influence also quickly dissipated.  A change in 
attitude was evident almost immediately when John Turner won the subsequent Liberal 
leadership convention and was sworn in as Canada’s seventeenth Prime Minister in June 
1984. 
John Turner and the New Approach to Policy 
The distancing of Turner from the policies and approach of his predecessor was 
both deliberate and enthusiastic. Long-time Liberal strategist Keith Davey stated that the 
day after winning the Prime Ministership, Turner and his close advisors such as Bill Lee 
and John Payne, were “anxious to distance John Turner from everything and anything 
which smacked of Trudeau.”33  Similarly, interviews conducted by journalist Christina 
McCall (foremerly McCall-Newman) and political scientist Stephen Clarkson led them to 
conclude that Turner’s long time supporters had personally held Trudeau and his advisors 
responsible for all the ills that had occurred in Canada during their sixteen-year reign. 
Clarkson added that a vindictive attitude emerged soon after Turner’s victory and “it was 
impossible for [Turner’s advisors] to believe that anything the Trudeauites had wrought 
was worth preserving.”34  
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Journalist Greg Weston further argued that Turner’s team had a profound level of 
“paranoia and disdain for the Trudeaucrats” in the central institutions. 35 Trudeau’s 
“backroom boys” had to go. As a result there was a major purging of officials. Authors 
Clarkson and McCall go into further detail and argue that the PMO and PCO were 
targeted for purging and Turner’s advisors “took out their rage at Pitfield’s governmental 
system.”36 Journalist James Rusk of The Globe & Mail argued that Turner’s “first act as 
Prime Minister was to begin the dismantling of the complicated bureaucratic structure 
Pierre Trudeau and Michael Pitfield erected to run the Government of Canada.”37At his 
first press conference, Turner went to great lengths to emphasize that he was going to 
transform the policy making process to make it more efficient. Turner considered the 
existing system ‘too elaborate, too complex, too slow and too expensive.”38 
When asked about the key differences in the operation of the Trudeau and Turner 
cabinets, veteran Cabinet Minister Herb Gray said that Turner’s cabinet was far more 
“simplified” as there were far fewer committees and meetings. He added that it made the 
policy process more flexible and able to respond to issues more quickly.39  Turner 
reduced the number of cabinet committees from thirteen to ten. As well, the cabinet was 
reduced from thirty-seven to twenty-nine ministers and the Ministry of State for Regional 
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Economic Development and the Ministry of State for Social Development were 
disbanded. In addition, the parallel bureaucratic structure that mirrored the cabinet system 
was eliminated.40  
Liberal strategist Keith Davey commented in his memoirs that Turner’s 
“determined attempt to discredit Pierre Trudeau, all of his actions, and most of his 
friends… was terrible politics.”41  Turner’s unofficial biographer Greg Weston  agreed 
with Davey’s sentiments and speculated that the purging of “Trudeaucrats” was a major 
contributing factor to Turner’s subsequent election problems.42 At the June 1984 news 
conference announcing the election call, Turner remarked that “the people of Canada 
want and should have a choice and an opportunity to clear the air.”43 Unfortunately for 
Turner, the electorate felt that the best way to fully “clear the air” was to dismiss the 
Liberal government completely and to elect the Progressive Conservative alternative.44 
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Out of the Loop: CACOR Post-Trudeau 
While only Prime Minister for a few months the changes made by John Turner 
did not bode well for an organization that advocated long-range thinking, the use of 
systems analysis, and argued for the ability and necessity of governments helping to 
shape the future and to regulate the forces of economic growth. Long-time federal 
environmental advisor Keith Ronald’s impression was that the Club of Rome’s (COR) 
greatest time of strength in Canada coincided with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s time 
in office and that once Trudeau left the halls of power, the COR and its Canadian 
Association (CACOR) relative presence dissipated.45 However it was not just at the apex 
of power that COR/CACOR lost key contacts.  
The positioning of the COR/CACOR officials that led the symbiotic relationship 
emerging between the federal government and the COR/CACOR has been discussed in 
previous chapters. The special relationship was most evident within, but not limited to, 
the Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST). The full extent of 
COR/CACOR presence within the upper reaches of the federal public policy 
development in the mid-1970s was revealed to American COR-advocates Donald Lesh 
and Berrin Moore.  In 1975-1976 Lesh and Moore looked to Canada as they developed 
plans to establish a United States Association for the Club of Rome (USACOR). They 
conducted extensive interviews and examined the CACOR membership lists to get an 
impression of the types of individuals to recruit for their prospective organization.  
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The 1975 CACOR membership list that the Americans based their assessment 
upon contained numerous influential individuals from a variety of sectors.  Key civil 
servants and senators from the federal government were active members. The list 
included: Marshall Crowe, National Energy Board Chairman; James D. Fleck, Secretary 
to Cabinet; Ivan Head from the Prime Minister’s Office; Senator Henry Hicks; Senator 
Maurice Lamontagne; G. R. Lindsay, Chief of the Department of Defence’s Defence 
Research Analysis Establishment; Jorge Miedzinski, Science Advisor for the Science 
Council of Canada, C. R. Nixon from the Privy Council Office; Michael Pitfield who was 
a personal aide to Prime Minister Trudeau; Ronald Ritchie, advisor to the government; 
Clive Simmonds from the Industrial Programs Office of the National Research Council; 
Lister Sinclair, Vice-President of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; Otto Thur, the 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Economic Plans within the Department of Finance; and J. 
Rennie Whitehead who was Assistant Secretary for MOSST. Former Canadian Governor 
General Roland Michener was also a member.46  
CACOR also had strong representation from Canada’s research foundations. For 
example, as discussed in chapter one, C. D. Howe Institute President Robert Fowler 
played a critical role in the establishment of the CACOR and used C.D. Howe Institute 
resources in helping to establish the nascent organization; he also modeled CACOR’s 
legal framework upon the Institute’s. As well the President of the Pulp and Paper 
Research Institute, Pierre Gendron, the then Director of Dalhousie University’s 
Government Studies Programme, Michael Kirby, and the President of the Ontario 
Research Foundation, W. R. Stadelman, all went on to play major roles within the 
CACOR. In addition, André Raynauld, President of the Economic Council of Canada 
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was also a member as was J. Tuzo Wilson, the Director General of the Ontario Science 
Centre.47 
In addition to government and research centre circles, high-ranking academics 
and “captains of industry,” involved themselves in the CACOR. Included in the list of 
members were either the heads, and/or members of senior administration of McGill 
University, Queen’s University, Mount Allison University, Dalhousie University, the 
University of Saskatchewan, York University, the University of Toronto and the 
University of Guelph. The private sector was also well represented within the CACOR 
ranks. The Chairmen of the Board for The Steel Company of Canada Limited, Canadian 
Industries Limited and Polysar Limited were CACOR members. As well the Vice-
President of the International Nickel Company of Canada was an active member. Senior 
representatives from Arthur D. Little of Canada Limited, Kodak  Canada, Mitchell, 
Plummer and Company, and the firm of Herridge, Tolmie, Gray, Coyne and Blair also 
filled the ranks of the CACOR.48 
Lesh deduced from CACOR’s experience that the first priority for founding a 
USACOR was “the selection of outstanding members” who would be well connected at 
“research centers, corporations, universities, voluntary organizations and government 
offices.”49 Connected individuals had the ability to produce “a far more effective action 
program than the board of directors could [have shaped] alone. He added that it would 
also mean “less of a requirement to seek foundational support for new projects.”50  
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The USACOR’s Feasibility Study concluded that it was critical to have members 
in positions of influence within governmental and other policy development bodies 
ranging from academic institutions to industry and think tanks. Study authors John Harris 
and Berrien Moore deduced that the importance of having a well-connected CACOR 
membership was twofold. Having members on the inside of influential organizations 
guaranteed a “receptive audience” for CACOR ideas and played a critical role in securing 
support for both CACOR and COR initiatives. The report further put forth the idea that 
that the choice of initial members was critical to CACOR being able to operate in a 
relatively inexpensive “low-key” manner while pursuing their goals of promoting COR 
ideas and catalyzing support for research initiatives.51  
By the time Trudeau left office in June 1984, many prominent members were 
missing from the 1975 list. The toll was especially high within the ranks of the federal 
civil service. Marshall Crowe left the National Energy Board in 1977 and the next year 
established his own consulting agency. He also refrained from serious involvement in 
CACOR activities.52 Meanwhile James D. Fleck moved from the being the Secretary to 
Cabinet in 1975 to become the Deputy Minister of Industry and Tourism. In 1978 he left 
the federal civil service to become the William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Professor 
at Harvard University.53 
In addition, Trudeau advisors and kindred spirits Michael Pitfiled, Michael Kirby 
and Ivan Head had by 1984 either taken up Senate positions or were heavily involved in 
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activities outside the civil service. They, along with Senator Henry Hicks, had also fallen 
out of close contact with the CACOR and were not as involved in club activities.54 The 
influential members continued to dwindle.  Senator Maurice Lamontagne died in June 
1983.55 In the mid-1980s, Thomas de Fayer, born 1919, began to experience ill health.56 
Unfortunately for CACOR, as pivotal contacts diminished influential new contacts were 
not established. And in addition to challenges imposed by external circumstances, COR/ 
CACOR faced substantial internal challenges. 
 
Impact of Aurelio Peccei’s Death 
The impact of the loss of any of the contacts listed above paled in comparison to 
the death of Aurleio Peccei in March 1984. Peccei was a passionate man driven by a 
desire to use his privileged position to make a positive change in the world and to 
motivate others to join him in his cause.  COR member and Globe & Mail publisher Roy 
Megarry said that he often spoke to Peccei and warned him to slow down a bit and to 
relax his hectic schedule as it had the potential to be detrimental to his health. Peccei 
appreciated the concern but ignored the advice and worked incessantly.57 Just twelve 
                                                 
54 -- “Pitfield, Hon. Peter Michael,” in Lumley, Canadian Who’s Who 2003, pp.1087-1088. 
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Head Interview. 
55 Senate of Canada, “Lamontagne, The Hon. Maurice,” Senators and Members Historical Information, 
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February 2005). 
56 Rennie Whitehead, “Tom and CACOR,” in Gail Stewart (editor), Thomas L. de Fayer: A Tribute by 
Some of Friends and Colleagues, (Ottawa: Gail Stewart, 2004), p.8 
57 Roy Magarry, Conversation with Author, May 2004. (Hereafter Megarry Interview). 
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hours before he died, Peccei dictated to his secretary what would be his last missive: 
“The Club of Rome: Agenda for the End of the Century”.58  
From his deathbed, Peccei threw the torch to the COR members.  In the letter 
dictated from his hospital bed, Peccei stated the COR needed to study the major 
challenges confronting the world that was on the edge of an epochal transition. He added 
that COR members had  
to bring these major issues to  the attention of the public at large and, of 
course, of scholars, religious leaders and decision makers…Only if all 
these sectors are sensitized to the obligation to devote all our capacities to 
confront the unprecedented perils and chances they embody, can our 
generation adequately play their role as worthy heirs of our forebears and 
responsible progenitors to future generations.59 
 
Peccei then outlined the direction he thought the COR had to take in contributing “to the 
renaissance of the human spirit and the redress of human fortunes in a sane society.”60 He 
outlined five critical and decisive areas of inquiry that needed further exploration: human 
settlements, conservation of nature, governance of the global system, human 
development and encouraging the non-violent society.61  
Peccei’s ability to motivate others to convince them of both the rightness of his 
cause and the need to use their personal positions of influence to further the quest for 
solutions to the “global Problematique” was astounding.  Megarry said that when Peccei 
went to meet with the kings and queens of nations or with presidents and prime ministers, 
he went there to use them, not in any negative sense but to convince them that their 
elevated positions enabled them to make contributions to their nations and the world as 
                                                 
58 Aurelio Peccei, “The Club of Rome: Agenda for the End of the Century, 8-13 March 1984,” (CACORA: 
COR Papers). 
59 Peccei, “The Club of Rome: Agenda,” p.2. 
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others could not. Megarry added that more often than not, Peccei was successful in 
gaining help, be it financial, moral or otherwise, from world leaders. Megarry remarked 
of Peccei “He was an inspiration to everyone who came in contact with him… It has been 
a great joy to know him. No one ever has inspired me more.”62  
Similarly, CACOR Chairman from 1983 to 1984 Ran Ide  said that Peccei “was 
one of the great human beings of the world. I haven’t met anyone with the intelligence, 
ability, insight, charisma and dedication to compare with his. He was completely 
                                                 
62 Megarry was inspired by Peccei to collaborate with CARE Canada in establishing the Tools for 
Development Program. Under this still-existing program, CARE Canada “provides micro-entrepreneurs in 
the Third World with used tools and equipment donated from companies and individuals here in Canada. 
CARE Canada arranges shipping, makes sure donated gear is put to immediate use at its designated 
destination.” The website goes on to claim that it had never had a request for supplemental funds or repair 
parts and that it had provided “more than 4,000 pieces of equipment to 1,600 small businesses in the Third 
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Ireland combined with his trips to lesser developed nations such as Peru led to his interest in creating the 
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played by Aurelio Peccei in convincing Megarry of the need and ability to make a major contribution to the 
development of lesser-developed nations. Megarry commented in a conversation with this author that it was 
through conversations with Aurelio Peccei and through watching him conduct COR affairs at both the 
public and private levels that he became convinced to use his privileged position in society to make a 
positive contribution to developing nations of the world by using his extensive connections to Canada’s 
business community.  
As publisher of Canada’s most influential national business newspaper, the Globe & Mail, Megarry had 
extensive contact with major business organizations and leaders. He was able to convince them to donate 
equipment to operations in less-developed nations. A partnership with CARE Canada seemed a natural fit 
with the organization’s practical long-term business oriented approach to economic development in less-
developed nations.  From CARE’s perspective, it was a “new and interesting source of contributions-in-
kind from a business community that normally wouldn't even dream of getting involved in development.” 
The Tools for Development Program was not based strictly on recipients receiving free donated goods. 
Instead entrepreneurs were expected to purchase the equipment using special revolving funds that when 
repaid went into further credit programs for other entrepreneurs. The program reflected COR ideas that 
connected poverty, stability and the future of humanity. Megarry and CARE Canada believed that enabling 
local entrepreneurs to produce local goods, thus creating employment, would help reduce social tensions 
and help provide for a more stable and sustainable future in the less developed nations. 
-- “Aurelio Peccei Industrialist Founded the Club of Rome,” Globe & Mail, (15 March 1984), p.10. 
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selfless.”63 Other COR members, such as J. Rennie Whitehead, Ranjit Kumar, Dennis 
Meadows and Ivan Head added to this view.  They concurred that Peccei was known for 
his ability to secure funding for major initiatives and COR meetings through the strength 
of his charisma and intellect.64  
Beyond financial concerns, Peccei was also the main intellectual driving force 
behind the COR’s mission to explore and find solutions to the “Predicament of 
Mankind”. Dennis Meadows said that Peccei dominated the organization, especially in 
terms of its intellectual framework and its interest in systems analysis.65 Meanwhile, 
business commentators Robert Golub and Joe Townsend argued that the 1972 Limits to 
Growth report was “a computerized version of the major ideas of [Peccei’s] The Chasm 
Ahead.” They added that it served ‘as a tool of communication and conviction’ for 
Peccei’s ideas.66 
Peccei’s dedication to the Club of Rome had also helped to mask some serious 
internal problems. The inherent problem of Peccei’s domination of the COR was the 
question of succession: what would happen if he were no longer able to lead the 
organization? In March 1984, the COR members were forced to confront that question 
when Peccei’s secretary Anna Pignocchi sent a brief telex stating: “With deep sorrow 
                                                 
63 - “Aurelio Peccei Industrialist Founded the Club of Rome,” Globe & Mail, (15 March 1984), (CACORA: 
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64 In addition to his substantial networking abilities and powers of persuasion, Peccei also used his personal 
wealth to support COR initiatives. J. Rennie Whitehead estimated that Peccei contributed upwards of US 
$200,000 per year on Club of Rome activities. A year after Peccei’s death, Roy Megarry lamented the fact 
that COR activities required a minimum budget of $200,000 and argued that COR members were not 
taking fund raising seriously enough which threatened the survival of the organization. 
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65 Meadows Interview 
66 Golub and Townsend, “Malthus,” p.218. 
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inform you that Aurelio Peccei died this morning of a heart attack.”67 It was a devastating 
and nearly fatal blow to the COR, whose members were left without their leader and 
driving force.  The COR’s co-founder Alexander King commented that Peccei’s sudden 
death  
found the COR in complete disarray. The members could not imagine 
their Club functioning in the absence of his extreme charisma. They soon 
realized also his immense contributions in the form of time, resources, 
contacts and ideas. The immediate response was that we should have to 
disband.68 
 
Dennis Meadows’ description of the COR as “Aurelio Peccei and friends” 
reflected King’s explanation that he and Peccei consulted their respective “wide networks 
of colleagues,” for members who had to be invited to join.69  Without Peccei, the society 
of friends lacked a charismatic leader to act as a unifying force for an otherwise disparate 
group that ranged in occupational types from an American industrialist to a European 
banker; there were numerous academics from various disciplines; there was an African 
chief and even a Soviet communist commissar.70  In a strongly worded 1985 resignation 
letter to CACOR, publisher Roy Megarry argued that latent concerns were becoming 
evident during the last years of Peccei’s presidency and while his death did not cause the 
problems they had “come into sharper focus since his passing.”71 
With Pecei’s death in 1984, the COR seriously questioned the future existence of 
the organization. Moving beyond an initial reaction to disband, the COR decided to 
postpone any final decision and former French diplomat and COR member Bertrand 
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Scheider decided to act as the COR’s interim head.72 Canada’s Roy Megarry invited the 
COR’s executive committee to his Globe & Mail office to decide if the organization was 
to continue and, if so, to decide who was to become the new COR president.73  COR co -
founder Alexander King described the meeting as “a brutal hair down discussion of the 
pros and cons of continuing our work.”74 Ultimately it was decided that the COR’s 
“momentum and fund of good will should not be allowed to dissipate.”75 The COR would 
continue to exist with King as its president. 
Despite the conviction that the COR still had a critical role to play in world 
affairs, serious problems that imperilled the group’s future remained. One of the critical 
problems discussed at the Globe & Mail meeting was COR membership and its lack of 
diversity. Megarry argued that it remained too European, the developing world was under 
represented, as were women and, ominously, the COR was in desperate need of younger 
members.76 King concurred and, in his first address as the COR president, he told 
members that there was a clear and present need to diversify the membership in terms of 
geographic and cultural representation. He further added that it was essential “to 
incorporate sufficiently the feminine element… and to include more younger people.”77 
Peccei had been aware of the problems of an aging membership and dedicated the 
last few years of his life to creating a Forum Humanum.  In 1982 a desire to engage a 
younger generation in discussing the Problematique led Aurelio Peccei and future COR 
President El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan to collaborate in establishing the Forum 
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Humanum. It was designed to stimulate discussions and potential plans of action. It 
established a collaborative network of young individuals in diverse areas of the world 
who collectively attempted to depict a realistic desirable future. They also attempted to 
devise the means and circumstances required to make the desired future possible. 
Following Peccei’s death, the programme waned. 78  
The Forum Humanum initiative did not result in a revitalized COR membership 
as participants did not become leading members of the main COR body. In his 1985 
resignation letter, Roy Megarry postulated that the existing COR members were a 
hindrance to revitalization because the largely inactive members refused to formally 
resign from the organization and allow their places to be taken by younger members. 
Megarry lamented that a year and a half had passed since the executive committee had 
agree to take action on revitalizing membership but they had “failed to adequately purge 
our “active” membership list. 79  
Members of the COR Executive Committee began to detect a growing sense of 
detachment within the membership where some COR members appeared content to be 
nominal members of the association. Megarry described such individuals as having 
“opted out” of the association. 80 President Alexander King was finally took action in 
1986 when he invited such “members to become Associate members.” King explained 
                                                 
78 The basic idea was revived in the Think Tank 30 (TT30) initiative. That group continues today and 
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that this was meant to be a demotion for members who ceased to play an active role. 
They would still be considered members, but the change facilitated the inclusion of new 
and more active members.81  
Other key problems brought to the fore with Peccei’s death stemmed from his 
personal contributions. The COR had been able to operate as a “non-organization” in 
terms of bureaucratic structure because Peccei could either secure requisite funding for 
core COR activities, or else he paid the costs himself.  In addition, Peccei relied heavily 
upon his personal support staff and secretaries to conduct COR administrative business. 
Roy Megarry commented that in Peccei’s absence, it was critical that a COR Secretariat 
be established to assist the President in the operation and coordination of COR 
activities.82 
Canada offered to help the COR in its time of need by having operations 
transferred to Canada. Former President of the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) Ivan Head said offers were made to bring the COR to Canada and to have 
them operate out of the IDRC Offices in Ottawa. This would have enabled the COR to 
use IDRC staff in administrative matters and to use IDRC infrastructure to help with the 
distribution and coordination of COR initiatives.83 While the IDRC offer might have 
helped to solve some serious post-Peccei administrative problems, COR rejected the 
offer. Head added that the offer was soundly rejected on the grounds that “The Club of 
Rome was a European operation and European it would stay.”84  
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 In addition to the lack of a support staff, with Peccei gone, the COR could no 
longer operate as a purely informal group of individuals united behind a common concern 
for the future. One of the first problems was that of leadership. Alexander King was 
eventually persuaded to assume the COR presidency. As the COR co-founder, he was the 
logical successor. Attempts to convince recently retired Canadian Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau to accept the presidency failed and there did not appear to be anyone willing to 
accept the burden.85 With no other options available, King agreed to serve as the COR 
president for a two-year period.86 
 Ranjit Kumar commented that while King did the best job that he could as COR 
President, he lacked “a certain sparkle” that Peccei had about him. Ivan Head added that 
King was getting elderly at the time and hence had diminishing energy levels.87 King was 
                                                                                                                                                 
example in a 1989 article in Foreign Affairs, Head discussed at length the problems caused by a state of 
“disequilibrium” in North-South relations that made “the status quo unsustainable.” He added that the 
consequences of states of disequilibrium were not visible in the short term. According to Head, the short 
four to five year time frames associated with democratic governments meant that the problems of 
disequilibrium were “certainly not influential in the time frame occupied by decision-makers.”  
Similarly, in his book On a Hinge of History, Head implicitly discussed the COR ideas. The book’s title 
was explained in terms similar to those presented by Aurelio Peccei. Head argued that the world was on the 
cusp of a major shift in human relations that went beyond traditional shifts in power alliances and it was “of 
a kind that has visited only occasionally in all of recorded history.” He further expounded on ideas parallel 
to the COR in his discussion of the interrelated nature of global politics, the benefits and potential dangers 
of technological advances, the complex relations and attitudes guiding the North-South dialogue and in the 
state of disequilibrium, the need for a multidisciplinary approach to find the means of moving towards 
greater equilibrium.  When asked about the omission of the COR from his writings Head explained that 
“yes they should have been there” but the organization had left his active thoughts following the rejection 
of the offer to move the association to Canada, “that was it for that.” 
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a reluctant president who had only agreed to be the interim president. He continuously 
laboured to secure a successor. Roy Megarry commented that while King was Peccei’s 
logical successor, there did not appear to be anyone who was willing and/or able to lead 
the COR into the future. Such an individual would have required “a great deal of 
physical, intellectual and managerial capacity.” He added that ideally, the person would 
not be a European.88  
By 1987, King’s frustration with being unable to secure a successor was evident 
in a speech to the Sandford Fleming Foundation at the University of Waterloo. After 
making several complaints about being too old for the job, King said that he was not able 
to find anyone, largely because the COR presidency was an intensive job that required a 
massive contribution of time and effort, for no pay.89 The following year he announced 
that he was stepping down and handing the reins to someone else.  It took another two 
years to find a replacement. In 1990, King’s successor, Chemical Engineer and academic 
Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner from Spain became the new COR president. With Diez-
Hochleitner’s assuming the presidency, the initial era of COR activities that were 
dominated by the co-founders Peccei and King came to an end. King continued on as 
President Emeritus but for the Club of Rome, a new era had begun.90 
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Brian Mulroney and Market-Based  Policy Development 
Peccei’s death came at an especially inopportune time, as the political and 
intellectual climate in Canada and beyond was becoming increasingly hostile to 
COR/CACOR ideas.  Beyond a loss of key bureaucratic contacts and Peccei’s death, the 
essence of the COR’s message of the need to ultimately control the forces of growth and 
the need of governments to guide the world into the future were on the cusp of becoming 
relics of an intellectual tradition that had run its course. 
As discussed above, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan’s public policy ideas 
placed a premium on allowing free markets to operate as far as possible without the 
interference of governments.91 Their ideas arrived firmly in Canada during the reign of 
Brian Mulroney. Signs of Mulroney’s penchant for market-based solutions appeared in 
the years before he came to power. In a May 1982 address, Mulroney did not reject 
Keynesian economic theory in its totality but felt it was no longer a viable option for the 
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federal government. He accused the Trudeau Liberals of committing  “one of the cruellest 
acts of economic infanticide in recorded history,” by having “smothered” Keynesian 
economics due to an insistence on continuing to spend and amass large deficits that 
undermined the government’s financial manoeuvrability and, ultimately, its ability to act 
as an economic moderator.92 
In a December, 1984 address to an American audience, Mulroney argued that 
Canada had traditionally had a far more activist/ interventionist government than did the 
United States. He quickly added, however, that his government was determined “to 
redefine the role of government itself.”  The Prime Minister explained that the Canadian 
government had “become much too big. It inhibit[ed] and distort[ed] entrepreneurial 
activity…. [government had] become a major obstacle to growth in the private sector.” 
His government had no choice but to “adopt an approach that reward[ed] 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking, and facilitat[ed] adjustment to the changing realities of 
new markets and technologies.”93 
Canadian political historian Reginald Whitaker stated that Margaret Thatcher, 
Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney commonly “viewed government as inherently 
inefficient and wasteful, and favoured extending the scope of the private sector and the 
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principles of the free market.”94 Political scientists Robert Campbell, Leslie Pal and 
Stephen Clarkson argue that as early as 1985 the influence of Reagan’s worldview was 
emerging as an important factor in Canadian approaches to policy development. At the 
1985 “Shamrock Summit” where Reagan and Mulroney embraced, it was evident that 
they “liked one another… shared a vision of Canada and the United States… shared a 
belief, though in different measure, in the efficacy of market systems and the need to 
minimise…the role of government in everyday life.”95 Clarkson argued that Mulroney 
“flaunted his warm personal contact with Ronald Reagan based on their common 
ideology.”96  
The contrast in attitude between Trudeau and that embraced by Thatcher, Reagan 
and Mulroney was evident in Trudeau’s Memoirs where he described their policy views 
as “wrong, wrong, wrong.”97 Trudeau went on to explain that the reliance on strictly 
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market forces may appear appealing in strictly economic terms but it was not always 
beneficial to society in general.98 Beyond that, there was the problem of the state 
forfeiting the ability “to control the excesses of the market.”99 It was an equivalent 
attitude to the message preached by Club of Rome arguing that unfettered economic 
growth was ultimately self-defeating, unsustainable and that growth had to be regulated. 
The “freeing” of the free-market is of the greatest importance to this dissertation, 
as it implied and encouraged perpetual unfettered growth as the best possible option for 
public policy aims. As discussed in previous chapters, the Club of Rome (COR) was 
founded largely to combat the notion that the earth could sustain a “growth for growth’s 
sake” philosophy that was prevalent in the boom decades following the end of the Second 
World War. The backlash against the idea of imposing limits on growth was a severe and, 
ultimately, successful effort that crushed the COR’s fundamental ideas. 
The fundamental Keynesian idea of the need for government guidance, or as 
critics would have it, interference, of market forces was also an Achilles heel in Club of 
Rome philosophy. Academic Stephen Clarkson said that in Canada, the minimalist 
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approach to governance rejected traditional notions about state-centred responses to 
policy issues and viewed any state interference in economic matters “as a mistake.”100 
Clarkson once wrote that free market-based policy analysis “knitted macroeconomic, 
industrial, and trade policy into a coherent pattern that buried Keynes.”101 Similarly, 
Canadian political scientists Neil Neveitte and Roger Gibbins, argued that for market 
advocates, the idea of “government intervention [was] as often as not a cure worse than 
the disease.”102 Analogous to the funeral rituals of Ancient Egypt where close 
acquaintances and selected subjects of the Pharaoh were interred with their master, so the 
Club of Rome philosophy and influence in Canada was “buried” when Keynesian 
economic theory succumbed to free market-based political theory.103  
CACOR Challenges 
Beyond the turmoil within the main COR group and the other challenges detailed 
above, CACOR faced particular difficulties that threatened the group’s survival. The 
problems ranged from reduced travel budgets for members who were civil servants and a 
declining membership to problems of apathy and a changed political climate. Potential 
problems for the CACOR were identified early in its development by the C.D. Howe 
Institute’s President Robert Fowler who played a primary role in establishing the 
CACOR and who helped to guide the nascent organization through its initial stages. In 
1977, Fowler argued that the CACOR membership was not sufficiently geographically 
dispersed and there were insufficient voices from the labour and business communities. 
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At the end of 1976, the CACOR membership lists showed that of its 75 members, 54 
were from Ontario with 23 of that number residing in Ottawa. The four western provinces 
had a total of six members while Quebec had fourteen, leaving the Atlantic Provinces 
with a single CACOR member.104  
Fowler was impressed with the large percentage of CACOR members who 
were either scientists or academics. However, he felt that the organization was 
still lacking substantial input from a sufficiently diversified membership and the 
voices of stakeholders were not represented. Fowler, with some success, 
endeavoured to use his connections as head of the then-centrist C.D. Howe 
Institute to bring voices from the left and the right to CACOR meetings. Fowler 
was convinced the association needed to make special efforts to ensure the voices 
of both organized labour and the business community were heard.105   By 1984 
when Peccei died, membership diversity had not improved and CACOR faced a 
series of additional problems.  
By the early 1980s, the CACOR also began to face serious financial challenges 
due to a combination of governmental, corporate and organizational travel-expense 
policy changes.  These were exacerbated by CACOR member apathy and the costs of 
supporting the main Club of Rome organization in the wake of Aurelio Peccei’s death. 
CACOR co-founder Rennie Whitehead said that at one point “several large organizations 
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also absorbed expenses for a senior executive to attend COR or CACOR meetings,” but 
that practice slowly ended.106 He added that while he was a senior civil servant, the 
CACOR and by proxy the COR, had access to funding, but Whitehead left the federal 
civil service in 1976.107  
In addition, during the recession of the 1980s, issues associated with trimming 
travel expenses became a major concern in governmental circles and beyond. In 1985, 
American Express came out with a major report outlining problems for business of travel 
expenses and offered strong suggestions to control escalating travel costs for business. By 
the mid-to-late 1980s, less generous travel management procedures became the norm. As 
a result access to travel funds, especially additional funding for extraneous purposes, 
became harder to secure.108 
Changes in the operations of the federal bureaucracy under Trudeau also meant 
that any contacts within the civil service were likely to be transient. An external review 
about CACOR  in 1979 commented that the “influence of key and/or active members 
[were] waning.”109 By 1979, the way the federal government allocated funds underwent a 
fundamental change when the Policy Expenditure Management System (PEMS) program 
was brought in to replace the Planning, Programming Budgeting System (PPBS). 
Political scientist Donald Savoie explained that the motivation was to establish tighter 
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spending controls and increased responsibility for expenditures at the ministerial level. 
Under the older system, policy decisions were made separately from spending decisions 
and departments were left to make their adjustments. However under PEMS both policy 
and expenditure decisions had to be taken concurrently.110 As a result, bureaucratic 
discretionary spending was curtailed.  Shortly after assuming power in September 1984, 
Brian Mulroney announced that all bureaucratic hiring and discretionary spending was to 
be frozen and subsequently he introduced even tighter controls.111 
In September 1979, concerns over the operation and future of the CACOR led 
CACOR President William Stadeleman to contract Ralph Boston to do a study of the 
CACOR with a view to suggesting future directions for the Association. CACOR 
members did not appear to have a problem with the idea of an overview, but resented the 
idea of hiring an outside consultant as CACOR members devoted their time and efforts to 
the Association for free. To add to the problem, CACOR members felt that they were 
more qualified to perform the task.112 The Boston Report generated far more controversy 
within the CACOR because of the circumstances that led to the report; few disagreed 
with its findings. 
Tensions within the organization continued to build until at the 1980 annual 
general meeting, matters reached a flashpoint. Chairman Stadelman attempted to have 
colleagues of his join the CACOR without having gone through the established 
procedures of first getting permission from the CACOR Executive. The move was met 
with stiff resistance and a break had to be called part way through the proceedings. The 
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CACOR members refused to accept Stadelman’s nominees and attempted to get the 
Chairman to withdraw them and to continue with the meeting.113 In response, Stadelman 
resigned completely from the organization. He perceived that the CACOR had 
deteriorated to the point of becoming “an organization content to meet and discuss the 
Problematique.” 114   
The Boston Report had earlier questioned the viability of the CACOR’s future 
and argued that it needed to develop new sets of goals that were Canadian-oriented. A 
more populist set of activities would attract significant attention, thus stimulating an 
increased membership so as to help allay fiscal problems. The Report also commented 
that CACOR’s traditional message about the importance of the Problematique had been 
largely accepted and that subsequent messages were “not catching the public eye.”115 
Stadelman warned the CACOR that “unless they became active and supported research 
the organization would slowly wither and die.” In recent correspondence with this author 
he bluntly added, “It did.”116 
The greatest problem facing CACOR appeared to be financial. The Boston Report 
showed that support from government and industry was on the decline at the same time 
as interest in the group’s annual general meetings dissipated.  Hence, revenues generated 
from such meetings declined.117 Furthermore, the CACOR faced serious financial 
challenges due to 36% of its members not paying membership dues. The Report went on 
to strongly suggest that a fundraising effort was required to generate between $50- 
$75,000 for each of the subsequent five years in order to ensure the CACOR’s 
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viability.118 Whitehead commented that many of the tensions within CACOR over the 
Boston Report were “a symptom of turbulence caused fundamentally by the continual 
attempt to run CACOR on a purely voluntary basis à la Peccei without the equivalent of 
Peccei's personal subsidy.”119 
Without substantial financial reserves, the CACOR struggled with questions of 
how to develop a sufficiently ambitious and provocative program of activities to attract 
new members to the Association. In July 1983, a proposal to commission well-known 
Canadian author Farley Mowat to prepare a future strategy for dealing with the 
Problematique was rejected due to the inherent costs. In addition the notion of arranging 
funding for a special film on the Problematique was viewed as too financially onerous to 
be pursued.120 Similarly, a lack of support caused plans for a Winnipeg conference to be 
cancelled. As well, plans for a memorial lecture series to honour the life and global 
contributions of Club of Rome co-founder Aurelio Peccei were considered too expensive 
to organize.121 
Frustration with the lack of dedication to finding and supporting innovative 
research projects led key CACOR members to question their continued presence in the 
organization. Tom de Fayer announced “the inability of CACOR to achieve more than 
just a ‘friendly rubbing of shoulders’” led him to consider resigning his executive 
position. He further added that other Board members who had served as long or longer 
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than he had ought to consider doing the same in order to make room for others to lead.122  
He was subsequently convinced to change his mind and he resumed a Board position in 
1984, when he also agreed to be editor of the CACOR Newsletter.123   
 
Verge of Collapse 
The CACOR was on the verge of dissolution in 1984 and 1985. In October 1984, 
CACOR Chairman Ran Ide wrote a worried letter to COR President Alexander King 
stating “our cupboard was bare, our charitable donation number had been withdrawn and 
the membership had been allowed to dwindle away.”124 The Ide letter followed a special 
CACOR executive meeting that questioned the feasibility of continuing the organization 
at all. In September 1984, the CACOR found itself “without the resources to cover the 
costs of board meetings and even basic but necessary administrative expenses” It was felt 
the group had to take “a draconian step” to reduce the Board to five  individuals with the 
financial and institutional wherewithal to continue CACOR initiatives and to improve the 
group’s financial base for future operations.125 
At the September meeting, Chairman Ran Ide announced that a “rebuilding 
process had commenced.”126 He later added that he was stepping down but would be 
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willing to continue to help in any way he could in ensuring the CACOR survived.127 Ide 
added that hope for the future of the CACOR in 1984 resided with Michael Kirby who, as 
explained in chapter five, was instrumental in transforming the Institute for Research on 
Public Policy (IRPP) into an active organization that produced tangible results. 128  The 
outgoing CACOR Chairman explained to Alexander King that Kirby was an ideal 
candidate as he was “young, able and as a Senator [had] an office and other support.”129 
However, problems persisted and long-time CACOR member Kenneth Hammond said 
that after Ide, the CACOR never regained its strength.130  
Despite the potentially fatal problems facing the CACOR, in December 1984 the 
organization endeavoured to continue on. However, financial constraints made 
advancement difficult. The 5000 Days Project led by Ken Hammond was highlighted as a 
major shining light of CACOR activity; as noted above, it was an activity that required no 
financial contributions from the CACOR. A second encouraging project was the release 
of Roger Voyer’s Global 2000 – A View of Canadian Economic Prospects, Resources 
and Environment. 131 This was a project that had spun-off from the Gerald S. Barney 
Global 2000: Implications for Canada project that had secured funding circa 1980-1981 
from the Department of the Environment thanks to the efforts of CACOR members W. R. 
Stadelman and Tom de Fayer.132  
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However, the changed political climate discussed in the previous chapter and 
above also weighed on the minds of the CACOR. Members realised that it was going to 
be more difficult to gain the attention of the Brian Mulroney’s government than it had 
been under Pierre Trudeau. In a letter to the CACOR Chairman, an anxious Tom de 
Fayer requested to know Kirby’s ideas about the CACOR’s future and to ask for his help 
in popularizing the Voyer publication. In that letter, de Fayer said “some of the 
conclusions and recommendations of the report may not be as attractive to our present 
government as to the previous regime.”133 In the words of former NDP advisor Robin 
Sears, by the 1980s “Keynesianism was dead… The “market” was being promoted as 
political and economic master.”134 
A third activity was the resurrection of the CACOR Newsletter. De Fayer was 
convinced to resume his editorial job of keeping members informed of both COR and 
CACOR activities.135 CACOR member Rennie Whitehead said that a lack of submissions 
from CACOR members meant that the newsletters “became increasingly a reflection of 
Tom’s own thinking on the Problematique.”136 The three areas outlined above of CACOR 
activity did not require any expenditure, had started in the past, and were predominantly 
reliant on the steadfast efforts of a single individual. Sadly, the need to develop an 
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ambitious and innovative research plan to attract members and public attention were 
considered beyond the financial ability of the CACOR to pursue.137  
By 1985, internal tensions and divisions amplified as questions of primary loyalty 
and responsibility came to the fore. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Aurelio Peccei’s 
death in March 1984 cast a psychological and financial pall over the Club of Rome and 
imperilled its future. One of the key challenges was how to maintain operations without 
Peccei’s personal financial backing. The autonomous, but nominally-and-intellectually-
affiliated national COR associations were viewed by the remaining COR executive as a 
partial solution to funding problems. 138 
It was with the intention of using CACOR to help in the raising of funds for the 
COR that Roy Megarry accepted a position on the CACOR Executive as Vice-Chairman 
in charge of finances.139  Megarry viewed the CACOR as an important vehicle in “raising 
funds for the survival of the COR” and by April 1985, he had raised over $15,700 in 
support. However he had erroneously issued tax-receipts that later had to be rescinded.140 
The episode caused substantial conflict as the perception that CACOR was being asked to 
be used “simply as a vehicle for the collection of funds for the COR,” met with stiff 
resistance and resentment.141 
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Long-time CACOR member Kenneth Hammond said that the CACOR began to 
seriously deteriorate when Ran Ide stepped down as its President.142 The slide continued 
until the end of 1985, when Megarry left both the COR and CACOR and Kirby resigned 
as CACOR President. 143 The story of CACOR problems and near-dissolution in the mid 
1980s reflects a degenerative process identified by political scientist Diane Stone. In a 
book on the role, influence and fate of think tank type organizations she stated: 
“Frequently, the financial circumstances… are dire. Decline entails an inability to act on 
policy. New projects do not get off the ground; publications are not forthcoming. Efforts 
to forge links with politicians, bureaucrats… are not initiated.”144  
 Despite internal problems and problems with a loss of status and influence within 
federal bureaucratic spheres, Beatrice Bazar, who replaced Michael Kirby as CACOR 
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President in 1985, was able to prevent CACOR’s dissolution. Bazar had in 1967 been a 
founding member of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation (CHRF).145 Using her 
organizational skills and experience, she guided CACOR to ensure its survival. The 
strategy developed to ensure CACOR’s continuance was to consolidate efforts at the 
local level and to link local CACOR chapters together in the national association, but 
each chapter would operate independently in a similar relationship as between the main 
Club of Rome and its national associations. The process was strongest in Ottawa where 
frequent meetings were held among Ottawa-based CACOR members. 146   
In 1988, new CACOR President Erik Solem declared that the CACOR was forced 
to enter a new phase of operations. In a letter to Kenneth Hammond, Solem stated: 
“Aurelio Peccei cannot be resurrected, the big money is gone and government’s interest 
in [matters related to the Problematique] is spasmodic and erratic.”147 He added that there 
remained a need to continuously remind those in power of the importance of the ongoing 
Problematique and that CACOR with its past, it mandate and its membership was “as 
well poised as anyone” to provide that service in Canada.148 However the days of having 
the ear of government officials and of being able to use contacts to secure substantial 
funding for CACOR and COR initiatives had passed. In the post-1988 era, the Club of 
Rome and its Canadian Association had to operate on a smaller scale and in a different 
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The greatest time of influence enjoyed by COR/CACOR, and the time when 
holistic systems ideas were most prominent within federal bureaucratic circles, coincided 
with Michael Pitfield’s initial tenure as Clerk of the Privy Council Office from 1975 to 
1979. Personal relations played an important role in the dissemination of ideas. Pitfield 
was “a friend and close policy ally of Mr. Trudeau,” and he also established an ongoing 
dialogue with COR/CACOR member Rennie Whitehead.149 With the departure of Prime 
Minister Trudeau and Michael Pitfield from public life, two major COR/CACOR 
conduits of influence disappeared and were not replaced.  
Problems associated with losing key personal contacts within the federal civil 
service were amplified by the change of bureaucratic attitudes towards public policy 
development. The end of the Trudeau era also witnessed the emergence of monetarist 
economic philosophy that eschewed any interference with the dictates of free market. 
Political scientist Philip Resnick observed that the movement that spread of free market 
policy doctrine from the United Kingdom and the United States had “not left Canada 
unscarred.”150 It certainly also scarred both the COR and CACOR. The supplanting of 
ideas about the positivist state with the ability to help shape the future by an ideology 
professing the need for a minimalist state to allow market forces to dictate the future was 
highly detrimental to the Club of Rome’s, and it Canadian Association’s influence at the 
federal level. 
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Conclusion: The End of -- and Limits to -- Influence 
The last chapter brought to a close the narrative of the Club of Rome (COR), and 
its Canadian Association’s (CACOR) influential presence in Canada from 1968 to circa 
1988. That narrative did not present an exhaustive picture of the entire two-decade span 
in Canada’s political history but sufficient evidence from Canada and beyond was 
collected to show that the COR/CACOR enjoyed a special relationship, and had an 
influential presence, with Canadian public policy officials while Pierre Trudeau was 
Prime Minister. The dissertation further demonstrated that in this particular case, there 
were three key elements that led to the COR achieving an influential presence: like-
mindedness, political will and financial clout. 
Firstly, COR co-founder Aurelio Peccei and Trudeau were like-minded 
individuals who attracted other like-minded individuals to them and they also set the tone 
for their respective organizations. Both men shared common concerns and opinions on 
the state of the world and the dangerous course that humanity appeared to be on 
regarding the future sustainability of the planet. In Canada, Trudeau remained consistent 
in his opinion of the primacy the state as the sentinel of the national public interest. For 
Trudeau, rational public policy principles were the proper means to controlling and 
guiding the operations of the free market system. Peccei believed that left unfettered the 
free market system was not sustainable as it was not possible to have infinite expansion 
on a finite planet.  
Both Peccei and Trudeau were also idea patrons for the use of systems analysis 
and long-range thinking as the substratum upon which rational public policy was built. It 
was therefore no surprise to find that the Peccei-dominated COR and the Trudeau-
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dominated Canadian bureaucracy often shared common intellectual ground that led to 
synergistic energies being released. 
Closely connected to the first ingredient of like-mindedness was the element of 
political will. It was through the force of Aurelio Pecei’s personal will that the COR was 
driven. He spent a great deal of his time, energy and fortune on spreading both his own 
ideas and the ideas of others with whom he strongly concurred to world leaders and 
policy developers. However, as an unelected person, he was limited in terms of legitimate 
political power to turn ideas into political realities. In Canada the COR found a Prime 
Minister, Pierre Trudeau, who had sufficient convictions and political will to try and 
transform the public decision-making process from the substratum level of basic 
approaches to policy development. Hence Peccei and Trudeau were primary idea patrons 
with the convictions, and in the latter’s case the political power, to make things happen. 
The third key factor in COR’s influential presence was that of financial clout. In 
addition to being the prime intellectual and charismatic force within COR, Peccei was 
also its key financial backer. That backing enabled the organization to operate in its first 
sixteen years as “non-organization,” that is as a loose collection of similarly concerned 
renowned individuals who met, developed programs of research, and catalyzed funding 
for various initiatives without the benefit of established administrative structures or 
budgets. As an example, in Guelph, it is not likely that the 5000 Days course would have 
ever become a reality had it not been for the monetary support of Kenneth Hammond.  As 
owner of a multinational corporation, Hammond had the financial reserves to provide 
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conditional support to the University of Guelph and to insist on directing exactly where 
his contributions were to be spent.1 
At the Prime Ministerial level, it was Trudeau’s financial independence that had 
enabled him in his formative years to travel the world and become sensitized to the 
interrelated problems of the world, especially for people in the developing world. Beyond 
the individual level, Trudeau and his bureaucracy had access to vast public funds that 
were often used in direct and indirect support of COR/CACOR initiatives and the ideas 
they promoted. 
While like-mindedness, political will, and financial clout were three key elements 
of influence, they were not sufficient. Without the broad international and Canadian 
populist movements related to global problems, especially ecological concerns, it is not 
likely that the COR and its Canadian association would have been able to achieve an 
influential presence within Canada from 1968 to circa 1988. The COR’s and CACOR’s 
diverse membership was united by a common set of concerns known as the 
Problematique. The Problematique was an aggregate of virtually all the world’s problems 
that COR members such as Peccei believed were interconnected and ultimately 
threatening to humanity’s future on a finite planet.2  
Formed in 1974, the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome (CACOR) 
explained that the Problematique was: 
a concept created by the Club of Rome to describe the set of the 
crucial problems – political, social, economic, technological, 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Hammond Conversation with Author, March 2005. 
2 Aurelio Peccei, One Hundred Pages for the Future, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p.52. 
Clairborne Pell, “The Club of Rome – the New Threshold,” Congressional Record” Proceedings and 
Debates of the 93rd Congress, First Session, (Volume 119 No.43, March 20, 1973), p.1. 
Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, The First Global Revolution: A Report by the Council of The 
Club of Rome, (New York: Pantheon Books,1991), p. xviii. 
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environmental, psychological and cultural - facing humanity. The 
complexity of the world Problematique lies in the high level of 
mutual interdependence of all these problems on the one hand, and 
in the long time it often takes until the impact of action and 
reaction in this complex system becomes visible.3 
 
The concerns and issues that united the COR membership were not novel. For 
decades previously writers had been attempting to raise similar concerns with the general 
public and policy makers. In fact atomic scientist and environmentalist Harrison Brown’s 
1954 book, The Challenge of Man’s Future detailed much of what would be included in 
the Problematique. In the preface of the work, Brown stated that the survival of human 
civilization was dependent upon society being able to recognize existing problems, 
anticipate emerging ones, and develop solutions that were to be acceptable to society as a 
whole. He also believed that humanity had the ability to free itself “from the serious 
predicament” that was becoming evident. The key, according to Brown, was “an 
understanding of the relationships between man, his natural environment and his 
technology.”4  
Introducing themes that were to become integral to the definition of the 
Problematique, Brown concentrated on the key factors of population growth, impact of 
industrialization, North-South divide, food supply, energy, depletion of natural resources 
and possible collapse of modern industrial civilization.5 Nearly a decade later another 
writer, biologist Rachel Carson, piqued public interest in the relationship between 
                                                 
3 -- “World Problematique,” Canadian Association for the Club of Rome Newsletter, (Summer 2005), p.3. 
4 Harrison Brown, The Challenge of Man’s Future: An Inquiry Concerning the Condition of Man During 
the Years that Lie Ahead, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1954), pp.xi - xii. 
5 In subsequent years Brown joined the Club of Rome, an organization to which he was an unofficial 
progenitor. 
Brown, The Challenge, pp.8-17, pp.50-54, p.61, Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V, and  p.254.  
Mol Peter Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability: Futures Studies and the Environment: the Role of the 
Club of Rome, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1991), p.281. 
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humanity and nature through her seminal work Silent Spring. Carson warned that the 
reckless application of pesticides was not only often counterproductive, but often resulted 
in unintended consequences that imperilled species beyond the intended targets. Most 
disconcerting of Carson’s scientifically supported hypotheses was that ultimately humans 
were often directly and indirectly affected by the over-use of pesticides, frequently to 
their peril.  
Building upon Carson’s lead, a wide array of publications on humanity’s 
relationship to nature emerged and attracted a significant public following. In addition, 
several environmental disasters focussed public attention on ecological concerns with two 
sets of significant consequences. The first was the emergence of groups such as Pollution 
Probe, and the second was the creation of federal environment departments in the United 
States and Canada. While the preceding line of events is over-simplified, it gives an 
impression of the extent to which the general public and policy makers became 
increasingly aware of the importance of investigating and protecting the interrelationships 
between humanity and nature. Add into the mix works by individuals such as former 
Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson about the moral and economic importance of 
the Third World to the industrialised world and you have most of the scattered elements 
of the Problematique.  
What the COR achieved was to bring the disparate elements listed in the 
preceding two paragraphs together in the form of a quest to understand if and how the 
world’s problems were related. Then, in sponsoring a computer-based systems analysis 
project – The Limits to Growth – the COR provided illustrations, through graphs and 
mundane examples, of a variety of public concerns that had been expressed for a decade 
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or more.  It also appeared to provide scientific sanction to existing ecological concerns 
and, as the COR was a group of renowned academics, multinational businessmen, Nobel 
Prize winners and senior civil servants of note, the argument could not be easily 
dismissed by opponents as left-leaning lunacy.  
It is also important that the COR emerged at a time when loosely defined 
Keynesian ideas about a positive role for the state prevailed in the Canadian bureaucracy 
and beyond. If one or more of the broad societal conditions listed above had not been  
active, then it is not likely that the COR/CACOR could have enjoyed any success within 
Canada.  
 
Of the Persistence of Limits  
The cartoon below from artist Dan Piraro is a satirical glimpse into a possible 
future devoid of fossil fuels. Piraro’s cartoon image also speaks of the interconnected 
nature of energy and more basic societal issues, such as transportation, work and leisure. 
One could easily envision the broader national and international ramifications for present 
and future society if the fate of Mr and Mrs Fossil Fuel was to be visited upon the 
masses. It shows that reliance on finite energy supplies goes beyond being an 
environmental issue and encapsulates a significant part of modern life in the 
industrialised world, and one that is increasingly important in the developing world. 
However, the consequences of the developing world striving to achieve the living 
standards and luxuries of the developed world will only serve to place increasing pressure 
on a multitude of the earth’s finite resources.  
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Figure 2: Artist Dan Piraro, Used With Permission, September, 2005.6 
 
 Originally produced in 2004, Piraro’s cartoon continues the themes and warnings 
that were uttered by the Club of Rome (COR) and subsequently its Canadian Association 
(CACOR) in the late 1960s, throughout 1970s and into the 1980s. The seeming lack of 
significant advancement in coming to terms with the finitude of the earth’s resources 
during those years, in part, contributed to the sense of frustration felt by COR members. 
The years dragged on and their message of the need to take action to ensure future 
sustainability was ridiculed and dismissed in the media and academic circles as neo-
Malthusian doom mongering. While the persistence of Limits would make a fascinating 
dissertation topic unto itself, the Piraro work illustrates the extent to which the COR 
message of the need for anticipatory action before a crisis point is reached remains 
pertinent.  
 This dissertation explored a time in relatively recent history when similar 
concerns about the interconnected and finite nature of this planet were coming into 
                                                 
6 Dan Pirario, Emails to Author: 22 August 2005, 16 September 2005, and 21 September 2005. 
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sharper populist focus both internationally and in Canada. An important part of that 
growing consciousness was the publication in 1972 of The Limits to Growth. The report 
was the renowned or infamous, depending upon one’s perspective, and it told a story that 
could lead to Mr and Mrs Fossil Fuel’s doorstep. Subsequent generations of historians 
may come to describe the Club of Rome as either alarmists or as Cassandra’s heirs.7  
 However, the COR was not inherently negative or cynical about humanity and the 
future.  Neither of the COR co-founders, Aurelio Peccei or Alexander King, nor their 
acquaintances who were invited to join their exclusive group, were pessimists in the late 
1960s. The COR was predicated upon a common belief that humanity had the collective 
ability to shape the future. With sufficient study, dedication, political will and ingenuity it 
would be possible to chart a flexible course to ensure the Earth’s sustainability for future 
generations. COR members further believed that a relatively small group - maximum 
number of COR members was to be 100 – could enact substantive attitudinal change 
towards how policy makers around the world conceptualised issues and solutions. To 
properly appreciate the complexity   and impact of policy decisions a holistic-long-range 
perspective was required. 8 
                                                 
7 In Greek mythology Cassandra was a prophetesses who had the ability to foresee the future, but because 
she reneged on a promise to sleep with the god Appolo, she was placed under a curse that meant no one 
ever believed her prophesies, all of which in time proved correct. 
Greece Info,  “Cassandra,” Who’s Who in Greek Mythology, 
http://www.in2greece.com/english/historymyth/mythology/names/cassandra.htm (accessed 19 December 
2005). 
William Smith (editor), “Cassandra,” in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities Volume 1, (NL: 
1870, http://www.ancientlibrary.com/smith-bio/0630.html, accessed 19 December 2005), p.621.  
8 In a similar manner to how the COR was not an inherently pessimistic organization, The Limits to Growth 
was not an inherently pessimistic publication. It reflected deep concerns about the path being followed by 
humanity and the ability of the earth to continue to sustain contemporary activities related to growth. That, 
however, was only part of the broader message being related the by MIT team of researchers. Limits was as 
much an invitation to further inquiry and deeper thinking about consequences of contemporary decisions on 
subsequent generations as it was about trends and likely difficulties if attitudes and actions did not change. 
The introduction invited researchers from around the world to join “in understanding and preparing for a 
period of great transition – the transition from growth to global equilibrium.” Unfortunately for the 
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 The COR’s hope and belief in humanity’s ability to shape the future led it to be a 
champion of the use of holistic long-range systems analysis as a tool for policy 
development. As mentioned the first and most powerful exploration of a new approach to 
global issues was through the Limits to Growth. The Limits shock wave previously 
mentioned reached Canada as well. In Ottawa “it created quite a stir” according to key 
aide to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Ivan Head.9  The intellectual disturbance was not 
caused by the book’s message, but rather due to its use of novel computer based 
technology and its use of holistic systems analysis. The policy approach being advocated 
by the COR met with an appreciative audience at the apex of Canadian public policy. 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, some key bureaucrats such as Michael Pitfield, Ivan 
Head, Rennie Whitehead, Tom de Fayer and some other key political figures such as 
Senator Maurice Lamontagne and cabinet minister Allistair Gillespie viewed the COR in 
a favourable light and followed its activities and pronouncements with interest.  
 In addition to having supporters within key Canadian decision-making structures, 
the COR benefited from having Senator Maurice Lamontage as both a COR member and 
as a critical idea patron. After a short troubled political career as a cabinet minister in 
Lester Pearson’s government, Lamontagne found new political life in the Senate 
Chamber. He quickly established himself as an intellectual and public policy force. As 
Chairman of the Special Senate Committee on Science Policy, called the Lamontagne 
Committee, the senator was provided with a platform from which to explore and promote 
                                                                                                                                                 
Meadows’ team and for their main sponsors, the COR, the basic argument that unless things changed, 
global economic growth would come to an end within a century was sufficiently disturbing and antithetical 
to establishing attitudes and cherished beliefs that other messages and invitations in the publication failed to 
register on the populist radar. 
Donella H Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to 
Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, (Washington: Potomac 
Associates, 1972), p.29. 
9 Ivan Head, Conversation with Author, February 2004. 
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the greater use of systems analysis in the decision-making process. It was also an 
opportunity to emphasise COR preoccupations with the need for holistic future-minded 
perspective in the development of public policy. The key output from his chairmanship of 
the committee was the creation of the Ministry of State for Science and Technology 
(MOSST). 
 Once in operation, MOSST provided an important distribution point for Club of 
Rome publications, including conference proceedings and papers. It also became a 
conduit through which COR/CACOR-supported initiatives, such as the Foundation for 
International Training in Toronto, came to fruition. The unofficial and informal MOSST-
COR/CACOR partnership was facilitated and nurtured by individuals such as Rennie 
Whitehead and his assistant John Bradley, who were members of both organizations. It 
was common interest and common perspective that led to a symbiotic relationship 
developing between the COR, its Canadian Association (CACOR), and the federal 
government.  The special relationship was especially evident in MOSST but also existed 
within the Department of the Environment (DOE) where key CACOR individuals held 
positions of influence. For example, CACOR member and Senior Policy Analyst in the 
DOE Tom de Fayer was instrumental in securing federal funding to support the 
publication of two CACOR-sponsored initiatives: Global 2000: Implications for Canada 




                                                 
10 Gerald O. Barney, Global 2000: Implications for Canada, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
Roder D. Voyer and Mark G. Murphy, Global 2000: Canada A View of Canadian Economic 
Development Prospects, Resources and the Environment, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1984). 
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The End of Influence 
Both the COR and the CACOR suffered a withering of fervour and influence as 
time progressed. COR optimism waned, in part, due to a failure of political will on the 
global geo-political stage to implement strategies to ensure a sustainable future for 
humanity. Within the organization, as well as within its Canadian counterpart, there were 
internal failures to implement measures to create a sustainable future. Aurelio Peccei and 
other COR members became convinced that humanity would not take action until a crisis 
point was reached.  At that point, the ability to take ameliorative actions would be greatly 
reduced. The longer humanity waited to take action, the more limited it options for action 
would become.  
In 1980 Aurelio Peccei wrote that despite the efforts of the COR, the world 
condition and willingness to confront the critical issues related to the future had 
deteriorated. He was no longer confident that ameliorative measures would be enacted in 
advance of a crisis situation. At the crisis point humanity would be in the 
disadvantageous position of having to react with a limited capacity for action. Peccei 
wrote in 1980, that ten years previously  
the Club of Rome predicted that bad social management, the wasting of 
resources, widespread pollution, and rapid overpopulation would 
eventually strangle our civilization. Few people listened. We now have 
increasing violence, fewer energy resources, military buildups, more 
economic difficulties and continuing overpopulation…. Today the world 
begins more and more to resemble a ricocheting  bullet as it careens from 
disaster to disaster…. I have pretty well given up predicting what will 
happen unless we act. The Club of Rome now concentrates instead on 
what may happen if present circumstances prevail. 
We are heading for a desperate situation here… When people’s 
basic needs are not being met, there will be increased social tension, more 
civil and military violence… practically everything will be 
unmanageable…. If we continue to burn tropical forests down to make 
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way for highways and settlements, and to cut them down to produce 
lumber, we will be destroying the very basis of life and food.11  
 
Similarly, the other COR co-founder, Alexander King, said in 1987 that 
governments were only prepared to implement cosmetic measures, to act as ad hoc 
firefighters charging from crisis to crisis with no real holistic plan of action over the long 
term. He added that the situation appeared unlikely to change until humanity was forced 
through a cataclysmic crisis to confront systemic problems of unfettered economic 
growth on a finite plant with finite resources and finite absorption capacities.12 Limits to 
Growth project leader Dennis Meadows bluntly said during a 2004 conversation for this 
dissertation, “Look, we are still rushing towards the limits and nothing is to be done 
about it until the crisis becomes reality… then it will be too late.”13 
In Canada, disillusionment for Trudeau and his followers with being able to shape 
the future was more associated with pragmatic electoral politics than broad geo-political 
realities.  Trudeau accomplished significant social and rights goals in enshrining the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1982 Constitution. However, in terms of 
                                                 
11 Interestingly enough, the 15th October 2005 issue of New Scientist had a feature article on concerns over 
the increasing intensity of deforestation in the Amazon. There are now proposals in the works to build 
highways into pristine Amazon forests to facilitate settlement, logging and farming. Scientist William 
Laurance of the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute has conducted extensive surveys and is issuing 
warnings that are Pecceiesque in tenor. Laurance says that he does not believe the Amazon to be a lost 
cause, but action needs to be taken soon and tough choices have to be made as “Decisions made in the next 
decade will profoundly affect the balance between peril and preservation.” Since 1990, Laurence reported 
cattle production had tripled from 20 million head to 60 million head, land for soya operations doubled 
from 10 million hectares to 20 million hectares and “Timber cutting has grown exponentially.” In 2000 
razed alone, developers raised three million hectares of Amazonian forests mainly to facilitate cattle 
ranching operations. The current rate of forest destruction “is roughly equivalent to an area the size of New 
York’s Central Park disappearing every hour, or Belgium being razed and burnt each year.” 
Aurelio Peccei, “The Challenge of the ’80s,” in Frank Feather (editor), Through the ‘80s: Thinking 
Globally, Acting Locally, (Washington: World Future Society, 1980), pp.430-431. 
William Laurance, “Razing Amazonia,”” New Scientist, (15 October 2005), pp.35-39. 
12 Alexander King, “The Great Transition: Speech Delivered to the Sanford Fleming Foundation 5 June 
1987,” (Waterloo: Sanford Fleming Foundation, University of Waterloo, 1987). 
13 Dennis Meadows, Conversation with Author, January 2004. 
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economics, the Trudeau era had its difficulties. A series of energy shocks led to strong 
inflationary pressures affecting the economy. At the same time unemployment levels also 
rose. The new phenomenon was termed “stagflation”; it meant economic stagnation 
amidst high inflation.  
The traditional approach to macro-economic policy broadly followed the 
suggestion of famous British economist from the early twentieth century, Lord Keynes. 
Yet stagflation (period of high inflation and high unemployment) was not possible within 
the Keynesian system. The economic problems of the 1970s severely harmed Trudeau’s 
popularity. They also watered the seeds of a new macro-economic approach to policy 
development that, in lieu of a strong government presence, popularly preached the virtues 
of reliance on free market forces as arbitrators of public policy. A devotion to market-
based instruments to determine public policy implied the freeing of capital and fostered a 
belief that markets were the solution to any policy problem needing to be addressed. The 
belief in unfettered economic growth as a cure for the world’s ills was antithetical to the 
core COR message that infinite growth was not possible on a finite planet and unfettered 
growth was inherently unsustainable for future generations.  
In Canada, the clash of philosophic approaches to policy development meant 
market-sceptics such as the CACOR/COR were supplanted and submerged.14 However, 
by the mid-to-late 1980s the dark clouds over COR and CACOR were not all due to 
paradigm shifts in the world of political philosophy. The organizations also faced serious 
                                                 
14 Right wing ideas emanating from groups such as the Fraser Institute and the C.D. Howe Institute came to 
popular prominenece. The case of the latter illustrates how far popular opinion shifted in Canada over a 
brief three-decade span of time. C.D. Howe President Robert Fowler played a critical role in the 
establishment and early running of the Canadian Association for the Club of Rome in 1974. However, three 
decades later his Institute disavowed any knowledge of Fowler’s CACOR involvement and argued that the 
C.D. Howe Institute had always opposed ideas such as the ones presented by the Club of Rome. 
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internal problems. Problems such as funding, internal divisions, lack of an heir-apparent 
were largely masked while COR co-founder, president and unquestioned leader Aurelio 
Peccei was alive. In March of 1984, Peccei’s unexpected death sent both COR and 
CACOR into crisis. The COR decided to continue, but to do so, it had to sacrifice some 
of its informal operations. Peccei had often used his personal wealth, and his personal 
secretaries, to cover many COR administrative costs and logistics. He also was able to 
use his vast charismatic powers of persuasion to convince other persons of influence to 
support COR initiatives and meetings. For the COR, Peccei was simply irreplaceable. 
Alexander King assumed the COR Presidency, but the COR’s spark and brilliance were 
interred with Peccei. 
Meanwhile Peccei’s death also had profound implications in Canada, where 
CACOR issues with membership, program of work and financing came to the fore and 
threatened to tear the group asunder. A combination of budgetary changes within 
government and elsewhere and a lack of sustained contact with a changing federal 
bureaucracy meant the in direct support of CACOR activities, such as travel funding, 
were reduced. The result was the contraction of the organization. By the late 1980s, the 
CACOR had become predominantly an Ottawa-based discussion group. There were still 
significant activities by individual members outside Ottawa, but in general the 
organization stagnated in Canada’s national capital.  
Former science advisor to successive Environment Ministers Keith Ronald said 
that once Trudeau left office, the COR/CACOR lost its clout within the federal 
bureaucracy.15 A further CACOR problem was the fact that new contacts were not made 
within the federal civil service to replace contacts lost through deaths and retirements. In 
                                                 
15 Keith Ronald, Conversation with Author, April 2005. 
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1988 Alexander King announced he was stepping down as COR President and the then 
CACOR President said in a letter to Hammond that CACOR had been forced to retrench 
and was shifting operations to essentially ride the coattails of individual members 
involved in initiatives deemed appropriate to furthering study in and finding solutions to, 
the Problematique.  For both organizations the curtain had fallen. The respective stories 
of COR and CACOR after 1988 would be of a new era and new challenges and are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 
The Limits to Influence 
The limits of influence were, ultimately, two-fold: time and circumstance. Time 
aged the COR/CACOR members and their bureaucratic contacts. Retirements, ill health 
and death meant a loss of key COR/CACOR contacts. COR/CACOR bureaucratic 
contacts were not replenished. In addition key COR/CACOR concerns such as systems 
analysis, computer-based modelling and interconnected global issues were exotic cutting-
edge ideas in the early years of this study. By the mid-1980s, such concepts and tools had 
become mundane and/or discredited in popular and bureaucratic cultures. 
Time also witnessed a political intellectual paradigm shift that fundamentally 
altered the circumstances that had enabled COR/CACOR to develop an influential 
presence. A shift in political ideology tore asunder COR/ CACOR admonitions to 
acknowledge the limits of physical economic expansion on a finite planet and to maintain 
a holistic long-range perspective in policy development. Such ideas may have appeared 
cogent during an era when Keynesian economics, in both their pure and watered-down 
manifestations, were respected. However by the market-driven mid-to late 1980s and 
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afterwards such ideas were antithetical to a new monetarist doctrine that preached of the 
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